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ABSTRACT 
This research project was initiated in response to concerns held by the author on aspects 
of the European Community (EC) internal market. These concerns applied particularly 
to what was understood at the time to be the perceptions of EC internal market 
practitioners; their perceptions on the process of EC internal market technical legislative 
change and on how well the EC internal market was functioning. 
A literature review was undertaken to determine if, and if so where, the EC internal 
market technical legislative change process was defined and to determine which 
organisations were the important players in the process. The literature review was then 
extended to determine more about the players in the process and the information 
exchanges between the defined process and individuals, such as EC internal market 
practitioners, having a legitimate interest in the process. Also within the literature 
review the views of other commentators are noted and assessed. 
A methodological review was undertaken. This review gave rise to the formulation of a 
structured interview that was applied to a purposive sample of EC internal market 
practitioners. Two main areas were examined via the structured interview. The first 
was the knowledge of the overall EC internal market technical legislative change 
process and of its main players. The second area was the perception of the 
completeness of the functioning of the EC internal market possessed by EC internal 
market practitioners. 
This research concludes that there are a number of flaws in the treaty establishing the 
European Community; this is the treaty that includes the high level description of the 
EC internal market technical legislative process. One of these flaws particularly affects 
the EC internal market technical legislative process. The research also concludes that 
the application of the treaty is not consistent and that the knowledge of the EC internal 
market technical legislative process exhibited by EC internal market practitioners is 
poor. Based on the conclusions a number of recommendations are made. 
Acknowledgements 
The path to a PhD for a distant, part time student is, in my experience, not the easiest of 
paths to follow. The academic difficulties were overcome with guidance from my 
Director of Studies, Professor Abby Ghobadian, and my Second Supervisor, Penny 
Kent - each of their contributions to my progress is acknowledged. 
Also of great importance has been the forbearance and support from my family, in 
particular my partner Cheryl Thompson. On a number of occasions I needed to be 
rescued from my information technology follies, here my special thanks for his skills 
and patience to Mark Rogers. 
My thanks too go to those who gave of their time to be interviewed and to friends and 
colleagues who listened to me, discussed with me and oftentimes gave me welcome 
encouragement to navigate the whole path. 
Terry Rogers 
June 2004 
i 
CONTENTS 
List of Tables v 
List of Figures V111 
Definitions x 
Abbreviations XlI 
1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Background 1 
1.2 Research problem 2 
1.2.1 Theoretical problem 3 
1.2.2 Practical problem 5 
1.3 Justification for the research 5 
1.3.1 Aim of the investigation 8 
1.3.2 Activities in support ofthe aim and objectives 8 
1.4 Contribution to knowledge 10 
1.5 Methodology 11 
1.6 Definitions 12 
1.7 Delimitation of scope 14 
1.8 Outline of thesis 16 
1.9 Summary 18 
2 The law making process 19 
2.1 Introduction 19 
2.2 European Community primary legislation 19 
2.2.1 European Community institutions 20 
2.2.2 European Community internal market Treaty Articles 24 
2.2.3 Membership of European Community institutions 28 
2.2.3.1 The Commission 29 
2.2.3.2 The Council 31 
2.2.3.3 The European Parliament 32 
2.2.3.4 The Economic and Social Committee 33 
2.2.3.5 Summary 34 
2.2.4 Languages of the European Union 35 
2.2.4.1 Authentic languages of the treaties 36 
2.2.4.2 Official languages and working languages 39 
2.2.4.3 A complication 41 
2.2.4.4 Summary 46 
2.3 Interactions involving the European Community 48 
institutions 
2.3.1 The Official Journal of the European Communities 49 
2.3.2 The formal interactions between the institutions 51 
(Category 1) 
2.3.3 The interactions bounded by the institutions - the internal 56 
processes (Category 2) 
2.3.3.1 The Commission 56 
2.3.3.2 The Council 58 
2.3.3.3 The European Parliament 63 
2.3.3.4 The Economic and Social Committee 64 
2.3.3.5 Summary 65 
ii 
2.3.4 The interactions of each institution with Member State 66 
governments and with other organisations andlor 
individuals (Category 3) 
2.3.4.1 The Commission 66 
2.3.4.2 The Council 67 
2.3.4.3 The European Parliament 68 
2.3.4.4 The Economic and Social Committee 69 
2.3.4.5 Summary 69 
2.4 An extended system 69 
2.5 Summary 71 
3 Literature survey and review 73 
3.1 Introduction 73 
3.2 European Community institution literature 75 
3.2.1 The 'official' view of the internal market 75 
3.2.2 EU institutional comments on the official view of the 86 
internal market 
3.2.2.1 The Council 86 
3.2.2.2 The European Parliament 89 
3.2.2.3 The Economic and Social Committee 95 
3.2.3 EU institution procedures 99 
3.3 N on European Community institution literature 103 
3.3.1 Journals and books 103 
3.3.2 Professional and trade literature 122 
3.4 UK processes related to EC institution processes 124 
3.5 Commentary on the literature 125 
3.5.1 The law making process 125 
3.5.1.1 The process 125 
3.5.1.2 Language 131 
3.5.1.3 The Official Journal 132 
3.5.2 EC institutional and non-institutional literature 133 
3.6 Summary 143 
4 Methodology 144 
4.1 Introduction 144 
4.2 Methodology rationale 144 
4.2.1 Fieldwork or secondary data? 149 
4.2.2 Fieldwork - what approaches were considered and 149 
adopted? 
4.2.2.1 Focus groups 150 
4.2.2.2 Action research 150 
4.2.2.3 Participant observation 151 
4.2.2.4 Self-completion questionnaires 153 
4.2.2.5 Interviews 155 
4.2.2.6 Evaluations (Tests of the system) 157 
4.3 Research procedures 158 
4.3.1 The Structured Interview 159 
4.3.2 Tests ofthe system 166 
4.3.2.1 Test related to the authority of an EC institution 167 
4.3.2.2 Tests requiring a simple reply 168 
4.3.2.3 Tests requiring an explanatory reply 169 
4.3.2.4 Test of the European Ombudsman's complaint system 174 
iii 
4.3.3 Participant observation 175 
4.3.3.1 UK trade association (PPMAIFEF) meetings with 176 
National Weights and Measures Laboratory (NWML) 
4.3.3.2 European trade association meetings (CECOD) 177 
4.3.3.3 Western European Cooperation on Legal Metrology 178 
(WELMEC) 
4.3.3.4 European trade association meeting with European 180 
Commission officials 
4.3.3.5 UK trade associations meeting with NWML 180 
4.4 Ethical considerations 181 
4.4.1 General 182 
4.4.2 Consent 184 
4.4.3 Withdrawal 185 
4.4.4 Confidentiality 186 
4.5 Summary 187 
5. Findings and analysis 189 
5.1 Introduction 189 
5.2 Fieldwork 190 
5.2.1 Structured interview 190 
5.2.1.1 Overview of sample (Part A of Structured Interview) 190 
5.2.1.2 EC internal market legislative change process knowledge 194 
exhibited by the respondents (Part B of Structured 
Interview) 
5.2.1.3 Perception of the internal market (Part C of Structured 204 
Interview) 
5.2.1.4 Understanding of harmonised standards (Part D of 213 
Structured Interview) 
5.2.1.5 Suggestions for improvements to the process (Part E of 220 
Structured Interview) 
5.2.1.6 Structured Interview times 225 
5.2.2 Tests of the system 225 
5.2.3 Participant observation 228 
5.3 Findings in relation to research aims 229 
5.4 Summary 237 
6. Conclusions 239 
6.1 Introduction 239 
6.2 Conclusions from the research findings 240 
6.2.1 The top level process 240 
6.2.2 Second level involvement 243 
6.2.3 Strategic management of the European Community 245 
6.2.4 Management of European Community affairs by the 247 
Commission 
6.2.4.1 Distortion of the internal market 247 
6.2.4.2 Transposition deficit 248 
6.2.4.3 Other enforcement action 249 
6.2.4.4 Notification 249 
6.2.5 Activities of those outside of the European Community 249 
institutions 
6.2.5.1 Internal market practitioners 249 
6.2.5.2 The Trade press 250 
iv 
6.3 Conclusions about the research problem 250 
6.4 Limitations 251 
6.5 Recommendations 252 
6.5.1 To European Community and Member State legislators 252 
6.5.2 To internal market practitioners 253 
6.5.3 To commentators 253 
6.5.4 General 254 
6.6 Suggestions for further work 254 
6.7 Summary 255 
Appendix I Chronological list of European Union and European 256 
Community major legislative events 
Appendix II The Structured Interview 263 
Appendix III Introductory letter 396 
Appendix IV EC training document 399 
Appendix V Decision letter from European Ombudsman 322 
Consolidated references 308 
v 
List of Tables 
1.1 Showing the relationship between the aims and the supporting 9 
activities 
2.1 Indicating the introduction, change or re-affirmation of EC 23 
institutions by the treaties 
2.2 Summary of EC institutions 24 
2.3 Articles of importance to the internal market and their main 24 
provIsIOns 
2.4 Development of current Articles of importance to the internal 25 
market 
2.5 Correspondence between selected Articles of the Consolidated 26 
Version of Treaty of Amsterdam and the EC institutions 
identified 
2.6 EC institutions and EC institutions identified for the EC 26 
internal market 
2.7 EC institutions involved in the EC internal market technical 28 
legislative process 
2.8 Constitution and Membership of the Commission 29 
2.9 Constitution and Membership of the Council 31 
2.10 Constitution and Membership of the European Parliament 32 
2.11 Constitution and Membership of the Economic and Social 33 
Committee 
2.12 Authentic languages of Treaties 38 
2.13 Official languages and working languages 40 
2.14 Languages available on EC institution websites 43 
2.15 List of Member States with their national language and its 44 
abbreviation 
2.16 Comparison of official and working languages and their 45 
abbreviations as used by the various EC institutions 
2.17 Categories of interactions involving EC institutions 48 
2.18 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the 57 
Commission 
2.19 Historical development of the Commission's Rules of 58 
Procedure 
2.20 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the Council 59 
2.21 Historical development of the Council's Rules of Procedure 60 
2.22 A review of addressees of Council Decisions 61 
2.23 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the 63 
European Parliament 
2.24 Historical development of the European Parliament's Rules of 64 
Procedure 
2.25 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the 64 
Economic and Social Committee 
2.26 Historical development of the Economic and Social 65 
Committee's Rules of Procedure 
vi 
3.1 Indicating correspondence between aspects of Commission, 91 
Council and European Parliament structures 
3.2 Summary of information on EC institution Rules of Procedure 100 
3.3 Indicating how people become members of the institutions 127 
actively involved with the internal market technical legislative 
change process 
4.1 Link between 'Activities in support of the Objectives' and 165 
Fieldwork 
4.2 Measurement of Concepts 166 
4.3 Indicating replies from enquiries 171 
5.1 The distribution ofthe sample as a function of job function 191 
5.2 The distribution of the sample as a function of initial 191 
professional training 
5.3 Tabulation of the sample's response as to how they were 192 
trained for their current job function 
5.4 Tabulation of responses about method by which specialist 192 
training was received 
5.5 Tabulation of responses about value ofEC internal market 193 
technical legislative process training 
5.6 The number of responses for each of the European Union 
Institutions and number of incorrect responses 195 
5.7 The number of responses for the various incorrect organisations 196 
quoted as being European Union Institutions 
5.8 A consolidation of Table 5.8 into Types of Organisation 196 
Incorrectly Quoted as European Union Institutions 
5.9 The number of responses for each of the European Community 197 
Institutions and number of incorrect responses 
5.10 Types of Organisation Incorrectly Quoted as European 198 
Community Institutions 
5.11 Median scores achieved when self-assessing knowledge of how 199 
people become members of various EC institutions 
5.12 Number of exaggerated claims of knowledge of how people 200 
become members of EC institutions 
5.13 Distribution of responses about the formal description of the 201 
EC internal market technical legislative process 
5.14 Distribution of responses to the question 'Who has 202 
responsibility for ensuring proposals for change are known? 
5.15 Distribution of response to the question 'How do proposals 203 
normally become known? 
5.16 Distribution of responses on input points for views on 204 
proposals 
5.17 Measurement of concept of completeness of the EC internal 204 
market 
5.18 Distribution of individual respondents' aggregate scores 208 
relating to their perception of the completeness of the EC 
internal market 
5.19 Summary of comments made by respondents when asked to 211 
identify the difficult aspects of directives 
5.20 Assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming full 215 
knowledge of the special status of harmonised standards 
vii 
5.21 Assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming partial 215 
knowledge of the special status of harmonised standards 
5.22 Aggregate assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming 216 
full or partial knowledge of the special status ofharmonised 
standards 
5.23 The number of times each of the standards bodies who may 217 
prepare harmonised standards was identified 
5.24 Assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming full or 218 
partial knowledge of how the standards bodies authorised to 
prepare harmonised standards obtain their authority to do the 
work 
5.25 Aggregate assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming 219 
full or partial knowledge of the process by which a European 
standard can attain the special status of harmonised standard 
5.26 Responses to a request to suggest process improvements 221 
5.27 Responses to a request to suggest ways to improve availability 224 
of enforcement information 
viii 
List of Figures 
1.1 The cone of refinement of data through the thesis 17 
2.1 Procedure of Article 251 (Codecision) as modified by Article 52 
95 
2.2 Diagrammatic representation of an extended system 70 
3.1 Showing the internal market construct and the legislative forces 107 
acting on it 
3.2 Showing information flows for the 98/34IEC notification 113 
procedure 
5.1 The number of respondents as a function of the number of EC 194 
new approach technical harmonization directives affecting their 
work 
5.2 The number of respondents as a function of the number of EU 195 
Institutions correctly named 
5.3 The number of respondents as a function of the number of EC 198 
Institutions correctly named 
5.4 The number of respondents claiming knowledge of how people 199 
become members ofEC institutions (Commissioners, 
Commission officials, Members of Council, Economic & 
Social Committee and European Parliament) 
5.5 Distribution of responses to the request for opinion of the 200 
statement 'The EC internal market technical legislative process 
is a process that is formally described somewhere. ' 
5.6 Distribution of responses to a self-assessment of knowledge of 201 
the EC internal market technical legislative process 
5.7 Distribution of response of attempts to modify any proposals 203 
for change 
5.8 Distribution of responses for Questions C.1 - C.4 205 
5.9 Distribution of responses for Questions C.8 and C.1 0 207 
5.10 Aggregate distribution of responses for Questions C.1 - C.4, 208 
C.8 & C.10 
5.11 Response to requests for opinion of the statement 'The 209 
introduction of new, or modified directives, never provides any 
problems.' 
5.12 Response to requests for opinion of the statement' Some 210 
aspects of EC internal market new approach technical 
harmonization directives are more difficult to deal with than 
others.' 
5.13 Response to the question 'In your experience are the difficult 212 
aspects that you have just described similar from one directive 
to another directive?' 
5.14 Response to requests for opinion of the statement 'More recent 213 
EC internal market technical legislation is simpler than earlier 
EC internal market technical legislation. ' 
5.15 Distribution of responses to the request for opinion of the 214 
statement' All relevant standards are of value.' 
ix 
5.16 Distribution of responses to the request for opinion of the 214 
statement 'European standards are of value in relation to 
internal market new approach technical harmonisation 
directives. ' 
5.17 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of 215 
the special status of 'harmonised standards' 
5.18 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of 216 
which standards bodies are authorised to prepare harmonised 
standards 
5.19 Distribution of number of correctly identified standards bodies 217 
for those respondents claiming more than 'Complete 
Ignorance' of which standards bodies are authorised to prepare 
harmonised standards 
5.20 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of 218 
how the standards bodies authorised to prepare harrnonised 
standards obtain this authority 
5.21 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of 218 
the process by which a standard can attain the special status of 
harmonised standard 
5.22 Distribution of actual Structured Interview times 225 
Definitions 
EC internal market technical legislation is a sub-set of EC secondary legislation in the 
form of directives. 
x 
EC internal market technical legislative process may either create legislation for an area 
previously without legislation or may amend existing legislation 
EC secondary legislation is legislation adopted through the application of any of the 
appropriate processes included in the EU primary legislation. 
EU primary legislation is taken to be the treaties. 
Internal market practitioner - a person who deals with one or more aspects of the EC 
internal market on a daily basis. They may work, for example, as enforcement officials, 
legislators, or in manufacturing industry and may possess backgrounds that include 
engineering, law and science. EU officials, or Member State government officials 
acting in an EU capacity, are not included within this definition. 
Process - A process consists of a sequence of steps which transforms information from 
an initial state (input) to a final state (output). 
Born G, 1994, Process Management to Quality Improvement, Wiley 
Rapporteur - within each of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee much of the work is done within committees. A Rapporteur is the member 
of a committee who is responsible for drawing up a report on a matter referred to that 
committee or examined by that committee on its own initiative. 
Bainbridge T, 1998, The Penguin Companion to EUROPEAN UNION, Second Edition, 
Penguin, London 
User group (Groups of users) - this is a group of 'users ofEC internal market technical 
legislation' each with similar interests in the legislation, e.g. manufacturers 
User ofEC internal market technical legislation - manufacturers, certification 
organisations, Member State legislators and enforcement officials are, within the 
context of this thesis, each a user of legislation. 
xi 
Abbreviations 
BSI 
CECOD 
CECIP 
CEN 
CENELEC 
DDA 
DTI 
EC 
EEC 
ECJ 
EDC 
EFTA 
EIC 
EP 
ESC 
ETSI 
EU 
FEF 
MCD 
MEP 
MID 
NWML 
OJ 
OJEC 
OJEU 
PPMA 
SEA 
SLIM 
STRD 
TEU 
VOC 
WELMEC 
British Standards Institution 
European petrol pump manufacturers' association 
European weighing equipment manufacturers' association 
European standardisation organisation - non-electrical 
European standardisation organisation - electrical 
Disability Discrimination Act 
Department of Trade and Industry 
European Community 
European Economic Community 
European Court of Justice 
European Documentation Centre 
European Free Trade Area 
European Information Centre 
European Parliament 
Economic and Social Committee 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
European Union 
Forecourt Equipment Federation 
Machinery Directive 
Member of European Parliament 
Measuring Instruments Directive 
National Weights and Measures Laboratory 
Official Journal 
Official Journal of the European Community 
Official Journal of the European Union 
Petrol Pump Manufacturers Association 
Single European Act 
Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market 
Standards and Technical Regulations Directorate 
Treaty on European Union 
Volatile Organic Compounds 
Western European cooperation on legal metrology 
xii 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Most manufactured products legitimately on sale within the European Community 
(EC) 1 are subj ect to provisions of pervasive EC internal market technicallegislation2. 
Responsible manufacturers of products that are subject to EC internal market technical 
legislation have therefore, as a business imperative, a requirement for their products to 
comply with the appropriate technical legislation. To ensure that products can be 
manufactured in compliance with the appropriate technical legislation the technical 
legislation must be known. However, the technical legislative environment applicable 
to products for sale within the EC is subject to continual change. An example of such 
continual change is available from even a cursory review of the history of changes to 
the machinery directive (MCDl There have been three amendments to the MCD4,5,6. 
Subsequent to the issue of these amendments the MCD text has been consolidated and 
re-issued7 in a form that repeals the original text as amended. 
1 
The existence of the sequence of change illustrated above demonstrates that responsible 
manufacturers of products have a requirement to track the EC internal market technical 
legislative process to ensure that their knowledge of internal market technical legislation 
remains current. Knowledge of current internal market technical legislation is essential 
but, by itself, is not sufficient to ensure survival in the market place. Information is 
needed by manufacturers to warn them of, and provide them with details about, likely 
future and actual changes to the EC internal market technical legislative environment. 
1 The reader is referred to the list of Abbreviations on page xii for abbreviations used throughout this text 
2 The reader is referred to the list of Definitions on page x 
3 Council directive of 14 June 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
machinery (89/392/EEC), OJ 1989 L 183/9-32 
4 Council directive of20 June 1991 amending directive 89/3921EEC on the approximation to the laws of 
the Member States relating to machinery (911368IEEC), OJ 1991 L198/16-32 
5 Council directive 93/44/EEC of 14 June 1993 amending directive 89/392/EEC on the approximation to 
the laws of the Member States relating to machinery, OJ 1993 L 175/12-20 
6 Council directive 93/68/EEC of22 July 1993 amending Directives 87/4041EEC (simple pressure 
vessels), 88/3781EEC (safety of toys), 89/1061EEC (construction products), 89/3361EEC (electromagnetic 
compatibility), 89/392/EEC (machinery), 89/686/EEC (personal protective equipment), 90/3841EEC 
(non-automatic weighing instruments), 90/3851EEC (active implantable medicinal devices), 90/3961EEC 
(appliances burning gaseous fuels), 91/2631EEC (telecommunications terminal equipment), 92/421EEC 
(new hot-water boilers fired with liquid or gaseous fuels), and 73/231EEC (electrical equipment designed 
for use within certain voltage limits), OJ 1993 L 220/1-22 
7 Directive 98/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery [Machinery directive], OJ 1998 L 
207/1-46 
2 
Failure of access to, or failure to act upon, such information may mean that from time to 
time any given manufacturer's products become unsaleable within the EC as a result of 
non-compliance with new internal market technical legislation. 
The research reported here investigates the processes whereby European Community 
internal market technical legislation is created. This may be in an area previously 
without EC legislation or it may be updating existing EC internal market legislation. 
It is worthwhile to include here a brief clarification of the terminology frequently 
encountered with regard to Europe. The two references most frequently encountered 
are European Union (EU) and European Community (EC). The European Union came 
into being following the ratification, by all of the then Member States of the European 
Economic Communities, ofthe Treaty on European Union8. The Treaty on European 
Union reflected a closer integration of the Member States and established a basis for 
cooperation in areas beyond that of the initial aim of creating a common market. For 
the purposes of this research it is sufficient to recognise that what was the European 
Economic Communities became the European Community within the European Union. 
The European Community is often referred to as the first pillar (Craig and de Burca, 
1998)(Roney, 1998) of the European Union. The second pillar of the European Union is 
concerned with Common Foreign and Security Policy, the third pillar relates to Justice 
and Home Affairs. Within this research no further significant references are made to 
the second and third pillars of the European Union. 
1.2 Research problem 
The internal market of the European Community is defined in Article 14 (2) of the 
Consolidated Version ofthe Treaty Establishing the European Community9. For ease of 
reference the text of this paragraph of Article 14 is reproduced below: 
'2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. ' 
8 Treaty on European Union [Maastricht Treaty], OJ 1992 C 191/1-67 
9 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 2002 C 325/33-184 
3 
It is to be expected, therefore, that a corpus of European Community legislation exists 
to regulate each of the four sectors of the internal market. The research reported here 
has been restricted to deal only with the 'free movement of goods' sector ofthe EC 
internal market. Within this work references to the EC internal market, unless explicitly 
noted otherwise, are to be taken to be restricted to the free movement of goods sector of 
the EC internal market. The researcher is an internal market practitioner, without legal 
training, initially trained as a scientist and with a professional background developed 
while working within several sectors of manufacturing industry. This research was 
embarked on as a response to the difficulties experienced in trying to follow what 
appeared to be an ad hoc EC internal market legislative process. It has enabled a 
description, and critical review, of the EC internal market legislative process from the 
perspective of an internal market practitioner. This description enhances the ability to 
manage engagement with the process. This thesis is not, and should not be construed 
as, a legal analysis of the EC internal market legislative process although references are 
made to legal documents. Notwithstanding the above caveat concerning legal analysis 
this thesis must be viewed as multidisciplinary in nature as it is concerned with 
managing engagement with a process described in legal documents, the treaties. It is 
also recognised that each of the treaties may represent political compromise accepted by 
the Member States to enable progress in the development of the European Union by 
broad consensus. An important issue related to the research reported here, but not the 
primary target of this research, is the quality of the EC internal market technical 
legislation - the process output. 
1.2.1 THEORETICAL PROBLEM 
Manufacturers of products are only one user grouplO within the set of user groups ofEC 
internal market technical legislation. Others within the set of user groups of EC internal 
market technical legislation are Member State legislators and Member State 
enforcement agency officials. Some of these enforcement agency officials are central 
government officials and some are local or regional government officials. For the 
United Kingdom there is no single document providing guidance as to which of the 
hierarchical levels within government will enforce legislation. An example that serves 
to demonstrate the uncertainties associated with enforcement regimes is provided by 
'The Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive 
10 The reader is referred to the list of Definitions on page x 
4 
Atmospheres Regulations 1996,11 which state: 'it shall be the duty of the [Health and 
Safety] Executive to make adequate arrangements for the enforcement of these 
Regulations ." '. In practice this translates into the Health and Safety Executive, central 
government, acting as the enforcement agency for large installations such as oil 
refineries and local government officers acting on petrol filling stations. 
Each of the three groups of users of EC internal market technical legislation identified 
above is likely to have at least some similar needs with regard to the processes of 
change away from the existing EC internal market technical legislation. These needs 
may be broadly summarised as follows:-
1 To be aware of proposals for EC internal market legislation as the 
preliminary discussions and drafting are taking place. 
2 To be able to monitor the progress of proposals from their inception 
through to either their adoption as the new regime of EC internal 
market technical legislation, or their rejection. 
3 To be able to take an active role with a view of ensuring that the 
proposals meet the needs of all groups of users as the proposals 
progress on their way through to either their adoption as the new 
regime of EC internal market technical legislation, or their rej ection. 
The ability to monitor, and if adjudged appropriate to respond actively to, proposals for 
change to the existing EC internal market technical legislation is dependent on a 
knowledge of the elements ofthe process steps that are to be followed as the initial 
proposals either become new EC internal market technical legislation or the proposals 
are at some stage rejected. Here 'respond actively to' means the presenting of 
submissions to the relevant EC institutions, and possibly elsewhere, in an attempt to 
modify the proposals for change. 
The initial part of the research was concerned with a literature survey and review. The 
literature of interest being European Union primary legislation, EC secondary 
legislation, other source documents defining processes within, between and beyond the 
EU institutions, some case law on the application of internal market legislation and 
reviews by commentators. Details of this literature review are to be found in Chapter 2 
and in Chapter 3. 
II The Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres 
Regulations 1996, SI 1996/192 
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1.2.2 PRACTICAL PROBLEM 
The practical part of the research was concerned with trying to assess the level of 
understanding, and of the perceptions, of EC internal market technical legislation that 
exists amongst the groups of users of this legislation. The understanding and 
perceptions of particular interest to this research related to the processes involved in the 
EC internal market technical legislative process. Among the questions to be addressed 
was one concerned with the de facto existence of the internal market; was it perceived 
as a reality, was it perceived as something that nearly exists and that may indeed exist in 
the not too distant future or was it perceived as no more than a convenient illusion 
among officials and politicians? The Internal Market Scoreboards (Commission, 2001, 
2002,2003,2004) discussed in Chapter 3 establish one view of the status of the EC 
internal market; but is the overall view of EC internal market practitioners consistent 
with the Commission's view? 
At the outset of this research it was expected that the study of the technical legislative 
process within the ED would be a passive exercise. As the research progressed apparent 
anomalies and other difficulties were encountered. To resolve these anomalies and 
difficulties this area of the research had to become much more active. This change 
resulted in questions being put to various parts of the technical legislative process - in 
effect the process was tested. Detailed reporting of the research questions and of the 
methodology to determine answers to these questions is to be found in Chapter 3 and in 
Chapter 4. 
1.3 Justification for the research 
Prior to this research being undertaken there was considerable evidence, though largely 
anecdotal from professional colleagues and acquaintances, that the EC internal market 
technical legislative process was not well controlled. There was evidence of what 
appeared to be a process drift with time. This process drift suggests a process not well 
controlled. The initial suggestion of a process not well controlled was supported by 
perceptions of differences of procedure for different items of EC internal market 
technical legislation going through the same stages at the same time. 
In addition to the above anecdotal evidence the author was aware of questions being 
asked about where the relevant process information could be found. These questions 
were being asked from within the groups who are users of the EC internal market 
technical legislation. There were few, if any, helpful answers to be heard. 
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For the internal market for goods the legislative framework has two aspects. The first 
aspect is that the EC secondary legislation is securely based on the appropriate Treaty 
provisions. Assessments of the choice of the legal basis of the directives, and European 
Court of Justice case law related to the choices made, are not considered in detail in this 
research. 
The second aspect of the framework for the free movement of goods is that the various 
individual pieces ofEC internal market technical legislation should provide a clear, 
consistent, framework which the groups of users of the legislation may each use to 
accomplish their respective tasks. Article 94 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community12 requires that the framework for the internal 
market be achieved through the use of directives. Directives are legal instruments, 
defined in Article 249 13 in the following terms: 'A directive shall be binding, as to the 
result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave 
to the national authorities the choice ofform and methods.' Thus the Member States 
are required to transpose the requirements set out in directives into individual Member 
State legislation. The use of directives as the legal instrument for EC internal market 
technical legislation thereby extends the legislative process to include the process by 
which Member States transpose directives into national legislation. 
In addition to the above Rogers (1998) suggests that there is a need for a full 
investigation, and subsequent documentation, of the rules governing one particular 
section of the overall process, the actual legislative drafting process, so that the process 
may be controlled. 
The preceding discussion focuses on the processes of the EU institutions involved in the 
drafting of EC internal market technical legislation. From a product manufacturer's 
12 N. 9 above 
13 N. 9 above 
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perspective the means of demonstrating compliance with current internal market 
technical legislation is also of significance. A scheme has been put into operation14 
whereby certain standards prepared by European standardisation organisations in 
support of EC internal market technical legislation can be awarded a special status. 
Standards awarded this special status are identified as 'harmonised standards' and carry 
with them legally accepted presumptions of conformity with the requirements of EC 
internal market technical legislation. During the period of this research the process 
whereby a European standard is adopted as a harmonised standard was modified and 
has become both more transparent and which now involves internal market 
practitioners. 
The effects of EC internal market technical legislation on different groups of users are 
quite varied. For Member State legislative officials there is a Treaty obligation to enact 
national legislation within a defined timescale. The technical requirements of this 
national legislation are already determined in the directive. This leaves the Member 
States to determine the enforcement regime and the penalties for infringement of the 
legislation. For Member State enforcement these officials may be from either central or 
local government. The requirements for enforcement are set out in the national 
legislation. For these enforcement officials the regime may be reactive, complaint 
driven, or proactive where a program of inspection is specified. In either case risk to the 
enforcement agency is low. If the designated enforcement regime fails to provide the 
necessary level of protection the national legislation may be revised. 
Manufacturers have a greater need for the EC internal market technical legislation to be 
workable than do either of the two groups described above. The upper and lower 
bounds of what is workable are related to what is technically achievable and what is 
required to provide adequate protection to users of products. Directives are very broad 
in scope and may encompass many industry sectors. It is unlikely that the small team of 
EC institution officials drafting new EC internal market technical legislation will be 
able to assess, on their own, the impact of proposed legislation across all of the 
industries that might be affected. There is a need therefore, to ensure that manufacturers 
of products coming within the remit of new technical legislation have an adequate 
opportunity to become familiar with proposals for technical legislative change at an 
14 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, OJ 1998 L 
204/37-47 
early stage. Dialogue may then take place between manufacturers and the legislation 
drafters so that no unnecessary burdens are placed on manufacturers. This necessary 
dialogue between manufacturers and legislation drafters can only take place in a timely 
and efficient way if the technical legislative process is available to all and is user 
friendly for groups of users, and individuals, outside of the EC institutions. 
A careful consideration of the above has led to the establishment of a specific aim for 
this research, as set out in the next section. 
1.3.1 AIM OF THE INVESTIGATION 
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The aim of this project is to identify causes of potential weaknesses in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process as seen from the perspective of someone outside of 
the EC institutions with a need to manage engagement with the process, and to put 
forward possible process improvements. This management perspective of the process 
differentiates this survey from other, legally based, surveys of this area. To attain this 
aim the following supporting objectives were established: 
1 To critically investigate the EC internal market technical legislative 
process with a management perspective of someone outside of the EC 
institutions. 
2 To investigate the knowledge and perceptions of the internal market held 
by EC internal market practitioners. 
3 To investigate the role ofharmonised standards in support ofEC internal 
market technical legislation. 
1.3.2 ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The achievement of the Aim set out in Section 1.3.1 and its supporting objectives was 
enabled through the execution of the following, more detailed, activities. Table 1.1 
shows how the outputs from these detailed activities are used in support of the 
objectives and hence the Aim. 
Table 1.1 Showing the relationship between the Objectives and the supporting 
activities 
Su 
2 
3 g 
a Identify the European Union institutions that are involved in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process, and to establish the authorities ofthese 
institutions, then to identify any functions in support of the technical 
legislation. Identification of the appropriate EU institutions provides a focus 
for the remainder of the research. 
b Identify the existing process descriptions of the EU institutions involved in 
the EC internal market technical legislative process and of the functions in 
support of technical legislation. Review of the existing process descriptions 
will reveal those parts of the processes that do not have an adequate process 
description. Any parts of the overall process with inadequate process 
descriptions may prevent the overall process from being deterministic. 
c Identify the routes by which the groups most directly affected by any EC 
internal market technical legislation (Member State governments, 
manufacturing industry and Member State enforcement agencies) may 
interface with the institutions and functions identified in supporting activities 
a & b. Knowledge of these routes allows interested individuals, or groups, 
outside of the EU institutions to make their views known in a manner most 
likely to be heard, understood and accepted as a basis for subsequent action 
by the EU institutions. 
d Where practical, apply tests to the EC internal market technical legislative 
process to determine if the actual process follows its description and if the 
process is accessible to those outside of the EU institutions. 
e Investigate methods of improving the processes of the EU institutions 
involved with the generation of EC internal market technical legislation. 
One possible method for process improvement would be the use of the CEN 
System Handbook (CEN, 1998) as a model for the presentation of the EU 
institutions' processes. Process improvement may lead to benefits for all 
sectors of the Community - better protection for consumers, enhanced 
opportunities for user groups to input their views, reduced drafting time for 
proposals for internal market technical legislation and, as output from the 
processes, more appropriate EC internal market technical legislation. 
f Assess, through the use of a sample of the population of EC internal market 
practitioners, the level of knowledge of the EC internal market technical 
legislative process and the perception of how well the EC internal market 
achieves its objectives of barrier-free trade. 
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g Investigate the role of European harmonised standards in the application of 
EC internal market technical legislation. Currently it is unclear whether 
users ofEC internal market technical legislation (Member State 
governments, Member State enforcement agencies and manufacturing 
industry), manufacturing industry in particular, benefit from the availability 
of harmonised standards. There exists a perception that the clarity of 
language of harmonised standards, in support of the broad requirements 
expressed in internal market technical legislation, is an advantage. Is this 
perception widely held? 
1.4 Contribution to knowledge 
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A body of knowledge has been generated to inform all parties involved with EC internal 
market technical legislation. All parties to the process should now be better informed to 
make contributions towards ensuring that future EC internal market technical legislation 
is clear, timely, accessible and cost effective in its application. A brief overview of the 
contribution to knowledge shows that:-
1 In areas of the treaties where an attempt is made to define what should be 
a deterministic process there is a lack of completeness in the definition. 
2 Weaknesses in the overall EC internal market technical legislative 
process have led to distortions of the intended 'level playing field' 
internal market. 
3 The level of knowledge of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process held by internal market practitioners is low. 
4 The perception of the internal market held by internal market 
practitioners is that the internal market is not yet complete. 
Up to the early 1990s there was, at least in the petrol pump manufacturing sector of 
British industry, an understanding and acceptance of the need to manufacture to a 
number of different technical specifications in order to satisfy the legislative needs of all 
of the EC Member States - this despite the United Kingdom being part of the European 
Economic Community and its common market. 
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By January 1993 the much hailed internal market was expected to have removed the 
need for more than one technical specification for any given product. The January 
1993, and subsequent, messages that the internal market was complete, whereby one 
specification fits all Member States, appears to have been accepted by manufacturing 
industry's senior management in a way that has created tensions between senior 
management and their own internal market practitioners because the rhetoric about, and 
the reality of, the internal market remain different. 
1.5 Methodology 
The methods used for data collection and data analysis and the rationale for their 
selection are fully described in Chapter 4 of this thesis. This section provides a broad 
description of the methods used. 
The data collection consisted of the following three steps: 
a) Critical textual analysis; 
b) Testing the responses of the EC internal market technical 
legislative process; 
c) Assessing the opinions of EC internal market practitioners. 
The critical textual analysis consisted of three separate, but inter-related, phases. The 
first phase of the critical textual analysis was concerned with the determination of which 
EU institutions exist. This determination was achieved through a study of the EU 
primary legislation. The results ofthis first phase are presented in Chapter 2 'The law 
making process' and in Appendix I 'Chronological list of European Union and 
European Community major legislative events'. 
The second phase of the critical textual analysis, also presented in Chapter 2, was 
concerned with the documentation determining the processes and procedures of the EU 
institutions identified in the first phase as being of relevance to the EC internal market 
technical legislative process. 
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The third phase of the critical textual analysis, presented in Chapter 3 'The literature 
survey and review', was concerned with a critical assessment of primary ED legislation, 
secondary EC internal market technical legislation and the published literature. In the 
context of this research the published literature was divided into three categories:-
1 The official view of the internal market, from commissioned reports, 
reports from ED institutions and pronouncements from representatives 
of ED institutions. 
2 Published papers on ED institutions' processes and procedures, the 
effectiveness of these procedures and general reflections on the internal 
market, harmonization etc. 
3 Reviews of practitioners' perceptions of ED institutions and of the 
internal market. 
Prior to this research the author had only limited access to the opinions of the users of 
EC internal market technical legislation I 5 and its support functions. It was decided that 
to obtain the opinions of users ofEC internal market technical legislation it would be 
necessary to talk to people in some formal way. The method adopted for formally 
talking to people was that of a structured interview. The structured interview was 
conducted with a sample of people concerned with the application and implementation, 
on a daily basis, of the current corpus of EC internal market technical legislation. 
Details in support of these decisions are provided in Chapter 4 'Methodology' and a 
copy of the Structured Interview used as the instrument for the collection of data is 
provided in Appendix II. The fieldwork data is presented in Chapter 5 'Results and 
analysis' . 
1.6 Definitions 
The list included on page (x) provides definitions of words and phrases that, for the 
purposes of this research, have the particular meaning given there. 
At the commencement of this research, and for most of the period that this research was 
active, the applicable primary legislation in force for the EC was provided in the 
15 The reader is referred to the list of Definitions on page x 
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Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community16. Post 
dating and amending, the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community is the Treaty ofNice17, a treaty that came into effect on 1 st February 2003. 
The main purposes of this treaty, and its attached protocols, are to extend some political 
boundaries and to pave the way for a major expansion of the European Union. At the 
time of signing the Treaty of Nice it was anticipated that in the year 2004 there would 
be twelve new Member States ofthe European Union18. To accommodate this 
anticipated enlargement some structural reforms of the membership and voting rights of 
institutions within the EU had to be put in place. These structural reforms have no 
significant impact on this research, research that is concerned with the EC internal 
market technical legislative process. 
In addition to its main purposes, as noted above, the Treaty ofNice19, by application of 
its Article 2, has made a number of amendments to the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community2o. Three ofthese amendments have a 
very minor bearing on this research and are dealt with at appropriate places in the text. 
In December 2002 the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community21 was re-published incorporating the changes brought about by the 
application of the Treaty ofNice22. The text of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community23 no longer provides duality of Article 
numbering as existed in the previous version24. Within this thesis the convention of 
single system Article numbering will be followed except where appropriate. 
Official documentation of the EC is available in all of its official languages and working 
languages25 . Throughout this text all references to official sources are to be construed 
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 1997 C 325/33-184 
17 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain other Acts, OJ 2001 C 80/1-87 
18 Ten new Member States joined the EU as of 1 st May 2004 
19 N. 17 above 
20 N. 16 above 
21 N. 16 above 
22 N. 17 above 
23 N. 9 above 
24 N. 16 above 
25 Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning 
the accession of new Member States to the European Union (95/1IEC, Euratom, ECSC), OJ L 1/218 
as references to the appropriate English language text except where noted to the 
contrary. 
1.7 Delimitation of scope 
It is recognised that any given product manufacturer may wish to sell products in 
markets beyond the EC internal market. For each market outside of the EC internal 
market there may be similar, though not identical, technical legislative processes to 
those processes that exist for the EC internal market. Technical legislative processes 
associated with markets other than the EC internal market are not dealt with in this 
research. This research is restricted to a study of the processes that relate to the EC 
internal market technical legislative process. 
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It is to be expected that for any supranational organisations such as the EU and the EC 
almost any significant problem that has to be addressed by that organisation will be 
interdisciplinary. Chapter 4 'Methodology' discusses the justification for treating this 
research as applied research. Scott (1998) makes the following comment which 
supports the interdisciplinary expectation; ' ... applied studies [research] are much more 
likely to be interdisciplinary: practical problems do not respect disciplinary 
boundaries.', and this research is undoubtedly about a practical problem. In regard to 
the EU Craig and de Burca (1998) note: 
'That the EU legal and constitutional order should be so complex and 
labyrinthine may not be very satisfactory, but it is hardly surprising, given 
that it is largely a reflection of the political compromises and differences of 
approach across a vast range of policy areas among fifteen different 
Member States. ' 
Whenever significant decisions are made within the EC it is to be expected that they 
will be influenced by the political, economic, legal and process environment current at 
the time the decision is made. The political and economic circumstances that existed at 
those times when the current EC internal market technical legislative processes were 
created have not been evaluated within this research. Nor has it been the purpose of this 
research to study in detail case law established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
relating to the EC internal market. Where appropriate, the judgements of the ECJ 
relating to secondary legislation should be taken into account by Commission officials 
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when drafting internal market directives. This research is concerned with the processes 
for the generation of legislation under the authority of Article 95 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community26 as last modified by the Treaty of 
Nice27 . The consolidated version of the above treaties, now entitled the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community28 will, for the purposes of 
this research, be taken as the definitive treaty document unless specifically noted to the 
contrary. 
Chapter 2 outlines the way that the European Community institutions and their 
interrelationships have changed as a result of Inter Governmental Conferences that in 
turn have led to treaty changes. As a result of these treaty changes the balance of 
institutional power has shifted towards the European Parliament although the Council 
remains the most powerful body. This research does not attempt to analyse in detail 
either the reasons for, or the detailed effects of, any shift in the balance of power. It is 
important to recognise, however, that the shifts of power have been instrumental in 
shaping the current process. 
The generation and application of EC internal market technical legislation involves the 
governments of the individual Member States of the European Union. Where it is 
appropriate to consider the involvement of Member State governments this research was 
restricted to a consideration of the United Kingdom government only. 
Many sectors of industry are affected by EC internal market technical legislation. It 
was beyond the scope of this research to investigate how each of these industries 
interfaces with the EC internal market technical legislative process. This research was, 
therefore, restricted to study of the perspectives of two sectors of manufacturing 
industry - fuel dispensers and weighing equipment. A link between the two sectors of 
manufacturing industry selected for the study is that products from each of these two 
sectors are subject to the requirements of legal metrology. Legal metrological 
requirements affect products from these two sectors of industry because their products 
are concerned with the measurement of commodities for sale to the pUblic. 
26 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [Treaty of Rome], HMSO, London (This is 
Cmnd. 4864 that reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 1957) 
27 N. 17above 
28 N. 9 above 
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It is further recognised that, as a result of the United Kingdom joining the European 
Communities, the UK government has assumed some of the constitutional function and 
power of parliament (Cygan, 1998). This research makes no attempt to analyse any of 
the constitutional issues that may have resulted from the UK joining the EC. 
In the latter stages of the preparation of this thesis the European Union and hence the 
European Community was enlarged from fifteen Member States to twenty five Member 
States, this enlargement formally occurred on 1 st May 2004. This thesis is, therefore, 
written on the basis of the treaties, and of an EU of fifteen Member States, that existed 
prior to 1 st May 2004. None of the process criticisms noted in this thesis are likely to be 
diminished as a result of the EU enlargement. 
It is acknowledged that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe29 was 
published subsequent to the submission of this thesis. The existence of this Treaty, one 
that cannot enter into force before 1 November 2006, has no material effect on the 
research reported here. 
1.8 Outline of thesis 
The overall literature review ofthis research, covered in Chapters 2 and 3, is atypical in 
that it encompasses both archival research and a more traditional, critical, review of the 
literature. Chapter 2 provides, from archival research, a description of the European 
Community internal market law making process and identifies the EU institutions 
involved. Chapter 3, the more traditional literature survey and review is concerned with 
establishing the official view of the internal market, its processes and procedures and 
their effectiveness. This review then broadens its scope to review the perceptions of 
those involved, on a daily basis, with working within the EC internal market technical 
legislative framework. 
The way that the overall literature review of Chapters 2 and 3 provides the foundation 
for the remainder of the thesis is indicated by the overall summary of the structure of the 
29 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310 A preliminary review of this Treaty 
suggests that Article III-396, replacing existing Article 251, improves detenninism of the EC internal 
market legislative process. This Treaty cannot enter into force until after it has been ratified by each of 
the Member States. If the Treaty enters into force then its effect on the EC internal market technical 
legislative process would become an area for additional study. 
thesis presented in Figure 1.1 which also shows how the broad based data is refined to 
allow reasoned conclusions to be drawn. 
Figure 1.1 The Cone of Refinement of data through the thesis 
Chapters 2, 3 & 4 
Chapter 6 These Chapters look at a Chapter 5 
variety of aspects of the 
Here is identification of process. Various facts The various facts are what has been discovered 
emerge at different times in ordered and then and suggests how things 
no pre-ordained order, this 
analysed for meaning. may be caused to improve. includes raw data from 
fieldwork. At this stage 
analysis is limited. 
REFINEMENT 
.... 
..... 
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Chapter 4 is concerned primarily with the collection of data from people with 
knowledge and/or perceptions of the EC internal market technical legislative process. 
While collecting data from people about the processes of drafting internal market 
technical legislation the opportunity was taken to ask some more general questions. 
Some insight into the level of training provided for drafters of EC internal market 
technical legislation as compared to the level of training of users of EC internal market 
technical legislation was an anticipated outcome from these more general questions. 
The data was obtained from people via a structured interview, discussed in Chapter 4 
and available as Appendix II. The data collected via the structured interview was of 
limited value until collated and analysed. Chapter 5 provides summaries of the 
responses to the structured interview questions and data from other fieldwork together 
with analyses of the information obtained. 
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Conclusions drawn from the research, together with recommendations for further work 
and recommendations to some groups of people involved, in various ways, with EC 
internal market technical legislation are presented in Chapter 6. 
1.9 Summary 
In this Chapter the major features of the background to the research have been 
established. The need for the EC internal market technical legislative process to be 
clear and accessible has been briefly discussed. Research questions together with 
anticipated outcomes of this research have been outlined. A more detailed treatment of 
these topics is provided in the following Chapters. 
Chapter 2 The law making process 
2.1 Introduction 
No critical review of a set of processes is possible until the processes themselves are 
known, ideally the processes would be fully documented by those with responsibility 
for the processes that are to be reviewed. 
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For European Community (EC) internal market technical legislation the top level 
processes are described in EC primary legislation. This Chapter will first elucidate the 
progressive nature of the changes to European Union and European Community 
primary legislation. This Chapter will then show that, from the primary legislation now 
in force, it is possible to determine which of the EU institutions currently in place have 
a role in the EC internal market technical legislative process. 
For each of the EU institutions with a role in the generation ofEC internal market 
technical legislative process three aspects of that institution's processes will be 
investigated. The first aspect to be investigated will be the interactions with other EU 
institutions; the second, the institution's internal processes and the third, the institution's 
interfaces to organisations beyond the other EU institutions. 
The diversity of language within the Member States of the EU is recognised within the 
EU primary legislation, some discussion on the effects of this recognition is included. 
2.2 European Community primary legislation 
European Union and European Community primary legislation has as its genesis the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Communityl,2. From this somewhat 
limited beginning, the primary legislation has progressed via a number of quite clearly 
defined stages. Each of these stages has been characterised by an inter-governmental 
conference followed by the signing of a new treaty. The primary legislation currently in 
1 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel CommunityJECSC] [Treaty of Paris], Cmnd.4863, 
HMSO, London, [Reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 1951] 
2 The validity of the Treaty of Paris expired 23 July 2002 after its fifty year life. 
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force is the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community3 [Treaty of Rome] 
as last amended by the Treaty ofNice4, however all references to current primary 
legislation will be to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community5 as explained in Section 1.5 
It should be noted that the Treaty of Amsterdam6 was somewhat different from earlier 
amending treaties in that although it has provided amendments to the earlier treaties it 
has also provided a Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the Economic 
Community7 which re-established a coherent set of treaty article numbers. The 
subsequent Treaty ofNice8 introduced amendments to the newly established articles and 
also gave rise to an updated Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communitl. 
A number of institutions of the ED have been established as the result of the application 
of the ED primary legislation. Not all of the institutions of the ED currently in place 
have existed from the coming into force ofthe Treaty of Rome 10. The ED institutions 
that were not established by the Treaty of Rome (op. cit.) have been established by 
amending treaties. A brief outline of the sequence of treaties from the European Coal 
and Steel Treaty through to the most recent amending treaty, the Treaty of Nice, is 
provided in Table ALI of Appendix 1. Also included in Table ALI of Appendix I are 
some other ED legislative acts, together with the DK legislative acts to ratify the 
treaties. These additions are included to provide an overview of the current situation. 
2.2.1 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 
The brief outline of the development of ED institutions, provided in Table ALI of 
Appendix I, does not attempt to list all ED institutions. Other ED institutions, for 
3 Treaty establishing the European Economic CommunityJEEC] [Treaty of Rome], CmndA864, HMSO, 
London, [Reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 1957] 
4 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [Treaty of Nice], OJ 2001 C 8011-87 
5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 2002 C 325,133-184 
6 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [Treaty of Amsterdam], OJ 1997 C 34011-144 
7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 1997 C 340/173-308 
8 NA above 
9 N.5 above 
10 N.3 above 
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example the European Investment Bankll are, of course, important to the overall 
objectives of the EU. This research is restricted to the EC and its internal market, 
therefore only those institutions that have direct relevance to the EC internal market are 
considered in detail here. 
Using Table ALI of Appendix I as a starting point it is now possible to focus on the 
institutions with direct relevance to the European Community and specifically those 
with effect on the EC internal market technical legislative process. Table 2.1 is 
assembled from data already provided in Table ALI of Appendix I and shows more 
clearly how the EU institutions affecting the EC have been established. 
It is helpful to clarify here the use of the term 'institution'. Article 4 (1) of the Treaty of 
Romel2 lists four institutions: an Assembly, a Council, a Commission and a Court of 
Justice. Article 4 (2) (op. cit.) reads 'The Council and the Commission shall be assisted 
by an Economic and Social Committee acting in an advisory capacity. ' From the above 
it would seem reasonable to conclude that within the then European Economic 
Community the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) was not seen as an institution. 
A rather different view ofthe status of the ESC emerges from a review of the 'Table of 
Contents' of the Treaty of Rome (op. cit.), for ease of understanding the relevant extract 
of the Table of Contents is set out below: 
PART FIVE - The institutions of the Community 
Title I - Provisions governing the institutions 
Chapter 1 - The institutions 
Section 1 - The Assembly 
Section 2 - The Council 
Section 3 - The Commission 
Section 4 The Court of Justice 
Article 
137 - 209 
137 -199 
137 -188 
137 -144 
145 -154 
155 -163 
164 -188 
Chapter 2 - Provisions common to several institutions 189 - 192 
Chapter 3 - The Economic and Social Committee 193 -198 
Title II - Financial provisions 
11 N.5 above 
12 N.3 above 
199 - 209 
The above extract is somewhat unclear about the status of the ESC. The whole of 
PART FIVE is about the institutions of the Community and the ESC is included in 
PART FIVE suggesting that the ESC is seen as an institution. The ESC is included 
under 'Title I - The institutions of the Community' further suggesting that the ESC is 
seen as an institution. However, the exclusion of the ESC from 'Chapter 1 - The 
institutions' might be taken to suggest that the ESC is not seen as an institution. 
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Clearly, whatever its status, the ESC can only operate if there exists some financial 
support. Within Articles 193 to 198 there is no provision for financial support of the 
ESC. It would appear, therefore, that the only financial support available to the ESC is 
through Article 203 (2) (op. cit.) which begins 'Each institution of the Community shall 
draw up estimates of its expenditure ... J , which again suggests that the ESC must be 
seen as an institution of the European Economic Community. 
The earliest European Economic Community Treaty, the Treaty of Rome l3 , does not 
make clear the status of the ESC because of the imprecision inherent in such a treaty 
document. The lack of clarity of the status of the ESC has persisted through several 
revisions ofthe EEC/EC treaties and remains in the current EC treaty, the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community14. Notwithstanding the 
above, for the purposes of this research, references to the European Economic 
Community, European Union or European Community institutions shall be taken to 
include a reference to the Economic and Social Committee. 
Support for the view expressed above that the Economic and Social Committee should 
be treated as an institution is provided on web page www.europa.eu.intleur-
lex/pap/process and players6.html, accessed 9 June 2003, which lists the institutions of 
the EU and includes the Economic and Social Committee, albeit by the unofficial name 
European Economic and Social Committee. For clarity the EC institutions are listed in 
Table 2.2 
13 N.3 above 
14 N.5 above 
Table 2.1 Indicating the introduction, change or re-affirmation of EC institutions by the treaties 
ECSC' 
High Authority 
Common 
Assembly 
Special Council 
Court of Justice 
Consultative 
Committee 
15 N.l above 
16N.3 above 
EEC H) Euratomll 
Commission Commission 
Assembly Assembly 
Council Council 
Court of Justice Court of Justice 
Economic and Economic and 
Social Committee Social Committee 
TREATIES 
Mergerl~ SEAI~ TEULU 
Single Commission 
Commission 
European European 
Parliament Parliament 
Single Council Council 
Court of Justice 
Economic and 
Social Committee 
Court of Auditors 
Committee of the 
Regions 
ToA2I ToNa 
Commission Commission 
European European 
Parliament Parliament 
Council Council 
Court of Justice Court of Justice 
Economic and Economic and 
Social Committee Social Committee 
Court of Auditors Court of Auditors 
Committee of the Committee of the 
Regions Regions 
17 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom], Cmnd.4865, HMSO, London, [Reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 
1957] 
18 Treaties establishing the European Communities - treaties amending these Treaties - Documents concerning the Accession, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications ofthe 
European Communities, pp 745-773 [Merger Treaty](English text version of Official Journal of the European Communities, Number 152, 1967) 
19 Single European Act, OJ 1987 L 169/1-29 
20 Treaty on European Union [Maastricht Treaty], OJ 1992 C 191/1-67 
21 N.6 above 
22 N.7 above 
Table 2.2 Summary of EC institutions 
Commission 
European Parliament 
Council 
Court of Justice 
Economic and Social Committee 
Court of Auditors 
Committee of the Regions 
24 
From the institutions within this list it is now necessary to determine which of them are 
involved in the EC internal market technical legislative process, this is accomplished in 
Section 2.2.2 
2.2.2 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTERNAL MARKET TREATY ARTICLES 
For the purposes of this research the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community23 were used as the prevailing primary legislation. Treaties 
amending the original Treaty establishing the European Economic Community had 
achieved their amendments by a series of modifications, insertions and deletions of 
Articles, an overall procedure that had made the resultant text very difficult to read. 
Working from the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community24, the Articles governing the high level legislative processes to achieve EC 
internal market technical legislation have been identified. These Articles and their main 
provisions are shown in Table 2.3 
Table 2.3 Articles of importance to the internal market and their main provisions 
Article25 
14 
94 
95 
249 
251 
253 
254 
23 N.5 and N.7 above 
24 N.5 above 
25 N .5 above 
Main Provision 
Establishes an internal market. 
Council to issue directives after consulting EP and ESC. 
Refers to the Article 251 procedures to be followed and sets out 
conditions for some national provisions. 
Definition of 'directive' and other legislative acts. 
Describes the procedures between Commission, EP and Council. 
Requires legal basis for the legislative act and references to the 
necessary opinions (EP and ESC) to be noted in directives. 
Requires adopted directives to be signed by the Presidents of the 
EP and of the Council and for them to be published in the OJEC 
(OJEU see Section 2.3.1). 
, 
, 
, 
, 
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Table 2.3 shows those Articles that are of importance to EC internal market technical 
legislation under the authority of the Treaty of Rome26 as last amended by the Treaty of 
Nice27 . Table 2.4 summarises the sequences of change that have contributed to the 
current status of each of the Articles identified in Table 2.3 
Detailed study of the Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (op. cit.) Articles as listed in Table 2.3 shows that each of these Articles 
requires actions by various EC institutions. Correspondence between the Articles and 
the EC institutions identified by them is shown in Table 2.5 
Table 2.4 Development of current Articles of importance to the internal market 
EEC211 SEA2lJ TEUJU 
Article Article Article 
8 (P5) 8a (I, p7) 7a (N, p7) 
100 (P37) 100 (NC) 100 (R,p10) 
100a (1, p8) 100a (A, 
189 (P60) 
190 (P60) 
191 (P61) 
Note: A 
26N.3 above 
27 NA above 
28 N.3 above 
29 N.19 above 
30 N.20 above 
31 N.7 above 
32N.5 above 
NC 
p10) 
189 (NC) 189 (R, p37) 
189b (I, 
p37) 
190 (NC) 190 (R, p39) 
191 (NCL ~1 (R, p39) 
Amended 
No Change 
I 
R 
ConsolidatedJ1 
Version Article 
(Amsterdam) 
14 (N, p185) 
94 (N, p2l3) 
95 (N, p2l3) 
249 (N, p278) 
251 (A, N, 
p279) 
253 (N, p281) 
254 (N, p281) 
Inserted 
Replaced 
N 
P 
Consolidated32 
Version Article 
(Nice) 
14 (N, p44) 
94 (N, p69) 
95 (N, pp69/70) 
249 (N, pl32) 
251 (N, pl33) 
253 (N, pl35) 
__ 25~ (A, p135L_ 
Renumbered 
Page number 
Table 2.5 Correspondence between selected Articles of the Consolidated 
Version of Treaty of Amsterdam and the EC institutions identified 
Consolidated Version EC Institutions identified by 
Article Consolidated Version Article 
14 Council 
Commission 
94 European Parliament 
Economic and Social Committee 
95 Council 
Economic and Social Committee 
249 European Parliament 
Council 
Commission 
250 Council 
Commission 
251 Commission 
European Parliament 
Council 
253 European Parliament 
Council 
Commission 
254 European Parliament (President) 
Council (President) 
It is now possible to compare the set ofEC institutions, as set out in Table 2.2, with 
those EC institutions identified by the Articles of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community33 as concerned with the European 
Community internal market. Such a comparison is made in Table 2.6 
Table 2.6 EC institutions and EC institutions identified for the EC internal 
market legislative process 
EC institutions EC institutions identified for the 
EC internal market legislative 
process 
Commission Commission 
European Parliament European Parliament 
Council Council 
Court of Justice 
Economic and Social Committee Economic and Social Committee 
Court of Auditors 
Committee of the Regions 
33 N.5 above 
26 
27 
It is evident from Table 2.6 that there are three EC institutions that are not identified by 
the EU primary legislation as being part of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process. The role of the Court of Justice is specified in Article 220 (op. cit.) For ease 
of reference the text of an extract from Article 220 is reproduced below: 
Article 220(Extract) 
The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its jurisdiction, 
shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is 
observed. 
It can be inferred from Article 220 that the Court of Justice, and the Court of First 
Instance, have no direct role in the EC internal market technical legislative process. The 
Court of Justice does, however, have an important interpretative role 'post process'. 
The results of any interpretations issued by the Court of Justice are then available to 
other EC institutions for assistance in the drafting of subsequent EC internal market 
technical legislation. Given that the Court of Justice has no direct role in the EC 
internal market technical legislative process the processes of the Court of Justice will 
not be studied further in this research. 
The Committee of the Regions (op. cit.) has an advisory role, limited to concerns with 
regard to cross-border cooperation. The Committee of the Regions therefore has no role 
in the EC internal market technical legislative process and will not be further considered 
within this research. The Court of Auditors (op. cit.) has, as would be expected, an 
accounting function in relation to the EC institutions. The Court of Auditors has no role 
in the EC internal market technical legislative process and will not be further considered 
within this research. 
The Official Journal of the European Communities in itself is not a tangible institution, 
it is a publication of the Office for Official Publications. The Official Journal of the 
European Communities (OJEC) takes no active role in the sense of there being a 
dialogue between it and other institutions. It does, however, have an important function 
in the publication of draft proposals in the 'C' series of the OJEC and also in the 
publication of final legislative texts in the 'L' series of the OJEC. Given that there is no 
dialogue with the OJEC, it being a straight through process, the OJEC will not be 
considered to be an institution involved in the EC internal market technical legislative 
process. 
Within this sub-section the EC institutions that have a direct role in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process have been identified, these EC institutions are 
summarised in Table 2.7 
Table 2.7 EC institutions involved in the EC 
internal market technical legislative process. 
EC institutions involved in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process 
Commission I 
European Parliament I 
Council 
Economi~ and S~c~l ~ommittee_. __ ._ J 
Henceforward, within this thesis, references to EC institutions shall, unless otherwise 
specifically noted, be taken to mean those EC institutions involved in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process and are as listed in Table 2.7 
2.2.3 MEMBERSHIP OF THE EC INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EC 
INTERNAL MARKET TECHNICAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
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The rules governing the membership of each of those EC institutions involved in the 
EC internal market technical legislative process may be significant with regard to those 
EC institutions' relationships to other organisations and/or individuals, such 
relationships are discussed in Section 2.3.4 For each of the four EC institutions 
involved in the EC internal market technical legislative process the current treaty 
provisions, the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Communitl4 articles governing those institutions are identified and the text of the 
specific provisions on the process of membership are given in full. 
With the exception ofthe Council the Treaty provisions give no guidance as to the 
organisation that is to be in place to assist the institutions in carrying out their tasks. 
34 N.5 above 
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2.2.3.1 The Commission 
It is helpful to begin with an understanding ofthe nomenclature relating to 'The 
Commission'. In strict terms the Commission consists of twenty Members35 (op. cit.). 
It is to be expected that twenty Members of the Commission, a collegiate body whose 
individual members are known as Commissioners, alone cannot perform all of the tasks 
that are to be carried out. As a result there exists a significant organisation, often 
referred to as a bureaucracy, assisting the Commissioners with their work. The methods 
of recruitment to this organisation are not specifically set out in the Treaty, in general 
terms they appear to be somewhat similar to those of Member State civil services and 
also include secondments from Member States' civil services. 
In everyday usage the term 'The Commission' is used very loosely and may mean either 
the Commissioners as a collegiate body, or the officials assisting the Commissioners or 
the Commissioners as a collegiate body together with the officials. It is not always 
evident from the context of the use of the term 'The Commission' which of the three 
possible meanings is intended. As will be made more clear in Section 2.3.4 there are 
times when it is important to be certain which of the three meanings given here, is 
understood by a lay person. 
Set out in Table 2.8 are the Treaty articles that define the constitution of the 
Commission and the article that determines how people become Members of the 
Commission. 
Table 2.8 Constitution and Membership of the Commission 
Articles on the Article on 
Constitution Membership 
211-219 
_ .... _ .. __ ... __ ... _ ... _ ... _._ ... _ .. __ .... _ .... -
L-__ ~l~ _ 
For clarity, the text of Article 214 of the Treaty (op. cit.) is reproduced below: 
Article 214 
1. The Members of the Commission shall be appointed, in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in paragraph 2, for a period of five years, subject, if need be, 
to Article 201. 
35 Increased to 25 Members for the Commission appointed in November 2004 following the May 2004 
enlargement of the EU 
Their term of office shall be renewable. 
2. The Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government and 
acting by a qualified majority, shall nominate the person it intends to appoint as 
President of the Commission; the nomination shall be approved by the European 
Parliament. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority and by common accord with the 
nominee for President, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it intends 
to appoint as Members of the Commission, drawn up in accordance with the 
proposals made by each Member State. 
The President and the other Members of the Commission thus nominated shall 
be subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. After 
approval by the European Parliament, the President and the other Members of 
the Commission shall be appointed by the Council, acting by a qualified majority 
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At the time of writing, May 2004, the United Kingdom has the right to nominate two 
Members of the Commission36, their appointments being for a period of five years. The 
nominations, and appointments, of Members of the Commission from the United 
Kingdom are made by the United Kingdom government in power at the time. Should 
the United Kingdom government change during the five year tenure as Members of the 
Commission the incoming United Kingdom government does not have the right to 
dismiss those Members of the Commission inherited from the previous United Kingdom 
government. It is interesting to note that while it may be argued that the Members of 
the Commission are political appointments they do not necessarily reflect the current 
party political situation. 
The Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (op. cit.) 
gives no specific guidance as to how Member States shall select their nominees for 
membership of the Commission. It has not been possible to identify any formal process 
by which the United Kingdom government selects its nominees. To date nominees for 
membership of the Commission from the United Kingdom have been senior national 
political figures rather than senior figures from industry or commerce. 
36 With the Commission to be nominated in 2004 following EU expansion the United Kingdom has the 
right to nominate only one Member of the Commission. 
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2.2.3.2 The Council 
Set out in Table 2.9 are the Treaty articles that define the constitution of the Council and 
the article that determines how people become members of the Council. 
Table 2.9 Constitution and Membership of the Council 
Articles on the Article on 
Constitution Membershi~ 
202-210 
203 
-- -_ ..... __ .. _ ...... - _ ....... - ~- ....... -
For clarity the text of Article 203 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (op. cit.) is reproduced below: 
Article 203 
The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at 
ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member State. 
The office of President shall be held in turn by each Member State in the 
Council for a term of six months in the order decided by the Council acting 
unanimously. 
From the above text it can be seen that Council membership clearly reflects the political 
opinion ofthe United Kingdom government of the time. This is in contrast to the 
Members of the Commission from the United Kingdom who may have been nominated 
by a previous United Kingdom government holding different political views. 
The treatment of Council in the Treaty (op. cit.) is unlike the treatment of the other 
institutions in that additional reference is made to the way the work of Council is to be 
supported by other named organisations. For clarity the relevant extracts from Article 
207 are reproduced below: 
Article 207 (Extracts) 
1. A committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the Member 
States shall be responsible for preparing the work of Council and for 
carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council. The Committee may 
adopt procedural decisions in cases provided for in the Council's Rules of 
Procedure. 
2. The Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat, under the 
responsibility of a Secretary-General, High Representative for the common 
foreign and security policy, who shall be assisted by a Deputy Secretary-
General responsible for the running of the General Secretariat. The 
Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General shall be appointed by 
the Council acting by a qualified majority. 
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Article 207 (1) above allows, as one would perhaps expect, for much of the preliminary 
work relating to Council meetings to be performed by officials of Member State 
governments. However, final decisions appear to be reserved for Member State elected 
representatives attending Council meetings. 
For completeness it should be noted here that in addition to Council there exists within 
the European Union a European Council (op. cit. Article 4). The European Council is a 
meeting of heads of state or government taking place twice per year and is the forum 
within which broader political issues of interest to the European Union are discussed, it 
is not the forum where detailed issues of the EC internal market are discussed. The 
European Council will not be considered further within this research. 
2.2.3.3 The European Parliament 
Set out in Table 2.10 are the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (op. cit.) articles that define the constitution of the European 
Parliament together with the article that determines how people become members of the 
European Parliament. 
Table 2.10 Constitution and Membership of the European Parliament 
Articles on the Article on 
Constitution Membership 
189-201 
190 
For clarity the text of extracts of Article 190 of the Treaty are reproduced below: 
Article 190 (Extracts) 
1. The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the 
States brought together in the Community shall be elected by direct 
universal suffrage. 
3. Representatives shall be electedfor a term of jive years. 
2.2.3.4 The Economic and Social Committee 
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Set out in Table 2.11 are the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (op. cit.) articles that define the constitution of the Economic and 
Social Committee and the articles that determine how people become members of the 
Economic and Social Committee. 
Table 2.11 Constitution and Membership of the Economic and Social Committee 
Articles on the Articles on 
Constitution Membership 
257-262 
258-259 
For clarity the text of Article 259 of the Treaty is reproduced below: 
Article 259 
1. The members of the Committee shall be appointedfor four years, on 
proposals from the Member States. The Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, shall adopt the list of members drawn up in accordance with the 
proposals made by each Member State. The term of office of the members of 
the Committee shall be renewable. 
2. The Council shall consult the Commission. It may obtain the opinion of 
European bodies which are representative of the various economic and 
social sectors to which the activities of the Community are of concern. 
The text of Articles 257-262 (op. cit.) indicates that the candidates for membership be 
fully representative of Member State society; this requirement is taken to mean 
employers, employees, professional workers and craftsmen. These categories are 
sometimes referred to as Groups3? 
34 
It has not been possible to fully describe the United Kingdom process in support of 
appointments to the Economic and Social Committee. However, a written reply from 
Sir Stephen Wall of the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office provides some 
insights into the process as follows: '". applications should be sent to the Department 
of Trade and Industry for Group I (employers) and Group II (workers), or to the 
Foreign Office for Group III (various interestslcivil society) ". 'and 'Outside 
organisations (including the CBI and TUC) select candidates they wish to put forward, 
or individuals apply to the DTIor the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foreign 
Secretary and then the Prime Minister must approve nominations ". ' Approved 
nominations then go forward for confirmation of appointment by the Council of 
Ministers. 
2.2.3.5 Summary 
The above text has highlighted the processes by which people become members of the 
Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and of the Economic and Social 
Committee, the four EC institutions identified in Table 2.7 as those institutions involved 
with the EC internal market technical legislative process. 
A useful division of the four EC institutions can be made based on the processes of 
membership. Members of each of the European Parliament and of Council are elected, 
directly or indirectly, by the citizens of the Member States. Within the Consolidated 
Version ofthe Treaty Establishing the European Community (op. cit.) no caveats 
concerning candidates for election, nor the allegiances of those elected, are specified. 
For Commissioners, appointees, the Treaty (op. cit.) lays down that they should be 
chosen on the grounds of their general competence and independence. For members of 
the Economic and Social Committee, again appointees, the Treaty (op. cit.) requires that 
the members not be bound by any mandatory instructions, that they shall be completely 
3? The Members of the ESC are sometimes seen as members of groups within the ESC based on the 
sector of society that they are representing. When such references are made then Group I are employers, 
Group II are trade unionists/workers and Group III are professional workers and craftsmen/other interests. 
Bainbridge T, 1998, The Penguin Companion to EUROPEAN UNION, Second Edition, Penguin, London 
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independent and that the composition of the Committee shall take account of the need to 
ensure adequate representation of the various categories of economic and social activity. 
2.2.4 LANGUAGES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
At the commencement of this research there was no preconception that language was a 
major issue to the EC internal market technical legislative process. It was nevertheless 
recognised that the rich diversity of European Union languages could carry a significant 
burden of costs, in both time and money, to the legislative process. Any cost burden 
incurred in the management of European Community affairs being an inevitable 
outcome of the recognition, within successive treaties, of Member States' own language 
traditions. 
Section 1.2 makes it clear that this thesis is not a legal analysis of the EC internal 
market technical legislative process nor is it a legal analysis of other aspects of the 
Treaty. This thesis is concerned with the management of engagement with a process. 
Management of engagement with a process can only be achieved when the target 
process is known. The top-level description of this process appears in legal documents. 
An understanding of the languages to be accommodated by the EC internal market 
technical legislative process is to be obtained from a study of the treaties. The 
preliminary, somewhat cursory, study of the Treaty38 undertaken to establish the 
languages to be accommodated, revealed that there are two different processes each 
establishing a set of languages with which the EC institutions are required to have 
competence. 
Language in itself was not initially seen as an EC internal market technical legislative 
process issue other than the associated cost burdens to deal with a multiplicity of 
languages. The incidental finding that there are two routes by which the language 
competence of EC institutions is determined was seen as an EC internal market 
technical legislative process issue that should be investigated further. This investigation 
led to a broader investigation of the treatment of languages by the EC institutions. 
38 N.S above 
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The literature search identified two strands to the use of language within the European 
Union and its institutions. The first strand, the authentic languages39 of the treaties, are 
specified within the treaties. The second strand, official languages and working 
languages, are not specified directly within the treaties but instead are determined by 
Council. These two strands to the use of language will be considered separately. 
During the latter stages of the preparation of this thesis the EU was enlarged from 
fifteen to twenty five Member States, with effect from 1st May 2004. One of the effects 
of this enlargement was the establishment of nine additional authentic languages and 
nine additional official languages and working languages of the EU. These additional 
languages are: Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, 
Slovak and Slovene. 
The discussion and analysis in Sections 2.2.4.1 - 2.2.4.3 are based on events that 
occurred prior to the May 2004 enlargement. Full recognition of the existence of the 
additional languages is acknowledged. In the interests of clarity within this thesis, the 
subsequent references to and discussion about languages of the EU and the problems 
that have been identified is restricted to the situation as it existed prior to the May 2004 
EU expansion except where specifically noted. 
Initially it may seem unclear as to why the use of language within the EU is relevant to 
a critical review of the EC internal market technical legislative process. The following 
sections demonstrate how the language provisions, distributed as they are through the 
Treaties, contribute to a lack of clarity and also how the EC institutions fail to act in a 
manner that is both consistent and in accordance with agreements. Each of these 
situations provides evidence that is drawn upon in later Chapters. 
2.2.4.1 Authentic languages of the treaties 
From the outset of this discussion it is helpful to understand what is meant by the phrase 
'authentic languages of the treaties' . An extract from Article 100 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community40 is reproduced below: 
39 Hartley (2003) describes authentic languages by stating that Treaties are' authentic in the official 
languages of all of the Member States'. See also Section 2.2.4.1 
40 N.1 above 
Article 100(Extract) 
This Treaty, drawn up in a single original, shall be deposited in the archives oj 
the Government of the French Republic, which shall transmit a certified copy 
thereof to each of the Governments of the other signatory States. 
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The implication of this statement would appear to be that there is only a single language 
Treaty original (French), it is unclear from the above extract if the certified copies are in 
French or in some other language for each of the signatory States. No evidence has 
been found in the literature search to suggest that this lack of clarity has contributed 
either directly or indirectly to any particular problems related to the application of this 
Treaty. 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community41 introduced a rather 
different specification of 'authentic languages'. For ease of reference the full text of 
Article 248 of the Treaty of Rome is reproduced below: 
Article 248 
This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Dutch, French, German and 
Italian languages, all four texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited in 
the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which shall transmit a 
certified copy to each of the Governments of the other signatory States. 
There were six founding Member States of the EEC yet only four authentic languages 
are identified in the above quotation. Each of the other two founding Member States 
uses more than one of the authentic languages. Belgium uses Dutch, French and 
German in different geographical regions (Roney, 1998) and Luxembourg uses French 
for administrative purposes and German for the press and commerce (op. cit.). 
The expansion of the original EEC of six Member States into what had become, by 
April 2004, the EU of fifteen Member States was achieved via four Treaties of 
Accession. These four Treaties, together with Council Decisions rescinding the 
authenticity ofthe Norwegian text, added eight authentic languages. These Treaties, 
their references and the added authentic languages are summarised in Table 2.12 
41 N.2 above 
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Table 2.12 Authentic languages of Treaties 
Treaty 
Treaty of Paris42 
Treaty of Rome4j 
Treaty of Accession44 
Council Decision 4J 
Treaty of Accession4O 
Treaty of Accession 41 
Treaty of Accession4t1 
Council Decision4Y 
Treaty of 
Amsterdam50 
Treaty ofNiceJI 
42 N.l above 
43 N.3 above 
Authentic Languages of Treaty 
French 
Dutch, French, German & Italian 
Addition of Danish, English, Irish & 
Norwegian 
Removal of Norwegian 
Addition of Greek 
Addition of Portuguese & Spanish 
Addition of Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish 
Removal of Norwegian 
Re-statement of authentic languages 
Re-statement of authentic languages 
44 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the 
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Member States of 
the European Communities), the Kingdom of Denmark, Eire, the Kingdom of Norway, the United 
Kingdom, concerning the accession to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community by the Kingdom of Denmark, Eire, the Kingdom of Norway, the United Kingdom, 
OJ 1972 L 73/5-11 (In French) 
45 Council decision of the European Communities of 1 January 1973 adjusting the instruments concerning 
the accession of new Member States to the European Communities, OJ 1973 L 2/1-11 
46 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Eire, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the United Kingdom (Member States of the European 
Communities) and the Hellenic Republic concerning the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the 
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 1979 L 29119-16 
47 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Eire, the French Republic, the Hellenic Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Member States of the European Communities) 
and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic concerning the accession of the Kingdom of 
Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic 
Energy Community, OJ 1985 L 302/9-22 
48 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Eire, the French Republic, the Hellenic Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Spain, and the United 
Kingdom (Member States of the European Communities) and the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of 
Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden concerning the accession of the Kingdom of 
Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European 
Union, OJ 1994 C 24119-20 
49 Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning 
the accession of new Member States to the European Union (95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC), OJ 1995 L 111-
13 
50 N.6 above 
51 NA above 
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Article 248 of the original Treaty of Rome52 has been superseded by the provisions of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam53 and became Article 314 of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community54, a provision that was unchanged by the 
Treaty of Nice55 . Article 31456 confirms the authenticity of this revised Treaty of Rome 
in twelve languages. The text of extracts from Article 314 are reproduced below: 
Article 314 (Extracts) 
This treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Dutch, French, German and 
Italian languages, all four texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited in 
the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which shall transmit a 
certified copy to each of the Governments of the other signatory States. 
Pursuant to the Accession Treaties, the Danish, English, Finnish, Greek, 
Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish versions of this Treaty shall also be 
authentic. 
In summary the authentic languages of the ED of fifteen Member States, enshrined in 
the Treaty of Nice are, in alphabetical order: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, 
German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. 
2.2.4.2 Official languages and working languages 
It is of interest to note that Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome57 provides for the Council 
to determine the rules governing the languages of the institutions of the EEC. The text 
of Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome (op. cit.) is reproduced below: 
Article 217 
The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the 
Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously. 
It is evident from the above text that power to determine the languages of the 
Community institutions rests with the Council. This power was first exercised through 
52 N.3 above 
53 N.6 above 
54 N.7 above 
55NA above 
56 N.5 above 
57 N.3 above 
Council Regulation 158 and specified Dutch, French, German and Italian to be the 
official languages and working languages of the Community institutions. 
Following each of the Treaties of Accession that gave rise to an expansion of the 
EEC/EC there was a corresponding Council Act or Decision that modified the list of 
official languages and working languages of the EEC. This sequence of changes is 
summarised in Table 2.13 
Table 2.13 Official languages and working languages 
40 
II Authority 
I 
Official languages and 
working languages 
Council Regulation No 1 of 15 AprilI958:J~ Dutch, French, German & 
Italian 
Act concerning accession and adaptation of the Addition of Danish, 
treaties60 English & Norwegian 
Council Decision of the European Communities of 1 Removal of Norwegian 
January 1973 adjusting the documents concerning 
the accession of the new Member States to the 
European Communities61 
Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Addition of Greek 
Hellenic Republic and the adjustments to the 
treaties62 
Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Addition of Portuguese & 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and 
the adjustments to the treaties63 
Spanish 
Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Addition of Finnish, 
Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Norwegian and Swedish 
Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden 
and the adjustments to the treaties64 
Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 Removal of Norwegian 
January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning 
the accession of new Member States to the European 
Union65 
58 Reglement no. 1 portant fixation du regime linguistic de la Communaute Economique Europeenne, OJ 
17/385-386 (In French) 
59 N.58 above 
60 Acte relatif aux conditions d'ladhesion et aux adaptations des traits, OJl972 L 73/122 
61 N.45 above 
62 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Hellenic Republic and the adjustments to the 
Treaties, OJ 1979 L 22/113 
63 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and 
the adjustments to the Treaties, OJ 1985 L Series Number 302/242 
64 N.48 above 
65 N.49 above 
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Article 217 of the original Treaty of Rome66 has been superseded by the provisions of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam67 and became Article 290 of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community68. The Treaty ofNice69 made, what is 
for this research, the minor change that substituted the word 'statute' for 'rules of 
procedure'. There has been no change of authority to specify the official languages and 
working languages of the EU/EC since the Treaty of Rome7o - this authority rests with 
Council acting unanimously. 
In summary, the EU/EC of fifteen Member States had eleven official languages and 
working languages authorised by Council, these languages are, in alphabetical order in 
English: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, 
Spanish and Swedish. 
2.2.4.3 A complication 
In the context oflanguage, the Treaty of Rome (op. cit.), as updated by the Treaty of 
Nice7! has two other important changes. The first change was introduced by Article 2 
(11) of the Treaty of Amsterdam72 and added a new paragraph to Article 21 of the 
revised Treaty of Rome73 . The text of this new paragraph is reproduced below: 
Article 21 (Extract) 
Every citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies 
referred to in this Article [21] or in Article 7 in one of the languages 
mentioned in Article 314 and have an answer in the same language. 
The second change was introduced by Article 6 (81) of the Treaty of Amsterdam74, this 
added a new paragraph to Article 314 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community75 whereby Danish, English, Finnish, Greek, 
Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish were added to the list of authentic languages. 
This change was maintained by the Treaty ofNice76. 
66 N.3 above 
67N.6 above 
68N.7 above 
69 NA above 
7° N .3 above 
71 NA above 
72 N.6 above 
73 N.3 above 
74 N.6 above 
75 N.7 above 
76 N A above 
This new paragraph appears, at least in part, to have overridden the power invested in 
Council to determine official languages and working languages of the Community 
institutions. Utilising their power, Council77 has identified eleven official languages 
and working languages for the Community institutions. The addition to Article 21 
within the revised Treaty78 with its links to Article 314 now requires these same 
Community institutions to at least be able to communicate beyond their institutional 
boundaries in the eleven official languages and working languages plus Irish. 
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A check by telephone was made with the Representation of the Commission in London, 
with Mr LBarker of their Policy Unit on 7 December 1998, to determine if the 
Commission was already aware of the apparent discrepancy in language provision. It 
was clear from Mr Barker's response that the Commission in London was not aware of 
this discrepancy and their immediate reaction was one of concern as to how their 
translation service would deal with it. No concern was expressed that the Treaty was 
now less than clear and no undertaking was given that the discrepancy brought to their 
attention would be further investigated and action taken. 
Similarly an enquiry was made by telephone to the Irish Embassy in London on 5 
March 2005 to determine if the apparent changes to the status of Irish as a European 
Union language has, or was seen as likely to cause, any problems. The officiat19 to 
whom this author spoke was neither aware of any problems to date nor expecting any to 
arIse. 
Given that the Treaties now require that the institutions shall be able to communicate to 
the citizens of the Union in any of twelve languages a check was made of various 
institution websites to see what languages were fully served. The results of this 
investigation, carried out on 9 June 200, and again on 11 December 2003, are set out in 
Table 2.14 
77 NA8 above 
78 N.5 above 
79 Beyond reference to the 'Infonnation Unit' no contact details are available. 
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Table 2.14 Languages available on EC institution websites 
EC Institution Website address Number of 'Missing' 
Langua~es Langua~e 
Commission http://europa.eu.int 11 Irish 
European Parliament http://europarl.eu.int 11 Irish 
Council http://ue.eu.int 11 Irish 
Economic and Social http://esc.eu.int 11 Irish 
Committee 
It is of interest to note that each of the four EC institutions listed in Table 2.14 provides 
access to its website in only eleven languages, in each case the 'missing' language being 
Irish. This omission suggests that each of the four EC institutions were either not 
prompted to do anything by the Representation of the Commission in London or have 
chosen to ignore a specific provision of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (op. cit.) or do not see websites as being required 
to meet the provisions of Article 21 of the Treaty. This researcher has not been able to 
test the application of Article 21 by writing to each, or indeed any, of the four 
institutions in Irish. 
It is perhaps of significance to note that at www.europa.eu.intleur-Iexlenlindex.htm. 
accessed 25 June 2003 under 'News', there existed the comment dated 16105103 'Online 
access to the Treaties in Irish'. There was no indication as to why this news item had 
been included. No other information has been found that explains why this change was 
introduced 6 years after the requirement appears to have been established. The action 
may have been an attempt to resolve the language difficulty for the existing Member 
States before the accession of ten new Member States, and possibly their official 
languages, in May 2004. 
The Manual of Precedents (Council, 2001a) provides for an order of languages for Acts 
falling under secondary legislation. The order of languages, together with their 
approved abbreviations, reproduced from the Manual of Precedents (op. cit) is provided 
in Table 2.15 
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Table 2.15 List of Member States with their national language and its abbreviation 
Member StatelLanguage Abbreviation 
1 Spain (castellano) es 
2 Denmark (dansk) dk 
3 Germany (Deutsch) d 
4 Greece (ellinika) gr 
5 United Kingdom (English) en 
6 France (fram;ais) f 
7 Italy (italiano) i 
8 Dutch (Nederlands) nl 
9 Portugal (portugues) pt 
10 Finland (suomi) fin 
11 Sweden (svenska) sv 
Two interim conclusions can be drawn from Table 2.15. The first interim conclusion 
that may be drawn is that Council, as at May 200 1, accepted that there were only eleven 
official languages and working languages. The second interim conclusion is that 
Council, i.e. representatives of the Member States, agreed the actual official languages 
and working languages and their approved abbreviations. Under such circumstances it 
would seem reasonable to expect that all institutions of the EC would adopt the agreed 
language abbreviations and order of presentation. 
Table 2.16 provides a comparison of official and working languages and their 
abbreviations as used by the various EC institutions. It may be inferred from this table 
that of the EC institutions involved with the EC internal market technical legislative 
process, and the European Court of Justice, none of them comply with the Manual of 
Precedents (op. cit.) - not even Council itself. 
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A reflection on language is provided in the preface by Martin Bangemann, at the time a 
Vice-President of the Commission with responsibility for industry, to a book by Boman 
(1991). An extract from this preface is reproduced below: 
'The problem which the languages of the twelve Member States gave and 
give rise to is still a serious problem within the European Communities. 
Mutual understanding is further complicated by the national and 
international abbreviations to such a degree that the contact between the 
individual Member States often becomes ineffective or impossible. ' 
Since the above statement was made the EC has expanded to fifteen Member States, 
thereby Finnish and Swedish also becoming official languages and working languages 
of the EC. An already acknowledged problem caused by language diversity may be 
exacerbated by further expansion of the EC. Bainbridge (1998) makes the comment 
that: 
'A referendum on membership of the Union in an applicant state would 
certainly be lost if the electorate were to be informed that their national 
language was not to be used in the Union institutions. ' 
Bainbridge (op. cit.) also states that approximately one third of the Commission staff are 
engaged on interpretation and translation services and that there are twenty seven 
languages in use within the European Union as at 1998. From this it is clear that some 
compromises regarding the use of language within the EU can, and surely must, be 
achieved. 
2.2.4.4 Summary 
It appears that up to the very highest levels within the legislative framework of the 
European Union and its institutions there is a lack of care in the preparation and 
application of legislation. Primary legislation, the Treaties, appears to be flawed or at 
least unclear. 
The European Committee for Normalisation (CEN) and the European Committee for 
Electro-technical standardisation (CENELEC) provide good examples of a way forward 
in this type of multilingual environment. CEN and CENELEC are independent 
standardisation bodies outside of the set of EC institutions, but they are bodies that have 
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a special role in support of EC internal market technical legislation. This special role 
will be discussed more fully in Section 3.3.1, for the present the way that multilingual 
needs are dealt with is of relevance. All EC, and EFTA, Member States are also 
Members of CEN and CENELEC through their national standards body, for the United 
Kingdom this is the British Standards Institution (BSI). The diversity of language 
within CEN and CENELEC is, therefore, no less extensive than it is within the EC. 
Within CEN and CENELEC the official languages are restricted to English, French and 
German (CEN, 1996a, Vol. 2). As one would expect CEN/CENELEC rules exist for 
the provision of translations of official language texts in other CEN/CENELEC Member 
languages (CEN, 1996b, Vol. 2) but these translations are under the responsibility of the 
relevant CEN/CENELEC Member. 
There is evidence of unilateral action by EC institutions to alleviate the burden created 
by the current extensive list of official languages and working languages. The Economic 
and Social Committee have published a booklet on the Single Market (Economic and 
Social Committee, 1999), this booklet carries the clear statement' This publication is 
available in the following languages: English, French and German. '. A written 
enquiry was made to the ESC as to why such documents are not available in all of the 
official languages. The written reply set out a pragmatic approach to the situation, the 
relevant extract from the reply is reproduced below: 
A booklet like the one referred to by you is not an official EU-document. It 
gives a quick overview of some of the topics that we have been working on and 
those interested in the opinions mentioned in the document can obtain these in 
any of the 11 official languages. Reducing the number of languages is the only 
realistic way of preparing "overview" - booklets like the one in question. 
There is a hierarchy to EU/EC legislation, EU primary legislation then EC secondary 
legislation within which EC internal market legislation is a sub-set. This hierarchy of 
legislation has similarities to a management hierarchy in an organisation. Within an 
organisation striving for high quality outputs the concepts of quality start from the top -
as strategic objectives (Harvey-Jones, 1993). The achievement of high quality 
standards is by a 'top down' system rather than a 'bottom up' approach. By analogy 
lower level EC secondary legislation is unlikely to be of better quality than the 
controlling EU primary legislation. Any errors, deficiencies or inconsistencies present 
in the treaties would not set a good example, or provide a good role model, for activities 
lower down the hierarchy. 
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Within this section no legal analysis of the status of different languages within the 
European Union has been attempted. What has been shown is that the Treaty has been 
written in a manner that allows the establishment of two different sets of language 
competences for the EC institutions. It has also been shown that the EC institutions 
involved with the EC internal market technical legislative process do not follow the 
requirements specified in the Manual of Precedents (Council, 2001a). Each of these 
two findings is an indicator of the quality of the overall process. 
2.3 Interactions involving the European Community institutions 
The institutions involved with the EC internal market technical legislative process have 
been established, see Table 2.7 It is now necessary to determine the various 
interactions involving these institutions. For the purposes of this research the 
interactions have been divided into three general categories as set out in Table 2.17 It 
is recognised that there is no formal basis for the interactions that are identified as 
Category 3 in Table 2.17 It is clear that interactions between the EC institutions and 
other individuals and organisations take place. When interactions between EC 
institutions and individuals or organisations are initiated by an institution the 
interactions may be described as consultation. When interactions are initiated by 
individuals or by organisations seeking to influence, for their benefit, the outcome of the 
process these interactions may be described as lobbying. Some illustrations of 
opportunities for this type of activity are provided within this section. 
Table 2.17 Categories of interactions involving EC institutions 
Category Description 
1. The formal interactions between the institutions as 
defined in the primary legislation; 
2. The interactions bounded by the institutions - the 
internal processes; 
3. The interactions of each institution with Member State 
governments and with other organisations andlor 
I individuals. 
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2.3.1 THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
It is evident from Table 2.7 that there are four EC institutions involved with the EC 
internal market technical legislative process. In addition to these four institutions it is 
convenient to understand the role of the Official Journal of the European Communities 
(OJEC), created by a Council Decision8!. The OJEC plays a very straightforward role 
as the official publication of the EU, a role analogous to that of the London Gazette or 
the Edinburgh Gazette in the United Kingdom. It is a passive role in that there is no 
dialogue, or other interaction, with other institutions, organisations or individuals either 
inside or outside of the EC institutions. The OJEC role is to publish, and thus make 
publicly available, various texts in the 'C' series82 and in the 'L' series. Publication in 
the OJEC is important in that, in many instances, the act of publication determines the 
date that a given piece of legislation enters into force. 
Treaty provisions for the publication of legislation, up to and including those provisions 
applicable following the entry into force of the Single European Act83 , are elucidated in 
Article 191 of the Treaty of Rome84. For clarity the text of Article 19lis set out below: 
Article 191 
Regulations shall be published in the Official Journal of the Community. 
They shall enter into force on the date specified in them or, in the absence 
thereof on the twentieth day following their publication. 
Directives and decisions shall be notified to those to whom they are 
addressed and shall take effect upon such notification. 
From the above text it can be inferred that there was no requirement to publish the text 
of directives even though directives are essential to the creation of the EC internal 
market. Direct access to source EC internal market legislation was not guaranteed to all 
users. Access to the text of directives improved with the entry into force of the Treaty 
81 Council decision creating the 'Official Journal of the European Communities', OJ 1958 390158, (In 
French) 
82 For the purposes of this research the OJ is published in two series. 'The 'L' (Legislation) series 
contains the texts of all legislative acts of the European Community including Decisions taken by 
representatives of the governments of member states. The 'C' (Communications series contains a wide 
range of other range of other material including the texts of legislative proposals from the European 
Commission, and Opions thereon delivered by other institutions. ' 
Bainbridge T, 1998, The Penguin Companion to EUROPEAN UNION, Second Edition, Penguin, London 
83 N.19 above 
84 N.3 above 
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of Amsterdam85 . For clarity, and for ease of comparison with the earlier text, the text of 
Article 254 (2)86 is reproduced below: 
Article 254 (2) 
Regulations of the Council and of the Commission, as well as directives 
of those institutions which are addressed to all Member States, shall be 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. They shall 
enter into force on the date specified in them or, in the absence thereof, 
on the 20th day following that of their publication. 
It would appear to be a fundamental necessity that Ee internal market directives be 
addressed to all Member States and be guaranteed to be available to all. For the first 
time, from the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam87, the EC internal market 
legislative process requires that the text of directives be published, thereby guaranteeing 
all users direct access to source legislation. The EEC/EC institutions have taken over 
30 years to reach the stage where they guarantee to publish the requirements that they 
set out for the establishment of the EC internal market. 
The OJEC has no other role in the legislative process for EC internal market technical 
legislation and will not be considered further in this part of the discussion. 
One of the minor changes introduced to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the Economic Community88 by Article 2 (38) of the Treaty ofNice89 was a 
re-naming of the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) to Official 
Journal of the European Union (OJEU). Hereafter within this text references will be 
made to the 'Official Journal', in the formal references OJEC and OJEU are used as 
appropriate. This change of name became effective on 1 st February 2003 with the issue 
ofOJEU 'c' Series Number 25 and 'L' Series Number 27. 
85 N.6 above 
86 N.7 above 
87 N.6 above 
88 N.7 above 
89 N.4 above 
2.3.2 THE FORMAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONS AS 
DEFINED IN THE PRIMARY LEGISLATION (CATEGORY 1). 
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Reference to Table 2.3 shows, via Article 9490, that EC internal market technical 
legislation shall be introduced by the issue of directives. Directives are defined in 
Article 249 (op. cit.). The procedure to be followed for the issue ofEC internal market 
directives is that described in Article 251 (op. cit.) amended by the provision of Article 
95 (1)(op. cit.) requiring consultation of the Economic and Social Committee. The text 
of Article 251, as modified by Article 95, is quite complex and an understanding of the 
process is assisted by reference to Figure 2.1 that has been constructed, by this author, 
from the text of Article 251. 
It can be seen from Figure 2.1 that the overall process from the 'Initiating event' all the 
way through to meetings of Council and of the European Parliament following any 
necessary 'Conciliation Meetings' is composed of many steps. The links between the 
various process steps are quite straightforward but it is necessary to understand where in 
the process any particular proposal has reached if any statement about the next step is to 
be made. 
However, Figure 2.1 also shows that if the Commission manages, by whatever 
consultation means are seen as appropriate, to put forward a proposal that is acceptable 
to each of Council and the European Parliament then a satisfactory outcome, with the 
proposal being adopted, can occur much earlier in the process. 
A letter widely distributed by the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive in 
August 1999 includes the following: 'I am sorry to say that my earlier letter does not 
give a clear picture. It confuses the opinion Council must deliver on the European 
Parliament's amendments and the position Council will take for conciliation. I am 
therefore writing again to clarify the process to which ATEX)] will now be subject. 
Please accept my apologies for any confusion this may have caused' This extract 
provides a documented illustration of the lack of understanding by officials of a 
90 N.5 above 
91 Directive 1999/921EC of the of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on 
minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from 
explosive atmospheres (15th individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16( 1) of Directive 
89/391IEEC) OJ 2000 L 23/57-64 
Figure 2.1 Procedure of Article 251 (Codecision) as modified by Article 95 
European Parliament 
Opinion, may include 
proposed amendments. 
The Commission prepares a 
proposal 
Council 
EP 
Amendments? 
Yes 
Council approves all EP 
proposed amendments? 
No 
No 
Yes 
Economic and Social Committee 
Opinion 
Council, acting by Qualified 
Majority, may adopt proposed 
act. 
Council, acting by Qualified 
Majority, may adopt proposed 
act. 
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Figure 2.1 Continued 
8 
Council, acting by Qualified 
Majority, adopts a Common 
Position and gives reasons. 
European Parliament now has 
three months to consider the 
Common Position. 
EP approves Common 
Position or fails to respond 
within the three months. 
EP rejects Common Position 
by absolute majority of its 
component Members. 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Commission prepares 
its position. 
Act in question is 
deemed to have been 
adopted. 
Proposed act shall be 
deemed not to have 
been adopted. 
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Figure 2.1 Continued 
Council considers EP 
amendments and 
Commission opinion. 
Council, within three 
months approves the 
amendments of the EP. 
No 
Within six weeks President of Council 
and President of European Parliament 
shall convene a meeting of the 
Conciliation Committee. 
Conciliation Committee procedures as 
Article 251 (4) - Appendix II 
EP prepares amendments. 
Yes 
Commission considers EP amendments. 
Commission prepares opinion. 
Act in question deemed to have been 
adopted. 
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Figure 2.1 Continued 
Conciliation 
Committee joint 
text agreed? 
Yes 
Council approves 
joint text? 
No 
Proposed act shall be deemed 
not to have been adopted. 
No 
Yes 
Act in question is approved in 
the form of the joint text. 
Proposed act shall be deemed not 
to have been adopted. 
Proposed act shall be deemed 
not to have been adopted. 
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typical Member State of the changes brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam92 . Here 
there is little acknowledgement by officials of a Member State of their need to keep 
abreast of change of the laws, regulations and internal rules that control their work. An 
apology regarding their failure to be aware of the rules governing their work was seen 
by these officials as being all that was required of them. There remains, of course, an 
expectation that those governed in some way by legislation drafted by these same 
officials should be both aware of the legislation and expected to comply with it. A 
simple apology by a member of the public found to be failing to comply with legislation 
is not normally seen as sufficient. 
2.3.3 THE INTERACTIONS BOUNDED BY THE INSTITUTIONS - THE 
INTERNAL PROCESSES (CATEGORY 2). 
Within this sub-section, for each of the four EC institutions previously identified as 
being involved in the EC internal market technical legislative process, two items are 
established. Together these two items allow an assessment of whether the top level 
process description, the treaties, requires individual internal EC institution process 
descriptions and whether any such requirements are met. The first of these items is the 
authority under which the institutions' various Rules of Procedure have been adopted. 
The second of these two items being the Rules of Procedure currently in force, together 
with an outline of the historical development that has culminated in the present 
situation. For clarity of presentation this information is provided in tabular form in 
Tables 2.18 to 2.21 for the Commission and for Council and in Tables 2.23 to 2.26 for 
the European Parliament and for the Economic and Social Committee. 
2.3.3.1 The Commission 
It is important to recognise here that within the Treaty93 references to the Commission 
are taken to be references to the college of Commissioners. As a result of this 
interpretation the Commission Rules of Procedure (Commission, 2000) relate only 
to the college of Commissioners and not to the whole organisation colloquially known 
as the Commission. Within the Rules of Procedure (op. cit.) there is an open reference 
92 N.6 above 
93 N.5 above 
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to additional rules, but these appear not to be identifiable. Three direct enquiries to the 
Commission, most recently in November 2003, have each failed to elicit even an 
Table 2.18 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
Treaty Article Requirement to Act 
[Treaty of Paris f4 13 'The High Authority shall act by a majority of its 
(ECSC) members. The rules of procedure shall determine 
the quorum. ' 
NOTE: It is not stated who shall adopt the Rules of Procedure. 
[Treaty of 162 'The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure 
Rome]95 so as to ensure that both it and its departments 
(EEC) operate in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty. It shall ensure that these rules of procedure 
are published. ' 
[Treaty of 131 'The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure 
Rome]96 so as to ensure that both it and its departments 
(Euratom) operate in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty. It shall ensure that these rules of procedure 
are published. ' 
[Merger Treaty]'" 16 'The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure 
so as to ensure that both it and its departments 
operate in accordance with the provisions of the 
EEC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties and of this 
Treaty. It shall ensure that these rules are published.' 
Repeals [Treaty of Rome] (EEC) Article 162, 
[Treaty of Paris] (ECSC) Article 13 and [Treaty of 
19 Rome] (Euratom) Article 131. 
[Maastricht G48, [Treaty of Rome] (EEC) Article 162, [Treaty of 
Treaty] 98 H 3, I 8 Rome] (Euratom) Article 131 and [Treaty of Paris] 
[Treaty on (ECSC) Article 13 insertions within which each (2) 
European Union] states: 'The Commission shall adopt its rules of 
procedure so as to ensure that both it and its 
departments operate in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty. It shall ensure that these 
rules are published. ' 
acknowledgement. This despite the inclusion, as an Annex to the Rules of Procedure 
(op. cit.), oftheir adopted 'Code of Good Administrative Behaviour for Staff of the 
Commission in their Relations with the General Public' - wherein Paragraph 4 Dealing 
with Enquiries begins with the statement: 'The Commission undertakes to answer 
enquiries in the most appropriate manner and as quickly as possible.' Given that three 
94 N.1 above 
95 N.3 above 
96 N.17 above 
97 N.18 above 
98 N.20 above 
direct enquiries for references to any additional rules have each failed to gain any 
response then the commitment of the Commission, at all levels of the organisation, to 
the 'Code of Good Administrative Behaviour' is in doubt. 
Table 2.19 Historical development of the Commission's Rules of Procedure 
What was adopted Quoted authority to adopt Reference 
Commission Decision Article 218(2)'1'1 Commission Decision1uu 
amending its Rules of (NB. There was no direct 
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Procedure reference to the document 
being amended.) 
Rules of Procedure Article 218(2)( op. cit.) Commission, 290Qb 
2.3.3.2 The Council 
For the purposes of this section ofthe research the provenance of Council's Rules of 
Procedure is of interest rather than the detail contained within the Rules of Procedure. 
No evidence has been found of unpublished Council Rules of Procedure. Thus it is 
assumed that Council Rules of Procedure adopted on 24 July 1979 were the first such 
Rules of Procedure. The Treaty of Paris (ECSC)101 and the Treaties of Rome (EEC and 
Euratom)I02 pre-date the Merger Treatyl03 by sixteen and ten years respectively. Each 
of these three treaties contain the imperative 'Council shall adopt its rules of 
procedure.' It is not until a further twelve years after the Merger Treaty that Council 
demonstrates compliance with a provision of the treaties. No explanation for this 
substantial delay is available. From the perspective of an individual citizen of the ED 
such delays in taking action, even though time limits for compliance were not specified 
in the treaties, demonstrate a low regard for the provisions of the treaties, i.e. primary 
ED law, by Council. 
Notwithstanding the above criticism of the delay in adoption of the Council Rules of 
Procedure a study of the current Rules of Procedure (Council, 1993, 1995) shows them 
to be quite detailed and generally written in the imperative form. The previous 
99 N.7 above 
100 Commission Decision of 17 October 2000 amending its Rules of Procedure (2000/633/EC), OJ 2000 L 
Series Number 267/63-66 
101 N.l above 
102 N.3 and N.17 above 
103 N.18 above 
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paragraph suggests that Council have exhibited a low regard, over a long period, for 
primary law. With Council exhibiting such low regard for primary law there can be no 
certainty that Council will rigorously adhere to other rules, perhaps with less authority 
than primary law, that are intended to govern Council's actions. The rules are such that 
Table 2.20 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the Council 
Treaty Article Requirement to Act 
[Treaty of Paris] lU4 30 'The Council shall adopt its rules of 
(ECSC) procedure. ' 
[Treaty of Rome] IV' 151 'The Council shall adopt its rules of 
(EEC) procedure. ' 
[Treaty of Rome] lU6 121 'The Council shall adopt its rules of 
(Euratom) procedure. ' 
[Merger Treaty]lv' 5 'The Council shall adopt its rules of 
procedure. ' 
7 Repeals [Treaty of Rome] (EEC) Article 
151, [Treaty of Paris] (ECSC) Article 30 
and [Treaty of Rome] (Euratom) Article 
121. 
[Maastricht G46, [Treaty of Rome] (EEC) Article 151, 
Treaty]l08 H 10, [Treaty of Rome] (Euratom) Article 121 
I6 and [Treaty of Paris] Article 30 insertions 
within which each (3) states: 'The Council 
shall adopt its rules of procedure. ' 
[Treaty of 2,3,4 [Treaty of Rome] (EEC) Article 151, 
Amsterdam] l09 [Treaty of Rome] (Euratom) Article 121 
and [Treaty of Paris] (ECSC) Article 30 
replacements within which each (3) states: 
I 'The Council shall adopt its rules of 
procedure. ' I 
[Treaty ofNice]lIv No change to existing provisions. I 
researchers have limited access to information on the actual workings of Council lll . As 
a result external quality audits of Council's workings are restricted in scope and rely on 
assessment methods that can be conducted by a review of the output from Council. 
104 N.1 above 
105 N.3 above 
106 N.17 above 
107 N.18 above 
108 N.20 above 
109 N.6 above 
110 N.4 above 
III This author is aware of the existence of a body of European Court of Justice case law on access to 
information, transparency, but detailed discussion of it is outside the scope of this research. 
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Table 2.21 Historical development of the Council's Rules of Procedure 
What was adopted Quoted Authority to Reference 
adopt 
Council rules of procedure adopted by [Merger Treaty] 112, Council, 1979 
Council on 24 July 1979 Article 5 
Council, amendment of the Council's [Merger Treaty], Article Council, 1987 
rules of procedure adopted by Council 5 (op. cit.) 
on 20 July 1987 
Council Decision of 6 December 1993 [Treaty of Rome] 114 
adopting the Council's Rules of 
Procedure 1 13 
(EEC) Article 151 (3), 
[Treaty of Paris] 115 
(ECSC) Article 30 (3) 
and [Treaty of Rome] 116 
(Euratom) Article 121 
(3). 
Council Decision of 6 February 1995 [Treaty ofRome]llll 
amending the Council Decision of 6 (EEC) Article 151 (3), 
December 1993 adopting the [Treaty ofParis]119 
Council's Rules of Procedure, (ECSC) Article 30 (3) 
following the accession of Austria, and [Treaty of Rome] 120 
Finland and Sweden 117 (Euratom) Article 121 
(3). 
~--- ~---
A Council Decision known as the Modules Decision121 appears to lay down a series of 
quality assessment modules to be applied to all EC internal market new approach 
technical harmonisation directives. It is clear both from the text and context of this 
Council Decision that it is directed at the drafters of EC internal market new approach 
technical harmonisation directives, no other group of people is in a position to directly 
make use of this Council Decision. The Council Decision, if implemented as written, 
would apply the same regime of quality assessment modules to all EC internal market 
112 N.18 above 
113 Council Decision of 6 December 1993 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (93/662/EC), OJ 
1993 L 304 
114 N.3 above 
115 N.l above 
116N.17 above 
II? Council Decision of 6 February 1995 amending the Council Decision of 6 December 1993 adopting 
the Council's Rules of Procedure, following the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (95/24/EC, 
Euratom, ECSC), OJ 1995 L 31/14 
liS N.3 above 
119 N.l above 
120 N.17 above 
121 Council Decision of22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity 
assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity marking, which are 
intended to be used in the technical harmonisation directives (93/465IEEC)[Modules Decision], OJ 1993 
L 220/23-39 
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new approach technical harmonisation directives while allowing for minor deviations to 
the quality assessment regimes where such deviations can be, and are, expressly 
justified in individual EC internal market new approach technical harmonisation 
directives. From a manufacturing perspective the application of the Council Decision in 
the way that it is written would be of benefit. This Council Decision fails to comply 
with the requirements of the Treaties in force by not being addressed to anyone. As a 
result, the Council Decision is seen by Commission officials, i.e those people who have 
drafted and continue to draft directives, as not applying to them. To check if this error 
of omission by Council was a rare aberration or was perhaps common practice the first 
five Council Decisions published in the Official Journal for each ofthe three years 
available at the time, 1996, 1997 and 1998 were investigated to see to whom they were 
addressed. The results of this investigation are given in Table 2.22 
Table 2.22 A review of addressees of Council Decisions 
Council Decision Official Journal of the European To Whom 
Communities Reference Addressed 
96/411EC L Series Number 12, 1996, p13 Not addressed 
96/88IEC L Series Number 21, 1996, p47 Not addressed 
96/89/EC L Series Number 21, 1996, p66 Not addressed 
96/90/EC L Series Number 21, 1996, p67 United Kingdom • 
96/911EC L Series Number 21, 1996, p69 Not addressed • 
97/7/EC L Series Number 3, 1997, p6 The Member States 
97/8/EC L Series Number 3, 1997, p7 The Member States 
i 97/9/EC L Series Number 3, 1997, p8 Not addressed 
I 
I 97115IEC L Series Number 6, 1997, p25 Not addressed 
97116/EC L Series Number 6, 1997, p32 Not addressed 
· 
98/1/EC L Series Number 1, 1998 p6 Not addressed • 
98/2/EC L Series Number 1, 1998 p8 Sweden 
98/3/EC L Series Number 1, 1998 p9 The Member States 
98/17/EC L Series Number 7, 1998 p27 Not addressed 
98/18/EC ... ~Se!i~~umber 7, 1998 p3? Not addressed. 
A review of the data of Table 2.22 shows that out of the total of fifteen Council 
Decisions reviewed only five are addressed, thus leaving ten out of the total of fifteen 
failing to meet a simple requirement specified in the treaties, Article 249122. 
122 N.5 above 
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A later review ofthe first five Council Decisions published in the Official Journal for 
each of 2001, 2002 and 2003 revealed that only three out of the fifteen Council 
Decisions were addressed. This result suggests there had been no improvement in 
Council's compliance with the requirement of Article 249 (op. cit.). A similar review of 
Commission Decisions for the same six years showed that all thirty of the decisions 
were properly addressed. 
The preceding paragraphs, together with the data within Table 2.22, suggest that 
Council is not assiduous in its application of primary law. Two possible explanations 
are offered; the first is a simple failure of procedure based perhaps on a lack of 
knowledge by Council and its Secretariat. The second possible explanation is a 
disregard for the provisions of those parts of the treaties that apply to Council. A 
possible response from Council, if challenged, might be that the addressees are self 
evident from the title and application of the Council Decisions. This author would have 
some sympathy with any such response but would remind Council that the Treaty (op. 
cit.) does not provide discretion even in the case ofthe perception of self evident 
addressees. The relevant clause of Article 249 (op. cit.) reads: 'A decision shall be 
binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. ' If a Council Decision is not 
addressed it is not binding on anyone and brings into question why it was produced at 
all. 
The Commission have been shown to be operating correctly in their addressing of 
decisions, however the Commission appears to be guilty of failing in its enforcement 
role. Hartley (2003) draws to our attention the lack of discretion available to the 
Commission in the application of Article 211 123 which requires that the Commission 
shall: 'ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied'. Hartley (2003) also notes that any 
Commission action in its enforcement role would only be initiated after careful 
consideration and possibly lengthy investigation. It is perhaps reasonable that single 
aberrations by Council in failing to address a decision may not cause the Commission to 
act. It then becomes a moot point about when Council's failures become systematic, 
possibly deliberate, failures to comply with treaty obligations that could be expected to 
initiate enforcement action by the Commission. 
123 N.5 above 
Whatever the reason, the effect of such failure to comply with the treaties can cause 
unnecessary difficulty to those outside of the EC institutions, e.g. manufacturing 
industry as outlined above. 
2.3.3.3 The European Parliament 
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At the time of writing (August 2004) the most recent European Parliamentary elections 
were held throughout the European Union in June 2004. The Members of the European 
Parliament (MEP) duly elected in the various Member States were also declared in June 
2004. Following the declaration of the MEPs various administrative procedures were 
carried out to fully establish the new European Parliament. At no time has there been a 
treaty obligation to publish the European Parliament Rules of Procedure. 
Table 2.23 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the European 
Parliament 
Treaty 
[Treaty of Paris] 1L4 
(ECSC) 
[Treaty of Rome] 1L:l 
(EEC) 
[Treaty of Rome] ILb 
(Euratom) 
[Treaty of 
Amsterdam] 127 
[Treaty of Nice] WI 
124 N.1 above 
125 N.3 above 
126 N.17 above 
127 N.6 above 
128 NA above 
Article Requirement to Act 
25 'The Assembly shall adopt its rules of 
procedure acting by a majority of its 
members.' 
142 'The Assembly shall adopt its rules of 
procedure acting by a majority of its 
members.' 
112 'The Assembly shall adopt its rules of 
procedure acting by a majority of its 
members.' 
Annex No change other than within 'Consolidated 
B version of the Treaty Establishing the 
Economic Community' Article 142 
becomes Article 199. 
No change to existing provisions. 
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Table 2.24 Historical development of the European Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure 
What was adoj)ted Quoted Authority to adopt Reference 
1 st to 3 ro Editions None found 
4tll Edition June 1987 None included, nor is any record European Parliament, 
of their adoption provided. 1987 
5tll to 13 til Editions None found 
14m Edition June 1999 None included, nor is any record European Parliament, I 
1999a,b I 
-
_ ..... __ ... _ .... _-
_of t~etr a~2Ption provided. 
- ... - ... - ... -~ 
2.3.3.4 The Economic and Social Committee 
From Table 2.25 it should be noted that since the coming into force ofthe Treaty on 
European Union129 there has been no requirement for Council to approve the ESC Rules 
of Procedure. Table 2.26 shows, briefly, the historical development of the ESC Rules 
of Procedure. At no time has there been a treaty obligation to publish the ESC Rules of 
Procedure. 
Table 2.25 Authority for creation of the Rules of Procedure of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Treaty 
[Treaty ofParis]UU 
(ECSC) 
[Treaty of 
Rome]l3l 
(EEC) 
I [Treaty of 
Rome] 132 
(Euratom) 
[Maastricht 
Treaty] 133 [Treaty 
on European 
Union] 
[Treaty of 
Amsterdam] 134 
[Treaty ofNice]m 
129 N .20 above 
130 N.1 above 
131 N.3 above 
132 N.17 above 
133 N.20 
134 N.6 above 
135 N.4 above 
Article Requirement to Act 
18 ' A Consultative Committee shall be attached to 
the High Authority.' 'The Committee shall adopt 
its rules of procedure.' 
196 'It shall adopt its rules of procedure and shall 
submit them to the Council for its approval, 
which must be unanimous. ' 
168 'It shall adopt its rules of procedure and shall 
submit them to the Council for its approval, 
which must be unanimous.' 
G65, [Treaty of Rome] (EEC) Article 196 and [Treaty 
18 of Rome] (Euratom) Article 168 replacements 
within which each paragraph (2) states: 'It shall 
adopt its rules of procedure. ' 
Annex No change other than within 'Consolidated 
B version of the Treaty Establishing the Economic 
Community' Article 196 becomes Article 260. 
No change to existing provisions. 
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Table 2.26 Historical development of the Economic and Social Committee's Rules 
of Procedure 
What was adopted Quoted Authority to Reference 
adopt 
Rules of Procedure None included, nor is any Was at www.esc.eu.int, now 
September 1998 record of their adoption superceded 
provided. 
Rules of Procedure Article 260(2)uO www.esc.eu.intI,Qages/enihome.as12 
July 2002 (Article 260(2) does not (Click on 'Rules of Procedure') 
exist - should refer to 
Article 260) 
On the interim assumption that the Rules available have legitimacy they provide a clear 
basis for the operation of the ESC. An appealing requirement is the duty of the oldest 
member of the ESC to convene the first meeting for the initial proceedings of a newly 
constituted ESC. The oldest member was to be assisted by the four youngest members, 
while the officers - President, Vice-presidents etc - are elected. The requirement for 
the four youngest members to be involved in the first meeting as described above no 
longer exists in the July 2002 version of the Rules of Procedure. 
2.3.3.5 Summary 
For the European Parliament the data of Table 2.23 suggests that there have been ten 
editions of their Rules of Procedure since the 4th Edition in 1987 (European Parliament, 
1987). On average each edition has been valid for a period of a little over 14 months. 
In Section 2.3.4 the Rules of Procedure will be looked at in some detail to investigate 
their role in establishing interfaces to the world beyond the EC institutions, in this 
context the length of time between successive changes to the Rules of Procedure may be 
found to be of significance. 
It can be seen that some of the Tables above are lacking in some details. These 
omissions are caused by an inability of the researcher to access the missing data. For the 
European Parliament it can be seen that data on editions 5 to 13 inclusive of their Rules 
of Procedure is not fully reported. With frequent changes, and no obligation to publish, 
it may be that these editions were never published into the public domain. Enquiries of 
the European Parliament have not successfully clarified if this was indeed the case. 
136 N.5 above 
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From the above data it is suggested that two conclusions can be drawn, the first is that 
without treaty obligations to publish their Rules of Procedure the institutions appear to 
have been satisfied with keeping the Rules of Procedure out of the public domain, with 
greater use of the internet this criticism has become less valid. The second conclusion 
is that it is far from certain that the institutions will meet their treaty obligations. 
2.3.4 THE INTERACTIONS OF EACH INSTITUTION WITH MEMBER STATE 
GOVERNMENTS AND WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS 
(CATEGORY 3). 
It has already been established (Section 2.3 .2) that the controlling process for new and 
amending EC internal market directives is the codecision process of Article 251 137. 
This process does not specifically call for any interaction by any of the EC institutions 
involved in the process with other organisations that are themselves not EC institutions. 
Thus any interactions that occur between EC institutions and other organisations are in 
addition to treaty requirements. It should also be noted that the Treaty (op. cit.) does 
not explicitly prohibit interactions between EC institutions and other organisations. 
What exists, then, is a situation where the EC institutions may consult with other 
organisations either as a result of each institution's own Rules of Procedure or in an ad 
hoc way. Within the remainder of Section 2.3.4 the evidence relating to formal and/or 
ad hoc interactions between individual EC institutions and other organisations is 
presented. 
2.3.4.1 The Commission 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3.2 the publicly available Rules of Procedure (Commission, 
2000) do not include the modus operandi for Commission officials. As a result EC 
internal market practitioners do not have ready access to information that describes the 
processes and procedures, if indeed they exist, that pertain to Commission officials 
following an initial instruction to officials to work on a particular piece of draft 
legislation. There is therefore a distinct gap in process information from initiation of 
137 N.5 above 
draft legislation until such time as the proposal becomes official and initiates the 
codecision process. 
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Despite the lack of transparency of the process it is clear that ad hoc interactions 
between the Commission and other organisations do take place. This author has himself 
been a representative of CECOD, the European petrol pump manufacturers' association, 
in discussion with Commission officials regarding the early drafts of the proposed 
Measuring Instruments Directive. It became clear during these discussion that other 
organisations had met with, and were to meet with, Commission officials. It also 
became clear that those organisations with an active and permanent presence in Brussels 
had the earliest and therefore most powerful voice. 
2.3.4.2 The Council 
It is evident from this author's professional experience of working with the Department 
of Trade and Industry's (DTI) Standards and Technical Regulations Directorate (STRD) 
and with their National Weights and Measures Laboratory (NWML) that Member State 
government officials are involved with Commission officials prior to the codecision 
process. Depending on the relationship that exists between a UK organisation and the 
DTI then that UK organisation may have an opportunity to influence the UK's position 
in the early stages of negotiations. The relationship of any organisation with DTI rests 
primarily with the organisation rather than with DTI. It clearly must remain the 
responsibility of the various organisations to ensure that their interest in certain 
legislative areas is made known to DTI. It would be unreasonable to expect that the 
DTI should be proactive and required to keep tabs on all organisations that might have 
an interest in any potential legislative area. 
Once the codecision process is initiated then Council, via Council and its subsets as 
defined in the Treaty138, has a significant and defined role to play. This author's 
experience suggests that Council working group members representing the UK can be 
receptive to external views provided that these views are well documented and well 
supported by appropriate evidence. 
138 N.5 above 
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Once new EC internal market technical legislation is adopted then the Member States' 
role changes from being one of a group negotiating a collective way forward to that of 
being in the lead role for a single Member State's transposition of the new directive into 
national law. In the past transposition may have been a somewhat arbitrary process but 
with the publication of the Cabinet Office's 'Transposition Guide' (Cabinet Office, 
2003) the transposition process becomes much more transparent. Of particular interest 
to internal market practitioners is its requirement to 'Ensure appropriate consultation 
with external stakeholders ... " a requirement that, if fully implemented by UK 
government departments, will surely produce beneficial outcomes. 
2.3.4.3 The European Parliament 
Chapter VIII 'Legislative Procedures' of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure 
(European Parliament, 1999) contains detailed procedures for all stages of legislative 
activity within the European Parliament. Within these procedures there are no 
requirements placed upon the overall parliamentary apparatus to consult with interested 
parties outside of the EC institutions. This author can confirm from first hand 
experience that the parliamentary committee system via rapporteurs of Parliamentary 
committees, can and does, welcome well researched submissions from external 
organisations. The windows of opportunity for the input of such submissions are 
narrow because of the procedural timetables and in general the submissions need to be 
made on the initiative of the outside organisations rather than by invitation. 
Article 194 139 confers on European Union citizens, and others, the right to petition the 
European Parliament on matters that affect them. This right, together with the services 
made available through the offices of the European Ombudsman (op. cit. Article 195) 
should not be seen as ways to affect the passage of legislative proposals through the 
legislative change process, see Section 4.3.2.4 
There are no treaty provisions for formal dialogue between the European Parliament and 
Member State national parliaments. However most, but not all, UK elected Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) are representative of the major political parties of the 
UK parliament and contact with national Members of Parliament are to be expected. 
139 N.S above 
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2.3.4.4 The Economic and Social Committee 
Setting it apart from the other institutions Chapter VI 'Observatories, Hearings, Experts' 
of the Economic and Social Committee's Rules of Procedure (ESC, 2002) makes 
specific provisions for outside speakers and experts from outside the ESC to assist in 
their work. This author has no first hand knowledge of making submissions to the ESC 
and since it is only a consultative body submissions to it rather than to the Commission, 
the Council and to the European Parliament are less likely to have a significant effect on 
the final outcome of legislative proposals. 
There are no provisions in either the Treaty140 or the Rules of Procedure (ESC, 1999a) 
for direct contact between the ESC and Member State national parliaments. 
2.3.4.5 Summary 
Section 2.3.4 has provided an insight into the opportunities that exist for individuals and 
organisations to interface with the EC institutions involved in internal market technical 
legislative change. Whilst opportunities to interact with the institutions clearly exist a 
proactive approach from outside is likely to be more successful than reliance on reacting 
to invitations to participate. 
2.4 An extended system 
Section 2.2 identifies the four EC institutions that are formally involved in the EC 
internal market technical legislative process via the Article 251 (op. cit.) process. 
Section 2.3.4, concerned with interactions beyond the EC institutions, clearly implies 
the existence of a wider system 141, albeit not all of the wider system is a formally 
140 N.S above 
141 The word 'system' is used rather than the word 'process' because process implies a flow from an input 
to an output. In the case of interactions between an EC institution and external individuals or 
organisations there is no specific flow direction and the concept of a 'system', within which there is no 
specific flow direction, is more appropriate. Such a system concept fully recognises the legal status of 
that part of the system described in the Treaty. 
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recognised system. To assist in the general understanding by EC internal market 
practitioners, and for ease of making future references, it is helpful to introduce and 
describe the concept of an extended system for the generation of EC internal market 
technical legislation. The core of this extended system being the four EC institutions 
involved in the EC internal market technical legislative process. The introduction of 
this extended system concept should not be construed in any way as compromising the 
legal status of the EC institutions. 
Figure 2.2 Diagrammatic representation of an extended system 
CORE 
Commission 
European Parliament 
Council 
Economic & Social Committee 
NON-CORE 
Member State Governments 
European Ombudsman 
European Court of Justice 
European Trade Associations 
SUPPORT 
European Trade Associations 
National Trade Associations 
European Documentation Centres 
European Information Centres 
Reference works 
Technical Press 
The precision with which the components of such a conceptual extended system can be 
described reduces with movement away from the core. The diagrammatic representation 
of the extended system provided in Figure 2.2 cannot be taken as a definitive picture 
because elements of the support system will come and go. Figure 2.2 does, however, 
provide a helpful guide to the structure of the conceptual extended system. 
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The non-core section of the extended system includes those organisations that the EC 
institutions are bound to take some notice of, but who have no direct control on the 
outcome of the output from the core. From the perspective of an internal market 
practitioner, Member State governments and European trade associations are possible 
routes by which influence may be brought to bear on the output from the core. The 
roles of the European Ombudsman and European Court of Justice are non-executive 
roles in the EC internal market technical legislative process, they can best be interpreted 
as reactive, post process, quality management. 
The support section of the extended system outlined in Figure 2.2 functions primarily as 
an information dissemination sub-system. The inclusion of European Trade 
Associations in both the non-core and support sections reflects their important link role 
between the EC institutions and internal market practitioners with information flows 
expected to be bi-directional. Dissemination of information operates, or should operate, 
in two ways. Some constituents of the sub-system, for example European and National 
trade associations and the technical press, operate in a 'push' mode whereby 
information coming to them is disseminated to their membership or readers. Other 
constituents of the sub-system, for example European Documentation Centres and 
reference works, operate in a 'pull' mode whereby they only disseminate information 
when accessed. 
2.5 Summary 
Within this Chapter the European Community institutions involved with the EC internal 
market technical legislative process were identified and then the Membership of these 
institutions was explained. This allowed some perspective on who the institutions 
represent and provided some clues as to their accessibility. 
This was followed by a discussion on provisions for languages made within the 
Treaty 142. This analysis highlighted some inconsistencies, possibly drafting errors, 
within the Treaty (op. cit.). 
142 N.5 above 
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For each of the four institutions identified as being involved in the EC internal market 
technical legislative process three aspects of their involvement in the overall process 
were examined. These three aspects being: their interactions with other EC institutions 
which the EC internal market technical legislative process as defined in the Treaty (op. 
cit.), their internal processes as described in their respective 'Rules of Procedure' and 
their interfaces beyond the EC institutional infrastructure. 
Related to the first two aspects noted above the examination of the Article 251 (op. cit.) 
process, shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.1, revealed that, under the authority of 
Article 251(2) 'The Commission shall submit a proposal [for legislative change] to the 
European Parliament and the Council. ' However, the internal Commission process that 
causes the Commission to begin work on a legislative change proposal, the 'Initiating 
Event' of Figure 2.1, remains unclear. Also, as discussed further in Section 5.2.4, 
specific requests for legislative proposals, made to the Commission, from the European 
Parliament, under the authority of Article 192 (op. cit.), can be denied by the 
Commission. Thus the Commission is in a very powerful controlling position with 
regard to the formulation of proposals for EC internal market technical legislation. 
Section 2.4 offers the concept of a system that extends beyond the EC internal market 
legislative process described in the Treaty (op. cit.). This conceptual system serves two 
purposes. The first purpose is to aid the overall understanding of the process by EC 
internal market practitioners. The second purpose is to identify all of the elements of 
the system that need to be investigated further within the remainder of the literature 
review that is presented in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 Literature survey and review 
3.1 Introduction 
The overall literature survey and review of this research is presented in two main parts. 
The first part is presented in Chapter 2 'The law making process'; within this part the 
primary, high level, European Community internal market technical legislative process, 
. . I· 12345··d ·fi d as set out m mter-governmenta treaties ' , , , , IS 1 entl Ie . 
The second part of the literature survey and review, presented here, is concerned with 
extending the findings presented in Chapter 2. Within this extension second, and lower, 
level processes and procedures associated with the establishment of European 
Community internal market technical legislation are identified. The identification of the 
processes and procedures that enable the European Community internal market 
technical legislative process6 is a necessary precursor to any analysis of the 
characteristics of the process. 
Section 3.2 presents a critical analysis of literature originating from those European 
Community institutions that have a formal role within the EC internal market technical 
legislative process. This literature is of particular significance to this research as it 
addresses the roles played by the EC institutions in the legislative process and the 
perceived state of the internal market. 
Literature generated by commentators external to the EC institutions on the legislative 
process and on the perceived state of the EC internal market is presented in Section 3.3. 
During the preparation of Chapter 2 a number of inconsistencies in primary EC 
legislation were discovered. It was also shown that the drafting of some secondary 
legislation does not comply with all ofthe requirements set out in European Community 
I Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [Treaty of Rome], HMSO, London (This is 
Cmnd 4864 that reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 1957) 
2 Single European Act, OJ 1987 L 169/1-29 
3 Treaty on European Union [Maastricht Treaty], OJ 1992 C 191/1-67 
4 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [Treaty of Amsterdam], OJ 1997 C 340/1-144 
5 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [Treaty of Nice], OJ 2001 C 340/1-144 
6 The reader is referred to the list of Defmitions on page (x) 
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primary legislation. An assessment of the effects of these deficiencies will be reported 
here. 
This Chapter extends the work reported in Chapter 2 to provide further critical analysis 
of the EC internal market technical legislative process, thereby fulfilling the 
requirement of Objective 1 as set out in Section 1.3.1 This part ofthe literature survey 
and review is not intended to provide a detailed legal critique of the output of the 
European Community internal market technical legislative process. Critiques of this 
type have been left, wisely in the author's view, to other commentators. However, it is 
fully recognised (OU Course Team, 1986) that a poorly defined and/or controlled 
process may result in wide variation in the quality of the output from the process. The 
corollary is that variation in the quality of the output of a process, may be of value to 
adduce that the process is not well defined and/or controlled. 
This is followed by a brief statement on the UK processes. In Section 3.5 a commentary 
on the overall literature view is presented that discusses the way that some of the 
literature findings are used in support of the structured interview and highlights findings 
used in later analyses. 
The literature search has failed to identify any works providing an understanding of the 
processes and procedures of the EC internal market technical legislative process, works 
that would generally and genuinely assist internal market practitioners to become fully 
involved in the process. Literature examples that do exist to help explain the EC legal 
order are provided by Louis (1995), Craig & de Burca (1998) and Roney (1998). Louis 
(1995) and Craig & de Burca (1998) each write in a manner appropriate for law students 
and members of the legal professions. These texts discuss in depth the meanings of 
many of the provisions of the treaties establishing the EC but provide no structured help 
to cater for the needs of internal market practitioners needing to monitor or influence the 
EC internal market technical legislative process. Roney (1998), somewhat in contrast to 
both Louis and Craig & de Burca, writes in a style judged to be more understandable by, 
and perhaps more useful to, those people with little or no legal training. However, in 
keeping with the other authors, Roney (1998) provides little or no 'how to help 
yourself guidance for EC internal market practitioners. This thesis addresses the 
identified gap in academic research by providing more complete data than hitherto 
available. 
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3.2 European Community institution literature 
This major sub-section of the overall review begins by establishing a baseline, or 
official, view of the internal market, a view generated from within the set of EC 
institutions with involvement in the generation of EC internal market technical 
legislation. Comments on the official view of the internal market expressed by other 
EC institutions are evaluated before the processes and procedures of the EC institutions 
involved in the generation of internal market technical legislation are reviewed. 
In the context of the development of the internal market and of supporting directives 
adopted via the EC internal market technical legislative process no single EC institution 
has either full responsibility or total executive control. The limits of each institution's 
responsibility and executive control is reflected in their views on the internal market. 
These views are reported in Section 3.2.2 
3.2.1 THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 
To establish the official view of the internal market the first requirement is to determine 
from whom the official view should be obtained. At the conceptual level the internal 
market is a construct of Council (the Member States), of the European Parliament 
(directly representing the citizens) and the Commission (generally seen as the executive 
of the European Community). 
The role of the Commission is established by Article 211 of the Treaty7. In the context 
of the internal market the first three indents of Article 211 are pertinent and for ease of 
reference are reproduced below: 
7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 2002 C 80/1-87 
Article 211 (Extract) 
In order to ensure the proper functioning of the common market, the 
Commission shall:-
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied; 
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in 
this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission consider it 
necessary; 
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures 
taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner 
provided for in this Treaty; 
From the above extract it would seem reasonable to infer that the Commission is the 
executive custodian of the internal market, so that the Commission's pronouncements 
on the internal market should be taken as the official view. For the purposes of this 
research the official view of the internal market is that view promulgated by the 
Commission. 
Within the remainder of this Section a number of issues will be discussed. These 
include the inconsistent use of terminology, New Approach directives, delay in 
completion of the EC internal market and timeliness of transposition of EC internal 
market directives into Member State national legislation. 
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An indication of an apparent lack of awareness of change by the Commission, and 
others, can be seen in the above extract from Article 211 (op. cit.). The Treaty ofNice8, 
which post dates the scheduled 31 December 1992 completion of the single market9, 
continues to make reference to the common market. The reality is that three quite 
different terms are currently used to describe what appears to be the same concept:-
Common Market - Treaty of Nice 10 
Internal Market - Treaty of Nice 11 , Single European Act12 
Single Market - Council resolution of 7 December 1992 on making the Single 
Market work13 
8 N.5 above 
9 N.2 above 
ION.5 above 
II N.5 above 
12N.2 above 
13 Council Resolution of7 December 1992 on making the Single Market Work, OJ 1992 C 334/1-3 
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From the perspective of those outside of the EC institutions in particular, it would be 
helpful if a standard nomenclature were adopted to describe this European Community 
market concept. Standardised use of nomenclature would also provide greater 
confidence that those responsible were working towards the same goal. 
The term 'common market' can be traced back to the very beginnings, i.e. the Treaty of 
Rome14, of what has evolved into the European Community and the European Union 
through the adoption ofthe Single European Act15 and the Treaty on European Union16; 
it is, however, a term that is somewhat lacking in clarity. Article 8 (1) (op. cit.) 
established that: 'the common market shall be progressively established during a 
transitional period o/twelve years [From 1958] , without there being a full definition 
of what the common market should be. As the EEC developed, and indeed focussed on 
improving the common market, it appears that there was a perceived marketing need to 
re-brand the common market at the time of its re-Iaunch. The re-Iaunch of the common 
market began with Lord Cockfield's seminal white paper (Commission, 1985), which is 
generally seen as the starting point for the transition from the common market to what is 
now known as the internal market. The Cockfield (op. cit.) paper set out a number of 
objectives that were to be met to complete the internal market by the end of 1992. The 
importance of this document in the long route to market integration should not be 
underestimated, but its limitations should also be recognised. It is, perhaps inevitably, a 
strategic political document, where the devil is in the [lack of] detail. 
The following brief analysis of the Cockfield document will be restricted to its impact 
on the free movement of goods although the paper addresses all four aspects of the 
internal market; goods, persons, services and capital. The analysis is assisted by two 
extracts taken from Part II (op. cit.), The Removal of Technical Barriers: 
Paragraph 58 
This does not mean that there should be the same rules everywhere, but that 
goods as well as citizens and companies should be able to move freely within 
the Community. 
14 N.1 above 
15 N.2 above 
16 N.3 above 
Paragraph 60 
.... barriers created by different national product regulations and standards have 
a double-edged effect: they not only add extra costs, but they also distort 
production patterns,' increase unit costs; increase stock holding costs; discourage 
business cooperation, and fundamentally frustrate the creation of a common 
market for industrial products. 
If a level playing field internal market is to exist without the same rules everywhere 
there is a need for an effective training programme, run by the individual Member 
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States which have responsibility for the training of national officials, for central 
government, and more local, legislators and enforcers. Such training would be to ensure 
that these individuals do not allow the disparities to impede the free sale and use of 
products. The only evidence of training encouraged by the Community in this general 
area is through the Schuman Project17• Given that this project is an awareness training 
programme for the legal professions rather than for internal market practitioners it rather 
projects the view that, instead of putting in place a legislative system for the internal 
market that works effectively then some preparations will be made to resolve the 
inevitable aftermath. 
The inconsistency arises from 'This does not mean that there should be the same rules 
everywhere ... ' and 'barriers created by different national product regulations ... ' in the 
previously noted quotations. The conflict between these two quotations may not appear 
to present significant problems to their authors but the responsibility for resolving the 
conflict now rests with practitioners who, somehow, have to make the system work. 
The problems associated with the inconsistency have been passed on, but without the 
necessary authority to properly resolve the inconsistency. The above inconsistency 
serves to illustrate the possible tensions between the Article 14(2)18 Treaty requirement 
for ' ... the free movement of goods, persons ... ' and the necessary technical 
harmonization through some form of collective agreement on the means to achieve the 
requirement. 
Fortunately an alternative internal market strategy was put forward in Paragraph 65 (op. 
cit.) The relevant extracts are provided below: 
17 Decision No 1496198/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 establishing 
an action programme to improve awareness of Community law within the legal professions (Robert 
Schuman Project, OJ 1998 L 196/24-31 
18 N.5 above 
- legislative harmonization (Council Directives based on Article 100 
[Now Article 94]) will infuture be restricted to laying down essential 
health and safety requirements which will be obligatory in all Member 
States. Conformity with this will entitle a product to free movement; 
- harmonization of industrial standards by the elaboration of European 
standards will be promoted to the maximum extent, but the absence of 
European standards should not be allowed to be used as a barrier to free 
movement. During the waiting period while European standards are 
being developed, the mutual acceptance of national standards, with 
agreed procedures, should be the guiding principle. 
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The 'New Approach', alluded to above, was confirmed in a detailed Council 
Resolution19 as the way to speed up the European Community internal market technical 
legislative process. A revised concept of internal market technical directives was 
clearly seen as necessary to meet the Council Resolution's (op. cit.) need to t ... resolve 
the present situation as regards technical barriers to trade and dispel the consequent 
uncertainty for economic operators '. The EC internal market technical legislative 
process had been suffering avoidable delays from the 'old approach' practice of 
including detailed technical specifications within directives. The old approach process 
had two significant drawbacks. The first was the requirement for unanimity in Council 
decision making and the second was the exclusion of all but legislators from the process 
of drawing up detailed technical specifications. The introduction of the new approach 
was a radical change that simultaneously maintained control of the legislative objectives 
by the EC institutions but devolved the detailed technical work to organisations outside 
the EC institutions. 
The introduction of the new approach heralded an era where the expectation was that 
only the objectives of technical legislation were to be set by the legislators. A revised, 
simpler, task such as this had the advantage of being more amenable to the requirements 
of voting in Council. Any necessary product specific technical details were then to be 
elucidated in standards2o• These standards were to be prepared by recognised European 
standards bodies (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI). These European standards bodies had 
first been formally recognised by the European Community in directive 83/189/EEC21 • 
19 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards, OJ 
1985 C 136/1-9 
20 Note that the real need remains that of complying with the relevant directives and transposed national 
legislation, compliance with published standards is just one way of achieving this. 
21 Council Directive of28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the 
field of technical standards and regulations, OJ 1983 L 109/8-12 
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These European Standards bodies have been re-affirmed in directive 98/34IEC22,23. The 
European standards bodies are supported through the national standards bodies of the 
Member States and other European countries. In turn these national standards bodies 
draw upon the whole spectrum of interested parties when considering proposals for 
technical standards. Such a hierarchy allows, even encourages the participation of EC 
internal market practitioners drawn from legislators, enforcers, manufacturers and users. 
For the United Kingdom the relevant national standards body is the British Standards 
Institution (BSI). 
In summary, the Commission view in 1985 was that the common market was not 
complete. With a new Commission in post, established in 1985, the conditions were 
conducive to a new impetus to complete the common market. The way forward was 
mapped out with proposals for a new approach to the necessary secondary legislation 
through a Council Resolution (op. cit.) and a Commission white paper (Commission, 
1985). The new approach way forward was coupled with a challenging timetable (op. 
cit. Annex I) that should see a completed internal market in place as at 1 January 1993. 
The preceding paragraphs have used the terms 'common market' and 'internal market' 
in a manner consistent with the literature being discussed. However, even before the re-
launch of the internal market on 1 January 1993, Council added to the potential for 
confusion by the adoption of a Council Resolution24 on making the Single Market work. 
In this resolution there are twenty-nine references to the single market and one reference 
to the internal market. 
At the time of writing, August 2004, the term common market appears to have fallen 
out of everyday use, leaving the terms internal market and single market apparently as 
synonyms. Mortelmans (1998) dismisses, as now irrelevant, the term common market 
and accepts the terms internal market and single market as synonyms. Is it of concern 
that two, or possibly three, synonyms are used? It is of concern on two counts. The 
first relates to image. The term internal market could be taken to imply a protected 
22 Directive 98/34IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of infonnation in the field of technical standards and regulations, OJ 1998 L 
204/37-48 
23 Directive 98/34IEC deals with two issues. The first issue identifies specific European Standards bodies 
and their role in support ofEC internal market technical directives. The second issue deals with a method 
of protecting the EC internal market from Member State national regulations and is discussed in Section 
3.3.1 
24 N.13 above 
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market, inaccessible to those outside of the EC. The term single market projects a 
modem, unified, image and it adequately reflects a market belonging to the EC as a 
whole. In practice, whatever its name, it is a market that is open to all, including those 
outside of the EC, all that is required is adherence to the market rules. 
The second concern is about accessibility of information. A UK internal market 
practitioner may look for help from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). An 
intended initial contact point within the DTI is 'Action Single Market' - not' Action 
Internal Market'. More generally in the EC accessibility of information about the 
internal market is made more difficult than necessary by the inconsistent use of the 
terminology. Within the Commission there is an Internal Market Directorate-General, 
not Single Market Directorate-General and EU internet sites are accessed via addresses 
including internal market not single market. Yet the Economic and Social Committee 
has a group that monitors the operation of the internal market and issues reports - from 
the Single Market Observatory (Economic and Social Committee, 1999). 
A further complication is unnecessarily introduced by the Commission's organisational 
structure. This structure places the responsibility for new approach directives with 
Directorate-General Enterprise rather than Directorate-General Internal Market as 
would perhaps have been expected. Within the Commission the various Directorates-
General are at the same hierarchical level and as a result DG Internal Market has no 
direct control of the activities of DG Enterprise. The management of the situation 
described is not assisted by Directorates-General Enterprise and Internal Market each 
being responsible to different Commissioners within the collegiate Commission. 
From the perspective of managing engagement with a process the institutions of the 
European Community do not assist by the inconsistency of nomenclature regarding the 
process. It has been found that there is no effective EC inter-institutional agreement 
about even the name of what is supported by a plethora of subsequent legislation. 
Notwithstanding the above criticism the remainder of this literature review will be 
conducted on the basis that the terms internal market and single market each refers to 
the same concept. This basis was questioned in correspondence with the Director 
General of Internal Market Directorate-General. In the reply Graaf, a Head of Unit in 
the Internal Market Directorate-General, stated that "There is no difference in meaning 
as regards the terms 'Single Market' or 'Internal Market' and both are used 
extensively. ". 
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Any view, particularly any official view, ofthe internal market must be assessed against 
the definition of the internal market established within the Single European Ace5. 
Article 13 of Sub-section 1 - Internal market, of Section II of the SEA (op. cit.) 
introduced a new Article 8a of the Treaty of Rome26. The new Article 8a introduced a 
timetable for the establishment of an internal market with defined characteristics. For 
ease of reference the new Article 8a (op. cit.) is reproduced below:-
Article 8a 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively 
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 
1992, in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Articles 8b, 
8c, 28, 57 (2), 70 (1), 84, 99, 100a and 100b and without prejudice to the 
other provisions of this Treaty. 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is assured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
There can be little doubt that the Member States, the 1987 signatories of the Treaty (op. 
cit.), expected the internal market to be fully functioning by 1 January 1993. 
To maintain a perspective on events it should be recognised that this research is being 
carried out nominally a decade after the intended establishment of the internal market. 
The completion of the internal market was to a timetable, itself in excess of five years 
duration, that had been agreed between the Commission and the Member States and 
which was publicly announced through publication of the Single European Act27 in the 
Official Journal. 
In recent times the Commission has put forward its view of the internal market in two 
series of publications. The first series are official Commission 'COM' documents each 
addressed to one or more of the other EC institutions. The second series are glossy 
brochures entitled 'Internal Market Scoreboard', these have a much wider intended 
25 N.2 above 
26 N.l above 
27 N.2 above 
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readership than the expected readership of the COM documents. In 2001 Mr Mogg, 
Director General of Internal Market Directorate General, widely distributed a letter 
stating that ' ... these informative brochures have been sent directly to Opinion Leaders 
and European Organisations '. The paper versions ofInternal Market Scoreboards 
indicate that they are only available in a restricted set of languages. In his reply to an 
enquiry Mr Schmeidel, an official in Directorate General Internal Market, said 'Internal 
Market Scoreboards have the status of Commission Staff Working Papers. As such we 
do not need to publish in all 11 ofjiciallanguages.' Currently paper versions are 
available in English and French (Commission, 2001a) with all official language and 
working language versions being published electronically. Each of these two series of 
publications reviews and assesses the internal market in its entirety - i.e. it goes beyond 
this research's interest, an interest limited to the free movement of goods. 
A paper from the first series of publications noted above is that entitled 'Working 
together to maintain momentum' (Commission, 2001b), the Commission's 2001 review 
of internal market strategy. In the 'Introduction' (op. cit.) there is much rhetoric about 
the external environment of the internal market. Additionally the Commission 
encourages the Member States and the European Community institutions into taking the 
internal market forward. Nowhere in the introduction is there even a hint of an 
admission that the goal of barrier-free trade by 31 December 1992 has not yet been fully 
achieved. 
Two illustrations are offered to suggest that barrier-free trade has not yet been achieved. 
The first stems from continuing practical experience of having to deal with barriers to 
trade that affect the free movement of petrol dispensers for retail use. The second 
derives from the existence of a recently adopted Measuring Instruments Directive 
(MIDi8. The MID is a directive for manufactured goods, measuring instruments, 
having as its legal basis Article 95 - the internal market Article of the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Communilf9. In the context of 
questions relating to the completion of the internal market the MID30 has some 
significance. The proposal encompasses products, including electronic petrol 
dispensers for retail use, not currently encompassed by legal metrology directives and is 
28 Directive 2004122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on measuring 
instruments (Measuring Instruments Directive), OJ 2004 L 135/1-80 
29 N.7 above 
30 N.28 above 
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not due to come into force until 2006. This strongly suggests that the internal market 
legislative framework, and hence the internal market itself, cannot yet be considered as 
complete. 
The main text of the Commission review (Commission, 200 1 b) contains a litany of 
failures of delivery of strategies for, and actual improvements to, the existing EC 
regulatory framework. Nowhere is there a clear plan of how existing and future 
commitments to regulatory progress will be delivered. The Commission's own analysis 
(op. cit.) shows that there remains a transposition deficit, directives that have not been 
transposed into Member State national law within the required time, of greater than 
1.5%. Arguably the transposition deficit should never have been allowed to rise above 
zero, and certainly not since 31 December 1992. 
Legitimate views of internal market practitioners could be that the Commission's report 
(op. cit.), and earlier reports, are seriously deficient in that they fail to analyse the 
options that exist, or could be created, to improve Member States' compliance with the 
requirements of the EC legislation. 
The second series of reports from the Commission have a different presentational style 
and target audience. Their overall message is more about the present state of the 
internal market than future strategy. The Commission strategy document (Commission, 
200 1 b) fulfils its title but does so from an apparent, implicit, assumption that, despite 
the admissions of legislative failure, the internal market is working well and is ready to 
be taken forward. Internal Market Scoreboard Number 9 (Commission, 2001c) 
expresses a series of shortcomings that suggests the internal market needs much 
attention before it fulfils its original expectations. Three brief extracts serve to illustrate 
this point:- 10% of directives have not yet been transposed in all Member States; 63% 
a/the Internal Market Strategy's target actions due by the end 0/2001 are expected to 
be completed on time; and most companies have not yet felt any impact from 
governments' attempts to simplify legislation. 
That 'progress from a 2.5% to a 2% transposition deficit has been made in only six 
months) (op. cit.) and that good progress such as this must be recognised appears to be 
simply the promulgation of the view that it is acceptable for Member State legislators to 
fail to comply with legislation provided some progress is being made. There is no 
evidence to suggest that manufacturers' claims of making some progress towards 
conformity with internal market legislation, rather than actually complying with the 
legislation, would provide protection from Member State enforcement regimes. 
Detailed analyses of earlier Scoreboards are not included here. The messages they 
contain are very similar to the current messages, this in itself is an indictment that the 
rate of improvement is slow. 
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These recent examples of the series of reports from the Commission suggest that the 
Commission, the custodian ofthe Treaty, is moribund. It is not clear if this situation is 
the result of political pressure originating either within, or external to, the Commission, 
the result of management failure or some other factor(s). Whatever the cause the effect 
is that there is no clear, effective, strategy offered that includes an enforceable way to 
ensure that planned events, such as transposition of directives, actually take place. It is 
now more than ten years since the planned completion of the internal market, existing 
Member States are unable to fulfil their transposition obligations but, nevertheless, the 
Commission (op. cit.) expects that 'Candidate Countries must be ready to apply rules 
effectively from day one '. 
It is interesting, though perhaps not particularly constructive, to reflect that there 
appears to be little personal accountability for failures by the Commission or by 
Member States to comply with treaty obligations with respect to the internal market. 
Article 288 of the Treaty31 contains the following statement: 'The personal liability of 
its servants towards the community shall be governed by the provisions laid down in 
their Staff Regulations or in the Conditions of Employment applicable to them. ' It has 
not been possible to confirm the texts of Staff Regulations or Conditions of 
Employment. Compare this to the situation where a manufacturer places a product on 
the internal market and it is found by a Member State that the product fails to comply 
with the national transposition of an internal market directive - possible forfeiture of 
goods and personalliability32. 
Overall the view of the EC internal market as projected by the Commission appears to 
be inconsistent in that the Commission promulgates the completion of the internal 
31 N.7 above 
32 The Environmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and Substances Etc.)(Amendment)(Petrol Vapour 
Recovery) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2678) 
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market as a/ait accomplit while at the same time admitting to serious deficiencies in the 
provision of the legislation at Community and Member State level that was seen as 
necessary for the completion of the internal market. 
The choice of directives as the legal instruments for EC internal market technical 
legislation, see Section 1.3, draws Member State transposition of directives into the 
overall EC internal market technical legislative process. Thus any failure of Member 
State transposition can be seen as impeding the completion of the internal market, a 
completion that in 2004 is in excess of eleven years late. The above evidence is drawn 
upon in later analyses. 
3.2.2 EU INSTITUTIONAL COMMENTS ON THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE 
INTERNAL MARKET 
It was argued in Section 3.2.1 that the source of the official view of the internal market 
is the Commission. Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee each has internal market legislative functions as defined in the Treaty33 as 
discussed in Section 2.2.2. Any separately expressed views on the functioning of the 
internal market from each of these three EC institutions has value to this research. 
These separately expressed views are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
3.2.2.1 The Council 
Before reviewing in detail any comments made by Council regarding the internal 
market it is helpful to be aware of the custodian role the Commission has with regard to 
the treaties, as set out in Article 211 of the Treaty34. This understanding should help to 
put in context the difference in the ways the functioning of the internal market is 
reported by Council and the Commission. In order to fulfil the custodian role the 
Commission could be expected to continually assess the effectiveness of the European 
Community legislative framework, a framework that includes those requirements 
necessary for the success of the internal market. As a result of any such assessments it 
is to be expected that reports and/or opinions may be issued by the Commission. 
33 N.7 above 
34 N.7 above 
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Council's role within the overall EC framework is rather different from the role of the 
Commission, Council's role is defined in Articles 202 to 210, inclusive, of the Treaty 
(op. cit). Within the overall provisions of Articles 202 to 210 one Article is of particular 
relevance in the current context. For clarity this particular provision is set out below: 
Article 208 
The Council may request the Commission to undertake any studies the Council 
considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to 
it any appropriate proposals. 
Article 208, therefore, provides for Council, if it so determines, to request the 
Commission to undertake any investigative work that Council may see as necessary to 
determine how any aspect of the European Community is functioning. This then takes 
the place of Council performing any substantive investigation of its own. With regard 
to the internal market the opportunity available to Council to avoid preparing its own 
assessments appears to be extensively exercised. Review documents prepared by the 
Commission are available, all that appear to be available from Council are responses to 
Commission documents. 
Article D of the Treaty on European Union35 expressly requires that 'The European 
Council submits to the European Parliament a report after each of its meetings and a 
yearly written report on the progress achieved by the Union.' It is unclear if such 
progress reports are based on primary or secondary data. The European Council report 
covering the year 2000 (Council, 2000) is rather bland and political in nature. 
References in the report (op. cit.) to the internal market are few and brief. Paragraph 3 
(op. cit.) contains the most telling comment 'The internal market is largely complete 
and is yielding tangible benefits for consumers and businesses alike.' Similarly 
Paragraph 16 (op. cit.) states 'Rapid work is required in order to complete the internal 
market in certain sectors '" '. These two statements together could be regarded as a 
positive, optimistic, 'spin' in claiming that the internal market is almost complete. 
What the European Council report (op. cit) does not provide is a thorough analysis of 
the difference between where the internal market currently stands and the 1985 
35 N.3 above 
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(Commission, 1985) expectation of completion by 31 December 1992. Where are their 
questions and demands for action about what went wrong? One possible explanation 
for the focus on the internal market apparently being lost could be the realignment of 
political focus and resources towards monetary and political union following the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union36 and more recently on the EU expansion of May 
2004. 
The blandness, and political nature, of the European Council's report covering the year 
2000 (Council, 2000) rather than it being a critical examination of the Commission's 
implementation of policies, is perhaps understandable when the European Council 
membership is remembered. The European Council is comprised of Member State 
political leaders - it is not an executive charged with the implementation of political 
ideas. The foregoing analysis suggests that reliance on yearly European Council reports 
for an in depth review of the internal market would be somewhat misplaced. 
Is there some other way that Council could andlor does make known its opinion of the 
internal market and its infrastructure, preferably coupled with at least some minimal 
analysis? Before embarking on a response to the above question it is useful to note that 
Council, other than the European Council, is really the Council of Ministers (Roney, 
1998) and any given Council of Ministers' meeting would, in general, be expected to 
work to a restricted agenda. Internal market matters are expected to be dealt with by the 
'Internal Market, Consumer Affairs and Tourism Council'. As at March 2002 the most 
recently available draft minutes of an Internal Market, Consumer Affairs and Tourism 
Council are of the 2351 st Council meeting (Council, 200 1 b). The general tone and 
language of these minutes is not very different from the language used in the yearly 
European Council (Council, 2000) report to the European Parliament. As in the yearly 
report (op. cit.) there is no real analysis of the state of the internal market. 
From time to time Council Resolutions are adopted, as allowed for by Article 20837 • 
These Council Resolutions tend to describe the background to a specific perceived 
problem and call upon the Commission, and other organisations, to take some action. In 
the case of the Commission it is usually to prepare some form of report. A good 
example of such an administrative action by Council is provided by the Council 
36 N.3 above 
37N.7 above 
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Resolution on the role of standardisation in Europe38 . The resolution (op. cit.) explicitly 
'INVITES all interested parties to participate actively ... ', 'CALLS UPON public 
authorities in the Member States to make appropriate and timely contributions to the 
process of standardisation". 'and 'CALLS UPON the Commission to report to the 
Council .... ' 
The use of Council Resolutions in this way no doubt draws to the attention of the 
Commission, and others, specific problems related to the internal market and its 
infrastructure. There is, however, little evidence that such Council Resolutions are 
rigorously enforced - invitations and calls have little real force. Council Resolutions of 
this type, which appear only irregularly with time, do not provide a coherent picture of 
the internal market. 
3.2.2.2 The European Parliament 
The role and authority of the European Parliament is established by Articles 189 to 201, 
inclusive, of the Treary39. Of these articles Article 192 is of particular interest in the 
context of the functioning of the internal market. For ease of reference Article 192 is 
reproduced in full below: 
Article 192 
Insofar as provided in this Treaty, the European Parliament shall participate in 
the process leading up to the adoption of Community acts by exercising its 
powers under the procedures laid down in Articles 251 and 252 and by giving its 
assent or delivering advisory opinions. 
The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its Members, request the 
Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it 
considers that a Community act is requiredfor the purpose of implementing this 
Treaty. 
Within the role described by Article 192 the European Parliament prepares, debates and 
issues resolutions. The detailed work of the European Parliament is, in general, 
performed within its Committees rather than in plenary sessions. A complete list ofthe 
European Parliamentary committees, and their membership is available, see for example 
38 Council Resolution of28 October 1999 on the role of standardisation in Europe, OJ 1999 C 141/1-4 
39 N.7 above 
90 
Dod's European Companion (Vacher Dod, 2001). Recognising the dichotomy of 
Directorates General with an influence on internal market technical legislation within 
the Commission, Section 3.2.1, it would seem prudent to be prepared to find a similar 
dichotomy with the EP committee structure. Based on the titles of the many 1999 -
2004 European Parliamentary committees, two appear to be candidates for reporting on 
matters relating to the internal market. These two candidates are: 'C6 Legal Affairs and 
Internal Market Committee' and 'C7 Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy 
Committee' . 
In an irregular sequence the Commission issues various communications and proposals 
for legislative change to the other EU institutions. On receipt of such communications 
or proposals by the European Parliament the President of the European Parliament 
assigns them individually to an appropriate European Parliamentary Committee charged 
with responsibility for the preparation of a response to the communication or proposal. 
These responses are then presented to plenary sessions of the European Parliament for 
adoption as European Parliamentary Resolutions - sometimes with amendments 
debated in plenary session. During the lifetime of the 1994 - 1999 European Parliament 
Commission communications relating to the internal market were referred, within the 
European Parliament, to Committee C7 Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights. Reference to 
the previous paragraph reveals that there is a difference in nomenclature for the 
European Parliament Committees of the European Parliament of 1994 - 1999 and the 
European Parliament of 1999 - 2004, changes such as these, necessary as they may be 
for the internal organisational efficiency of an organisation can, themselves, cause 
confusion to those outside of the organisation. To clarify the nomenclature Table 3.1 
has been prepared to indicate correspondence between parts of the Committee structure 
of Commission Directorates General, Council and 1999-2004 and earlier European 
Parliaments. 
In response to Commission communications the European Parliament adopts 
Resolutions that are published in the Official Journal. Such Resolutions are in an easy 
to read style that, overall, breaks down into three parts. The first part explains what it is 
that the European Parliament is responding to and identifies ancillary documents 
pertinent as background material. The second part consists of a series of short 
paragraphs providing succinct statements of problems that the European Parliament sees 
as existing and which should be addressed. The third part of the European 
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Table 3.1 Indicating correspondence between aspects of Commission, Council and 
European Parliament structures. 
Commission European 
Directorate Function Council Parliament 
General Committee 
Enterprise Issues proposals for Internal Market, C7 Industry, External 
new approach Consumer Affairs and Trade, Research and 
(Note 1) technical Tourism. Energy. 
harmonisation 
directives for goods (Note 3) 
and includes' Single 
market, regulatory 
environment, 
industries under 
vertical legislation ' . 
Internal Market Broad internal Internal Market, C6 Legal Affairs and 
market issues Consumer Affairs and Internal Market. 
(Note 2) including 'Free Tourism. 
movement of goods (Note 4) 
and regulated 
professions' . 
Notes: 1. Prior to 1999 was DG Industry 
2. Prior to 1999 was DG Internal market and Financial services 
3. Prior to 1999-2004 European Parliament was C4 Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy. 
4. Prior to 1999-2004 European Parliament was C7 Legal Affairs and Citizen's Rights. 
Parliamentary Resolution is again a series of succinct paragraphs that may be either 
criticisms directed at specific targets, e.g. the Commission, or calls upon, or requests, 
clearly identified target groups to take specific action to correct perceived deficiencies. 
Information on the views of the European Parliament on the operation of the internal 
market may thus be found in the second and third parts of European Parliamentary 
Resolutions taken in response to Commission communications. 
For the purposes of this research there is little, if anything, to be gained in a review of 
the European Parliament's, originally the Assembly40, comments on the common 
40 N.1 above 
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market extending back to the beginning of the European Economic Community in 1958. 
Where then, for this research, should such a review begin? By a Council Decision41, 
effective from 1979, direct universal suffrage for elections to the Assembly was 
introduced. Subsequently by the Single European Act42 the Assembly became the 
European Parliament. The Treaty on European Union43 introduced a new Article 189b, 
(Now Article 251 44), increasing the powers of the European Parliament in dealing with 
certain legislative acts. This new process is sometimes referred to as 'codecision' 
although no such reference is made to the process in the treaty itself. Codecision, called 
into effect via Articles 14, 95 and 251 (op. cit.) is the current process that is used for the 
generation of internal market technical legislation. It is, therefore, appropriate that the 
starting point for any review of EP opinions of the internal market should not pre-date 
the introduction of the Article 251 (codecision) process by the Treaty on European 
Union45 . 
In 1996, four years after the Treaty on European Union (op. cit.) and also four years 
after the intended completion of the internal market, the Commission embarked on a 
project entitled 'SLIM' - Simpler Legislationfor the Internal Market' (Commission, 
1996a)46. For the purposes of this research it would therefore seem reasonable to begin 
the review of the European Parliament's views on the internal market after the 
introduction of SLIM - i.e 1996. 
The European Parliament's initial response to the SLIM Project (op. cit.) was published 
as a European Parliamentary Resolution47 . In this Resolution the European Parliament 
makes two particularly telling comments. The first comment ' ... another reason 
explaining the current lack of achievement of the single market programme ".' and the 
second comment 'Notes that the SLIM Project has revealed that the burden of 
unnecessary legislation impairing the completion of the single market ". '. These two 
41 Council decision (76/787IECSC, EEC, Euratom) concerning the election ofthe representatives of the 
Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ 1976 L 278/1-11. [See also corrigenda OJ 1976 L 326/32] 
42N.2 above 
43 N.3 above 
44 N.7 above 
45 N.3 above 
46 The SLIM project was aimed at identifying ways in which internal market legislation could be 
simplified and to enhance the competitiveness and employment potential of European business. The 
project was to cover all four aspects of the internal market. The work was to be undertaken by a series of 
working groups within the overall project. 
47 Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
'Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market (SLIM): A Pilot Project' (COM(96) 204), OJ 1997 C 
132/213-215 
extracts strongly suggest that the European Parliament's view at that time was that the 
single market was not complete. 
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The SLIM Project (Commission, 1996a) continues as an on-going project, a project that 
has as its emphasis the simplification of legislation in those areas where legislation 
already exists. Subsequent SLIM reports from the Commission (Commission, 1996b, 
1997, 1999a) have not convinced the European Parliament of the overall success of the 
project although, as a project, it is supported as making a positive contribution to 
progress. In its responses to these Commission reports (op. cit.) the European 
Parliament48,49 used phrases such as ' ... the burden of unnecessary legislation impeding 
the completion of the single market ... ' , once more implying that the single market was 
not yet complete. 
Despite the apparent failure of completion of the internal market the European 
Parliament (op. cit.) clearly saw some merit in the work within the SLIM Project as 
evidenced by the phrase 'Urges the Commission to extend the scope of the SLIM method 
to all legislative areas in the Community, ... '. 
Much of the European Parliament's Resolution50 on the Commission's Strategy for 
Europe's Internal Market (Commission, 1999b) follows the bland calls for action etc as 
in earlier Resolutions. However, in amongst these calls etc there is one item that has 
particular interest. Paragraph 39 includes the phrase ' .... The Commission in its latest 
Single Market Scoreboard ... '. This is only a partial reference, as such it is particularly 
unhelpful in tracking down the relevant Single Market Scoreboard. The European 
Parliament's Resolution was taken on 13 April 2000, but not published until 7 February 
2001, and the research requiring access to the reference was carried out in February 
2002. From a process point of view there does not appear to be any valid reason why 
there is a delay of almost ten months before publication. 
48 N.47 above 
49 Resolution on the report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on simpler 
legislation for the internal market (SLIM): results of the second phase and the follow-up of the 
implementation of the first-phase recommendations (COM(97) 0618), OJ 1998 C 80/292-295 
50 European Parliament resolution on the communication from the Commission on to the European 
Parliament and the Council: The Strategy for Europe's Internal Market (COM(1999) 464 - C5-021211999 
- 1999/2167/(COS)), OJ 2001 C 40/465-469 
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The foregoing criticism has a particular irony when it is considered in relation to an 
admonishment in the European Parliament's Resolution5! where the European 
Parliament is critical of Commission delays associated with their Twelfth Annual 
Report (Commission, 1995). The report (op. cit.) was made available to the European 
Parliament on 19 June 1995 but was not published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities until 29 September 1995. The European Parliament52 made the 
direct statement 'that this delay limits the usefulness of considering these reports ... ' , 
but the delay is less than half of the delay in publishing a European Parliamentary 
Resolution five years later. Delays such as those noted above may be little more than 
irritants to the European Parliament but such delays contribute to the exclusion from 
processes that at best are barely visible to external individuals and organisations. 
The European Parliament's Resolution (op. cit.) is of significance in at least one other 
regard. Paragraph 33 includes the statement 'Regrets that the Commission is not 
making greater efforts to train and inform the legal professions in the field of 
Community law ... '. This statement may not adequately reflect the balance between 
Member State and European Community control over the legal professions. It also 
seems that this statement might have been a trigger that at least contributed towards the 
introduction of the Robert Schuman project53 . The Robert Schuman project was 
introduced to improve awareness of Community law among Member State legal 
professionals. In process terms the Robert Schuman project should be seen as an 'after 
the fact' process, a programme designed to assist with unravelling the consequences of 
Community law, consequences that may be the result of poor drafting or poor 
appreciation of the law by the legal professions. From the perspective of an internal 
market practitioner, and in keeping with modem quality management principles of 
preventing nonconformities and eliminating their causes (ISO, 2000), more focus on 
improving the existing process might be seen as more appropriate than improving the 
training of lawyers54. 
51 Resolution on the Commission's Twelfth Annual Report to Parliament on monitoring the application of 
Community law - 1994 (COM(95)0500-C4-0233/95), OJ 1996 C 65/37-43 
52 N.51 above 
53 N.18 above 
54 As a result of what was perceived, by UK trade association representatives, as misapplication of 
Council Decision 93/465/EC [The Modules Decision affecting manufacturers' quality management 
systems] the EP Rapporteur for the draft Measuring Instruments Directive was persuaded to take the 
unusual step of including in the EP's second reading amendments a specific amendment requiring the 
Commission to review the working of Council Decision 93/465/EEC. These amendments were 
subsequently adopted by the Commission and by Council and incorporated in the fmal text of the 
95 
No evidence has been found to suggest that the European Parliament initiates and issues 
'own opinion' reports on the functioning ofthe internal market. No evidence, other 
than the single incidence reported in Section 5.2.4, has been found to suggest that the 
European Parliament has invoked its powers under Article 192 of the Treaty of Nice 55 
to: ' ... request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on 
which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing 
this Treaty '. The European Parliament appears, therefore, to operate primarily in a 
reactive rather than a proactive way. This suggests that the institution with the most 
direct representation of the people is not fully exercising andlor exploring its potential 
for influence and the power of requests for a proposal from the Commission appears not 
to have been fully tested, and requests can of course be denied. 
3.2.2.3 The Economic and Social Committee 
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is, as an institution created by the 
Treaties56, part of the EC internal market legislative process. The status of the ESC 
within the overall process must be considered to be somewhat inferior to the status of 
each of Council, the European Parliament and the Commission because the ESC has 
only an advisory role. In the drafting of legislative proposals the Commission wields 
the power of the pen and has the responsibility for the preparation of the initial draft. 
'First reading' decisions on the Commission's legislative proposals are made by the 
Council, and the European Parliament, acting under the provisions of Article 251 57 . 
Article 95 (op. cit.) additionally requires Council to defer its decision until: 'after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee '. After any necessary re-drafting of the 
proposals by the Commission, there follows the 'second reading' by the Council and the 
European Parliament. At the second reading stage, and any necessary subsequent 
stages, the ESC has no official input to the process. The Economic and Social 
Committee thus acts only in an advisory role, the ESC cannot block, or force 
amendments to, any legislative proposals. 
Measuring Instruments Directive. This is an example of how informed practitioners can help themselves, 
and others, by engagement with the system. 
55 N.5 above 
56 N.I, 3,4 and 5 above 
57 N.7 above 
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It could be argued that, based on its advisory rather than executive role, the ESC has a 
lower level of involvement with the EC internal market technical legislative process 
than the Commission, the Council or the European Parliament. As a result the ESC may 
be likely to feel less ownership of the final legislation. 
The ESC is not required to respond to Commission communications, indeed is not on 
the formal distribution list for Commission communications that are not proposals for 
legislation. The ESC can, however, within its Rules of Procedure (ESC, 1998a, 2002) 
prepare own-initiative Opinions. One such ESC Opinion (ESC, 1998b), in response to 
the Commission Draft Action Plan for the Single Market (Commission, 1997), is highly 
critical of both the state of the single market and the way that new barriers to the 
effective operation of the single market can be created. The motivation of the ESC in 
drawing up its opinion is unclear. Whatever the motivation there is clarity in their 
analysis of what they see to be the impediments to the realisation of an effective single 
market. Following the analyses there are some specific, well reasoned, 
recommendations advanced to attempt to alleviate the problems. 
Among these recommendations one of particular significance from the perspective of 
single market practitioners being: 'It would be desirable to arrive at a more effective 
concept ofhamonization, by envisaging, in certainjields where this approach would be 
appropriate, greater use of regulations rather than directives58., Such a proposal is 
quite radical in that it is contrary to Article 94 of the Treaty59 but it is a proposal that is 
based on a reasoned argument concerning the effect of national derogations and 
transpositions that continue to impede the completion of the single market. In this 
context the ESC (ESC, 1998) makes reference to '.. the "residual" powers left to 
Member States in the application of some directives can be very important (for example, 
the possibility of choosing among the products or substances listed at European level 
those which they wish to authorize on their territory). ' Thus, in 1998, the ESC was 
critical of options extended to the Member States about whether certain products were 
controlled, or not, on the grounds that the single market could only work if there were 
58 The following distinction between regulations and directives is taken from Bainbrideg (1998). 'A 
regulation is of general application. It is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. A directive is binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed but leaves to the national authorities the choice ofform and methods. The essential difference 
between a regulation and directive is that whereas the latter must be transposed into national law before 
entering into force, the former is directly applicable and therefore usually has direct effect. ' 
59 N.7 above 
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no controls or there was uniformity of control throughout the EC. The measuring 
instruments directive60 adopted in 2004 contains just such an opportunity for distortion 
of the single market by the following inclusion:' This Directive establishes the essential 
requirements that the devices and systems referred to in Article 1 have to satisfy if they 
are subject to legal metrological control in a Member State.' From the perspective of 
an internal market practitioner it would appear that the ESC message appears to have 
gone unheeded by the Commission in particular. 
Another Opinion of the ESC (2001) reports on the workings of the internal market in a 
more forthright and constructive manner than the Commission. The Commission 
(Commission, 2001a, 2001 b, 2001c) reports in a matter of fact way, with some statistics 
including those of transposition deficits. The ESC (2001) report, however, makes a 
much more useful contribution to the debate; for example:-
Problems relating to competition persist owing largely to differences and 
shortcomings in the transposition of European legislation into national 
law. Economic operators need to enjoy fair competition conditions 
regardless of where they do business. 
Here the ESC has gone beyond what is typically provided in Commission reports and 
attempts to analyse the effects of legislative failures. 
Arguably Article 30861 provides a possible means to bypass the requirement of Article 
94 (op. cit.) to use directives for ' .. the establishment or functioning of the common 
market. ' It is beyond the scope of this research to consider the specific merits in this 
instance of the possible use of Article 308 and existing case law relating to Article 308. 
The purpose of highlighting Article 308 in this way is to suggest that even the ESC does 
not quite go as far as, perhaps, it could go in offering specific courses of action to 
alleviate the problems that it has identified. 
Given that the ESC can only offer advice, opinions, is it their enforced detachment from 
any executive function that imparts the ability, courage even, to be more pointedly 
critical of the official view of the internal market than Council or the European 
Parliament? Alternatively, is it the level of relevant knowledge and expertise within the 
ESC, as compared to the relevant knowledge and expertise of Council members, 
60 N.27 above 
61 N.7 above 
European Parliament members, Commissioners and Commission officials that allows, 
or even causes, ESC reports to be better informed and focussed? It is not within the 
scope of this research to provide full answers to these questions. 
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It may be of significance that the composition of the ESC may have some influence on 
its outspokenness. A characteristic of ESC members, from the UK at least, is that there 
is no need for them to participate in any public campaign trail as is the case for those 
wishing to become Members of the European Parliament or Council, via ministerial 
appointment through government. The ESC, made up as it is of three groups of 
individuals drawn from employers, workers and miscellaneous interests organisations, 
can provide a route whereby experts can arrive close to the centre of Community power 
without first having to become either a politician or Commission official. 
Much of this section has indicated that the ESC has been, and no doubt remains, 
prepared to produce reports critical of perceived shortcomings of the internal market. 
This independence has also been displayed in another, much less helpful, way. Within 
the ESC there exists a unit called the 'Single Market Observatory'. It is this unit that 
prepares publications entitled 'Monitoring the Single Market'. The Single Market 
Observatory (ESC, 1999) pUblication is particularly interesting in that it purports to 
come from the European Economic and Social Committee. Given that up to and 
including the Treaty ofNice62 reference in the treaties is made to the Economic and 
Social Committee, a question that arises is "What was the formal mechanism by which 
the ESC incorporated the word 'European' into its title?" A written enquiry was made 
to the Directorate for Communications of the Economic and Social Committee about the 
inclusion of the word 'European' in their title. The eventual reply from Mr Andersen, a 
Principal Administrator within the Economic and Social Committee, explained that the 
word 'European' was not introduced into the title by any formal mechanism, but the 
purpose of the change was ' .. to avoid the common misunderstanding because a/the 
French acronyms for the ESC and the ETUC being identical (le CES and la CES). } 
The unofficial name European Economic and Social Committee is clearly being used in 
a widespread manner as evidenced by the web page www.europa.eu.intleur-
lex/enJaboutipap/process and players6.html accessed 9 June 2003, this lists the 
institutions of the EU and includes the title European Economic and Social Committee. 
62 N.5 above 
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The need to avoid possible confusion is recognised but the somewhat arbitrary, 
unilateral, change of name in this way by the ESC is difficult to condone. In practical 
terms actions such as this which break the obvious correspondence between the working 
name ofthe organisation 'European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)' and the 
electronic contact points anyname@esc.eu.int and 'www.esc.eu.int' make electronic 
contact with the institution more difficult than necessary. 
From a process evaluation perspective unauthorised action such as the name change 
suggests that there is, at best, limited process control within the operations of the ESC. 
The written enquiry made to the Directorate for Communications of the Economic and 
Social Committee also included a question about the languages used for publication of 
'Monitoring the Single Market'. The pragmatism of the subterfuge used to avoid the 
need to publish in all EU official languages is illustrated in the following quotation from 
Andersen's reply: 'A booklet like the one referred to by you is not an official EU-
document... Reducing the number of languages is the only realistic way of preparing 
"overview" booklets like the one in question. ' 
The above comments on the behaviour of the ESC and their contribution to the EC 
internal market technical legislative process are drawn upon in Chapter 5. 
3.2.3 EU INSTITUTION PROCEDURES 
Within the Treaty63 obligations are placed upon each of the European Union institutions 
to adopt their own Rules of Procedure. It is not the purpose of this research to examine, 
critically and in minute detail, each clause of the Rules of Procedure adopted by those 
EU institutions with a role to play in the European Community internal market technical 
legislative process. What is more important to this research is to establish whether the 
Rules of Procedure currently exist and how accessible they are to internal market 
practitioners. 
Table 3.2 identifies; for each of the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic & Social Committee; where their obligation to adopt Rules of 
63 N.7 above 
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Procedure arises in the Treaty (op. cit.), where the Rules of Procedure are accessible on 
the internet and additional information on current edition of the Rules of Procedure etc. 
The Commission Rules of Procedure relate to the collegiate Commission itself rather 
than being a manual for Commission officials. Article 25 of these Rules of Procedure 
contains the following statement: 'The Commission may adopt supplementary measures 
relating to the functioning of the Commission and of its departments, which shall be 
annexed to these Rules of Procedure. I It is at this level in the hierarchy that procedures 
to be followed by officials would be expected to be found. To date searches through the 
europa.eu.int website have failed to identify any such annexes. Direct enquiries to the 
Commission for information to identify these annexes have not, so far, been successful. 
A limited number of specific questions related to training of Commission officials have 
been directed through the Commission representation in London, those responses 
gained have been of only limited value. The Commission has supplied a small number 
of documents, none of which contain data that can be used as reference to describe any 
specific training. One of these documents is, however, included as Annex IV. 
The early part of the opening paragraph of this document (Annex IV) reads as follows: 
'At the Commission it was decided that training in legal drafting called for by the 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on common gUidelines for the quality 
of drafting of Community legislation ... ' and in the second paragraph it continues: 'A 
number of the Commission's Legal Revisers have been given courses in training 
techniques. They have now started giving the actual drafting training.' It is unclear 
from the above what, if any, formal training of legislative drafters was provided prior to 
1998. 
The second page of Annex IV, providing as it does a list of 'Rules on Drafting' appears 
at first sight to be helpful. Ready access to the documents on the list of 'Rules of 
Procedure' would be helpful. The 'Rules of Procedure' document referred to above is 
undated, but it is assumed to be of 2001 vintage, or later, because of reference in it to 
the 2001 Manual of Precedents (Council, 2001a) document. By the time this author 
became aware of the 'Rules of Procedure' document all but the 'europa' 
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website addresses provided were no longer accessible, a problem that is taken up again 
in Section 5.2.1.2 Together the documents would have provided a corpus of 
knowledge that could have been of considerable benefit to outsiders, such as internal 
market practitioners, as well as to Commission and other EC institution members and 
officials. However, the overall value of documents such as that contained in Annex IV 
is low since there is no practical way that an outsider, such as an internal market 
practitioner, can access the latest versions of the documents on an as needed basis. 
It is evident from Table 3.2 that Rules of Procedure as required by the Treaty65, for the 
EC institutions concerned with the EC internal market technical legislative process, 
exist. Not only do they exist but they are currently available from EC institution 
websites which makes them available to EC internal market practitioners. Coupled with 
Article 251 of the Treaty (op. cit.) these Rules of Procedure provide, for EC internal 
market practitioners, a sufficient description of the overall process except for the work 
that is carried out by Commission officials, particularly in the early stages of drafting 
new legislation. With the current lack of access to the Commission officials' 
procedures there can be no confidence that Commission officials are required to, and 
actually, consult widely outside of the EC institutions in the early stages of legislative 
drafting. 
An example of the acceptance of inconsistency by an EC institution is evident in the 
ESC Rules of Procedure. Part I of these Rules of Procedure basically outline the 
genesis of the ESC by quoting relevant parts of treaties up to and including the Treaty 
ofNice66 - these quotes make reference to an Economic and Social Committee. The 
final line of the preamble to Part II of the Rules of Procedure makes reference to their 
unofficial title European Economic and Social Committee. General confidence in EC 
institutions is not enhanced when they exhibit this type of inconsistency and disregard 
for the treaties. 
65 N.7 above 
66 N.5 above 
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3.3 Non European Community institution literature 
Within Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 the views on the operation, or completeness, of the EC 
internal market from the EC institutions involved in the generation of internal market 
technical legislation were discussed. In contrast, within this Section, the views 
expressed by various sources external to the EC institutions are introduced and 
discussed. 
3.3.1 JOURNALS AND BOOKS 
In 1994 an independent expert group was established by the Commission to report on 
legislative and administrative simplification. This group was known as the Molitor 
Group after its Chairman. The terms of reference of the Molitor Group (Molitor, 1995, 
Annex III) includes a requirement to examine the state of Community and national 
legislation with regard to employment and competitiveness. Within the final report 
(Molitor, 1995) a number of general, and small and medium sized enterprise (SME) 
specific proposals, are advanced. The impact of all of these proposals on subsequent 
Community and national law cannot be directly assessed. Molitor's starting 
assumption, of a completed single market, is in line with the view of the single market 
advanced by the Commission. The discussion in Section 3.2.1 would suggest that such 
an assumption is flawed. The as yet incomplete single market does not allow 
simplification of legislation while maintaining completeness of the single market as an 
objective. From a process standpoint it could be argued that it would have been more 
useful to have worked to alternative, hierarchical, objectives such as: 
1. What Community and national legislation is needed to complete the 
establishment of the single market? 
2. How can the legislation to achieve 1. above be made as simple as possible? 
The final report from the group of independent experts (op. cit.) is of some value even 
though its preface contains caveats explaining the lack of overall consensus, the lack of 
consensus leading to the inclusion of several minority statements. Eighteen general 
proposals for action are made. Of these eighteen proposals five are of particular 
significance from a process perspective. These five proposals fall into two distinct 
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groups. The first group, of four proposals, relate to the process before any legislative 
act is adopted. These proposals are reproduced below: 
Proposal 5 
When drafting a new piece of legislation, the Commission must ensure that a 
study is carried out on its incorporation into Member States' national 
legislation and publish the findings of the study. 
Proposal 8 
Consultation with those who are concerned by new regulations, in particular 
consumers, business and workers, should be effective, systematic, and carried 
out in due time. 
Proposal 9 
The explanatory memorandum of all new proposals should indicate the 
expected impact on employment and competitiveness, costs and innovation. 
Proposal 15 
The Community should consider whether there are areas in which Community 
regulation (as an alternative to directives) would provide the best 
reconciliation of simplification and single market objectives. 
Given the Article 251 process67 then any actions taken under Proposals 5, 8 & 9 above 
would be expected to be completed and available at the time any original Commission 
proposal was submitted to the European Parliament and Council. As at year 2000, 
using the proposal for a Measuring Instruments Directive (MID) (Commission, 2000b) 
as the indicator, there is no evidence that Proposal 5 has been acted upon. For 
Proposals 8 and 9 there is some, but unconvincing, supporting information included in 
the draft MID that might be used to claim that Molitor's proposals had not been 
completely ignored. 
Proposal 15 above is consistent with suggestions from the Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC, 1998b). However no suggestions as to how such a radical change 
from the use of directives to regulations for control of the internal market could be 
accomplished is offered. For the internal market in goods no reasoned response to 
these proposals has yet been issued, it is possible that the only externally detectable 
response would be in the overall format of future legislative proposals. 
67 N.7 above 
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The second group of proposals, in fact only one proposal, relates to the process after the 
adoption of a legislative act. This proposal is reproduced below: 
Proposal 13 
The Commission should take a vigorous and active approach to auditing 
transposition and enforcement of EC legislation at national level in order to 
avoid, in particular, that national legislation or practices hamper the unity oj 
the Community market. The strengthening of the enforcement unit should be 
considered by the Commission in this context. 
It has already been noted, in Internal Market Scoreboards (Commission, 2001a,c), that 
auditing of transposition is now carried out, but effective follow-up to deficiencies 
found by such auditing, in line with Molitor's proposal for ' .. active approach to ... 
enforcement ... ', has not yet been adequately addressed. Internal Market Scoreboard 12 
(Commission, 2003) admits to a rise in the transposition deficit and Internal Market 
Scoreboard 13 (Commission, 2004) suggests that for the European Union of fifteen 
Member States the transposition deficit has stabilised over the previous twelve months 
at around 2.3% 
Whilst it is not central to this research it is perhaps worth noting that a practical 
difficulty arises in tracking the responses to, or assessing the effects of, reports such as 
that from Molitor (1995). This author has been unable to identify any considered 
response from the Commission, be it acceptance in whole or part or outright rejection of 
the Molitor proposals. 
Dannenbring (1999), as a lawyer working in the Representation of the German 
Confederation of Skilled Crafts & Trades to the European Union, brings an interesting 
perspective to the internal market debate. In common with Molitor (1995) Dannenbring 
starts from the not fully substantiated premise that the single market is complete. 
Evidence of this belief is provided by the following quotation: 'The effect of the 
completion of the Single Market was double-edged. On the one hand the dismantling of 
all cross-border trade barriers and the harmonisation of national regulations within the 
Community .... '. Dannenbring clearly expresses disappointment in Molitor's work by 
his comment: ' ... this commission did not focus its work around analysing the 
relationship between simplification on the one hand and competitiveness and 
employment on the other.' Dannenbring expresses further concern in his comment ' ... 
representatives of the European SME business community were not part of the group. 
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Nonetheless, the group devoted a special chapter of the report to SMEs '. However, in 
Dannenbring's view, it was the overall failure of Molitor that made a significant 
contribution to the way a subsequent Commission initiative SLIM68 (Simpler 
Legislation for the Internal Market) was established (Commission, 1996a). 
Dannenbring compares and contrasts the workings of Molitor and various SLIM groups, 
being somewhat critical of Molitor's failure to stay on track, and supportive of the 
SLIM groups' self-imposed restrictions on their mandates. The self-imposed restriction 
resulted from the perceived inability ofthe SLIM groups to deal adequately with both 
Community and Member State national legislation, each of which has implications for 
the internal market. The SLIM groups made it clear that, in the time allowed for their 
tasks, they were only able to deal with Community legislation and did not have time to 
deal with the plethora of Member State national legislation. The outcome of the SLIM 
groups (Commission, 1996b), noted by Dannenbring as: ' ... the burden of unnecessary 
legislation undermining the competitiveness of business is far greater at national than 
Community level. In everyday business life, enterprises in Europe oftenfeel hampered 
not so much by regulations stemming from the EU but more by regulations of national 
origin. ' This suggests that national regulations counter the positive influences towards 
harmonisation from the Community institutions. 
It is of value to view diagrammatically, as shown in Figure 3.1, the intellectual construct 
of the internal market to better understand the, often opposing, forces acting on the 
construct. The forces to build a strong internal market emanate from European 
Community legislation with the expectation that this legislation will be correctly 
transposed into Member State legislation without also creating any internal market 
distortions. Member State, nationally initiated legislation can only degrade rather than 
enhance the integrity of the internal market because nationally initiated legislation 
creates, rather than removes, perturbations in what is intended to be the internal market 
'level playing field'. 
68 N.46 above 
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Figure 3.1 Showing the internal market construct and the legislative forces acting 
on it 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEGISLATION 
MSx 
MEMBER STATEI TRANSPOSITION 
........ --- .... 
I \ 
I \ 
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...----, 
( " 
1", .... --- .... , 
I \ 
I \ 
~-------~---------------------------I---------------------------~-------, 
~ ~ 
MEMBER STATE NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
Note: 'MS' represents Member State and 'x' can have values from 2 to '15' inclusive. 
The process for the generation of internal market legislation is that described in Article 
2510fthe Treaty69. Earnshaw and Judge (1995) describe the application of Article 251, 
codecision, as an extremely intricate procedure but 'of fundamental importance to 
public perceptions of Parliament's role: it can no longer be accused of lacking teeth'-
quoted from Corbett (1994). 
Earnshaw and Judge's analysis (1995) of the Article 251 (codecision) procedure 
concludes that the European Parliament can now exert real influence over legislative 
decision making. From a practitioners' perspective this holds out hope that 10bbying70 
of the European Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg can have an effect on the 
69 N.7 above 
70 Some additional illustrations of lobbying are provided in Section 2.3 
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outcome of legislative proposals. The working practices of Parliament are such that the 
power-house is the Parliamentary Committees and their Rapporteurs71 appointed for 
each individual proposal for legislation. Individuals and organisations, both national 
and pan-European, can target their lobbying to the appropriate Rapporteur, in an attempt 
to influence the outcome of any specific legislative proposal. Evidence, in the form of 
unpublished correspondence from CECIP and CECOD, pan-European trade 
associations for weighing instruments and fuel dispensing equipment respectively, 
exists to indicate that direct approaches to European Parliamentary Rapporteurs have 
been made. 
It is not possible to be sure how much influence any individual submission for revision 
to legislative change proposals achieves. This is true even if all of the suggestions for 
revision from any given organisation are incorporated into the final text - but at least 
the process appears to be open and democratic. 
It is important to remember that the Rapporteur, Parliamentary Committee, EP Plenary 
session sequence is expected to occur twice for any given legislative proposal. The first 
time through the procedure deals with the initial proposal as received from the 
Commission - first reading. The second time through the procedure deals with the 
'common position' achieved by the Commission's consideration of responses from EP, 
Council and ESC to the original proposal. 
Earnshaw and Judge Cop. cit.) provide an indication of the influence, within the EP 
plenary sessions, of Parliamentary Committee reports when these reports are in support 
of proposals. However, when common position, second reading, amendments are 
proposed to the EP in plenary session there is a difficult detailed requirement to be met 
- an absolute majority ofMEPs has to be in support of any such amendment and this 
majority ofMEPs must be present for the vote. The power and resolve of Parliament is, 
therefore, much more seriously tested at second reading. From a process perspective, 
effective lobbying would have to be much more broadly based across the MEPs than at 
first reading - such a requirement may well be beyond the means of all but those 
organisations with permanent representation in Brussels. 
71 The reader is referred to the list of Definitions on page x 
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A review of the regulatory process has been undertaken by Majone (2000). The review 
is of considerable value in that it includes some radical approaches to some fundamental 
problems. Of concern to Majone is the underlying problem of credibility of the way the 
European Community has approached many of its problems. He is critical of the new 
approach to technical harmonization and reliance on mutual recognition, brought about 
in the 1980s in an attempt to move forward the stalled internal market. The introduction 
of the new approach is seen almost as a public relations move rather than as an attempt 
to attack the underlying problems of the internal market. In this context Majone is 
particularly concerned at what he sees as a dilemma related to new approach directives, 
the relationship between directives and standards. Directives are Community legislation 
and standards, emanating from independent European standardization organisations, are 
only voluntary. 
What is missing in Majone's analysis is a clear recognition and understanding that there 
are two classes of standards available from the European standards organisations. The 
first of these two classes includes the traditional standards, such as those for pipe 
threads, these exist to ensure compatibility between items. The second of these two 
classes are 'harmonised standards', these are important in that they have a special legal 
status that provides an automatic presumption of conformity to directives that are 
formally linked to the standard. Harmonised standards are produced by the European 
standardisation organisations in the same way as traditional standards but with three 
additional process steps. These additional process steps are; firstly a mandate from the 
Commission to the appropriate European standardisation organisation to prepare a 
standard, i.e the first part of the link between a directive and a standard, secondly a 
review near the end of the process by a Commission appointed expert to assess the draft 
standard and thirdly, if the expert assessment was satisfactory, to publish in the Official 
Journal a reference to the standard, the final part of the link. Harmonised standards are 
important because, while still voluntary, they provide a legal link to directives, and the 
standardisation process from which they emanate is open and transparent to all of those 
wishing to participate - this includes the opportunity for legislators to fully participate. 
The introduction of the new approach to directives and associated harmonised standards 
was an attempt to find a better way forward for the internal market in goods starting 
from the late 1980s. From a manufacturing practitioner's perspective the new approach 
is clearly an improvement on the earlier process that excluded all but the legislators in 
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the determination of the technical specifications. Further process improvement would 
be welcome and Majone (op. cit.) concisely defines the situation within which progress 
needs to be made: 
The challenge to Europe is to design institutional arrangements capable of 
fostering close working relationships with national regulators, European 
institutions, and with international organisations, while avoiding the major 
defects of the com ito logy system: opaque procedures, poor accountability, and 
lack of effective co-ordination of sectoral responsibilities with broader 
horizontal concerns. 
Can such a challenge be met in practice? A possible model to meet the challenge as 
proposed by Majone is that ofthe 'agency'. An agency would be independent of 
government, the EC institutions in this case, but with authority for rulemaking and to 
take final and binding decisions. Majone (op. cit.) is critical of what he describes as the 
'fragility of the EC regulatory system' because of its politicisation but goes on to 
suggest an amendment to Article 772 that would empower the existing EC institutions to 
establish new bodies, agencies, to facilitate the efficient functioning of the internal 
market without the need for Inter Governmental Conferences to amend the treaties. In 
the absence of additional amendments to the internal market articles of the treaties such 
bodies as Maj one envisages could not work because of the requirements of subsidiarity 
and the involvement ofthe European Parliament in the processes. What is significant, 
however, in Majone's proposals is an apparent acceptance that a mere tinkering with the 
current processes is not enough and that a radical re-engineering of the legislative 
process appears to be necessary. While the agency model discussed by Majone 
provides a useful reference point there are no other institutional equivalents to the 
present structure of the EC from which 'best practice' can be directly drawn. 
It is not the purpose of this research to even attempt to analyse in depth the European 
Court of Justice case law on free movement of goods. However, Barnard (2001) 
provides a helpful insight into the way Article 2873 : 'Quantitative restrictions on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member 
States. 'can influence the internal market. According to Barnard's classification system 
(Barnard, 2001) national regulatory laws can give rise to different regulatory burdens 
because an imported good may have to satisfy a dual regulatory burden (home state and 
host state regulations), with the additional cost that this entails. If, therefore, Barnard's 
72 N.7 above 
73 N.7 above 
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analysis is correct then even Member State social legislation, for example the UK 
Disability Discrimination Act (DDA)74 can become a measure having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions since it can create a dual regulatory burden. The 
structure of forces acting on the internal market are shown in Figure 3.1 which was 
originally drawn to indicate how Member States could intentionally distort the internal 
market by national legislation. It would appear, from Barnard's analysis, that internal 
market distortions can be created, sometimes accidentally, from any source of national 
legislation that creates a dual regulatory burden. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the introduction in the UK of the DDA was a move 
intended to distort the internal market. It is clear in the case ofthe DDA, that the 
circumstances of the use of a product can influence the technical requirements of the 
product itself and hence create a distortion of the internal market. An hypothetical 
example to illustrate this point could be the use of a card reader for credit/debit card 
sales on a retail petrol filling station open to the general public. For a card reader 
designed in another Member State it could have been designed in such a way that the 
card reader slot was outside (above) areas of explosion risk created by petroleum 
vapours - petroleum vapours being more dense than air sink towards the ground. The 
influence of the DDA on the use of this card reader in the UK could then be such that, 
to allow wheelchair users access to the card reader the card reader needs to be lower 
than its design height. Bringing the card reader slot lower may then bring it into a 
higher explosion risk area. The additional explosion risk must now be addressed by a 
design change to the card reading equipment so that it continues to meet the 
requirements of the Article 95 potentially explosive atmospheres directive75 . Social 
legislation in any given Member State can effectively distort the EC internal market. 
The criticisms noted earlier (Commission, 1997)(ESC, 1998b) indicating that national 
regulations produce greater impediments than Community regulations to the satisfactory 
completion of the internal market were non-specific about the purpose of the national 
regulations in question. From the above it appears that the Member State regulatory 
impediments to the satisfactory completion of the internal market could be deliberate, 
protectionist, or accidental stemming from social or environmental requirements. 
74 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
75 Directive 94/9IEC of the European Parliament and the Council of23 March 1994 on the approximation 
ofthe laws of the Member States concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in 
potentially explosive atmospheres, OJ 1994 L 100/1-29 
National regulations have been identified as an impediment to the satisfactory 
completion of the internal market. Are there any procedures in place intended to 
prevent the establishment of such regulations? 
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There exists a directive76 that lays down a procedure for notification77 , to the 
Commission and to the other Member States, of proposed Member State national 
technical legislation. Such notification procedures do not apply to Member State 
transpositions of directives, thereby creating a situation that leaves transposition open to 
abuse by the' gold plating' , for nationalistic purposes, of directives as they are adopted 
into national legislation. The procedure of this directive (op. cit.) is designed to allow 
the Commission and individual Member States to object to national measures that are 
seen as likely to distort the internal market. Figure 3.2 outlines the flow of information 
and comments between Member States and the Commission under the directive's 
procedure. Such procedures can only work effectively if Member State government 
officials are aware of them and follow them. 
It is important to recognise that the basic procedures of the directive (op. cit.) were first 
established in a 1983 directive78 and therefore the basic procedures have been in 
existence for approximately twenty years. This author's experience of the procedures of 
these two directives since 1985 suggests that the link between the notification point of 
each Member State and the Commission is the only part of the procedure that works 
efficiently. Within the UK, what little evidence is available suggests that officials 
within government departments, other than of the Directorate of the Department of 
Trade and Industry that contains the UK notification point, are not well informed of the 
requirements for notification. Even if the requirements for notification are understood it 
is possible that not all government officials would necessarily accept that their 
legislative measures could impinge upon the internal market and would therefore not 
activate the notification procedure. 
The overall process for the adoption of internal market legislation exists at several 
levels. At the top level the definition of the current process was established by the 
76 N.22 above 
77 Sometimes colloquially known as the notification procedure. 
78 N .21 above 
Figure 3.2 Showing information flows for the 98/34IEC notification procedure 
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introduction of Article 189b, via the Treaty on European Union79• The process there 
described remains the current process. For the purposes of this research the Article 
189b (op. cit.) process was not significantly altered by the adoption ofthe Treaty of 
Amsterdam80 nor by the Treaty ofNice81 other than by change of Article number 
toArticle 251. Dashwood (1994) provides an extensive review of the Article 251 
(Codecision) process that includes many conjectures about how a legislative proposal 
79 N.3 above 
8°N.4 above 
81 N.S above 
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may progress depending on actions taken by the European Parliament and/or Council. 
The Treaties of Rome82, Maastricht83 , Amsterdam84 and Nice85 have each followed 
tradition in that they are text only documents. In his review Dashwood (1994) suggests 
that some, at least, ofthe potential problems with the process described by Article 251 86 
follow directly from a lack of precision in the text. The various intellectual 'What ifs?' 
that are identified are each capable of resolution before they are called into play. 
Process flowcharts for use within manufacturing environments and flowcharts as a high 
level design for software descriptions have been utilised for many years. Such 
flowcharts are concise in their descriptions and hence easy to translate into the various 
EC official languages, are easy to follow and are deterministic. Other than for EC and 
other officials coming to terms with a technological leap forward there appear to be no 
obvious reasons why some parts of the treaties, those parts of the treaties that attempt to 
describe a process rather than a concept, should not be written in flowchart form to 
make them deterministic rather than interpretive. Internal market practitioners, other 
practitioners and those involved formally with the legislative process would then be 
able to follow the process more readily and hence be better equipped to make 
appropriate inputs. 
Visits to the 'europa' website (EU, 2003) provided access to a link 'Legislative 
flowchart - codecision procedure'. On each of several attempts to view this flowchart 
the page has been blank. The fact that links to a flowchart now exist, even though the 
flowchart itself does not yet exist should be seen as a step forward. The fact that the 
web page where the flowchart should be available remains blank is of concern. No 
reason for the blank page was provided. There is a suspicion that the failure of the EU 
institutions to make public the process that is used derives from an unwillingness to 
admit that it is different from the flowchart of Figure 2.1, a flowchart that was 
constructed from the words of Article 251 87. 
Within his conclusions Dashwood (1994) makes three comments that are of significance 
from a process perspective, the first is an indictment of the drafters of the treaties ' ... the 
Treaty on European Union has rendered an already complicated system of decision-
82 N.l above 
83 N.3 above 
84 N A above 
85 N.5 above 
86 N.7 above 
87N.7 above 
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making, under the EEC Treaty as amended by the SEA, very considerably more so '. 
The second comment is really more of a plea: ' ... it must surely be one of the objectives 
of the review of institutional arrangements in 1996 to simplify and rationalise the 
Community's legislative procedures, so as to make them intelligible to the citizens of 
the European Union '. For internal market legislation, currently enacted through the 
process of Article 251 88, the process remains broadly similar to the process in place 
following the adoption of the 1992 Treaty on European Union89. Dashwood's 
comments appear to have been unheeded. Dashwood's first two comments and the 
failure of subsequent treaties90 to make more intelligible the Community's legislative 
procedures are not entirely in keeping with the 1993 Council Resolution on the quality 
of drafting of Community legislation91 • Within this Council Resolution (op. cit.) 
paragraph (1) reads 'the wording of the act should be clear, simple, concise and 
unambiguous; unnecessary abbreviations, 'Community jargon' and excessively long 
sentences should be avoided.' In contrast to the above criticisms Dashwood's third 
process comment, that 'the Article 189b procedure enables the Parliament directly to 
influence the final outcome' provides some encouragement to practitioners to directly 
engage in the overall process via the structures of the European Parliament as already 
discussed. 
The basic message of the 1993 Council Resolution (op. cit.) was reinforced by 
Declaration 39 appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam92• The first part of this 
Declaration reads 'The [Inter Governmental] Conference notes that the quality of 
drafting of Community legislation is crucial ifit is to be properly implemented by the 
competent national authorities and better understood by the public and in business 
circles.' Since Article 251 93 was not re-worded in such a way to be totally clear it 
would appear that the contents of Declaration 39 are not specifically directed at, or seen 
as applicable to, the drafters of the treaties - an opportunity to set a good example from 
the top was thereby wasted. In this context the earlier comments indicating the use of 
the phrases common market, single market and internal market all apparently for the 
88 N.7 above 
89 N.3 above 
90 NA and N.5 above 
91 Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community legislation, OJ 1993 C 
166/1 
92 N.4 above 
93 N.4 and N.5 above 
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same concept suggests that there is no overall demonstrable commitment to high quality 
drafting of legislation within the EU. 
In his exposition on the Article 251, codecision, procedure Usher (1998) begins by 
suggesting that the cooperation procedure, Article 25294, is a procedure of Byzantine 
complexity and the codecision procedure is even more so - general sentiments in accord 
with those of Earnshaw and Judge (1995). With the process complexity in mind, 
coupled with the added comment from Usher (1998) that ' ... the terminology originally 
used in the Single European Act gave rise to different nuances in different language 
versions, ' and other process uncertainties some proposals for process improvement 
might be expected. No such proposals are in evidence. 
From the perspective of internal market practitioners important process questions that 
remain are: after the Commission has first put forward its proposals for legislation 
when, and to whom, can inputs be made by practitioners that may influence the 
outcome of proposals? Usher's review (1998) provides little procedural help to 
individual practitioners with the above questions. Without satisfactory answers to these 
questions the legal details of the process are of limited concern to individual internal 
market practitioners. 
A possible view held by internal market practitioners is that the internal market is 
indeed a 'level playing field'. There is some evidence that this expectation is not 
always met in practice. Community environmental legislation, or in some instances the 
lack of such legislation, can create distortions of the internal market. An example of 
such distortion is available from a consideration of environmental legislation to deal 
with pollution from volatile organic compounds (VOC). Stage I Vapour Recovery95 is a 
control measure to deal with a particular subset ofthe VOC pollution problem. 
European Community legislation in the form of a directive96 that uses as its legal base 
old Article 100a (New Article 95) the internal market, was adopted and Stage I Vapour 
Recovery control measures became mandatory throughout the EC. Stage I control 
94 NA above 
95 Stage I Vapour Recovery is intended to prevent the escape into the atmosphere of those petroleum 
vapours that are displaced when storage tanks at petrol filling stations are re-filled. 
96 European Parliament and Council Directive 94/631EC of20 December 1994 on the control of volatile 
organic compound (VOC) emissions resulting from the storage of petrol and its distribution from 
terminals to service stations, OJ 1994 L 365/24-33 
measures in the UK were introduced by UK regulations97 that implement the stage I 
directive. As far as is known Stage I Vapour Recovery measures have not caused 
distortion of the internal market. Stage II Vapour Recovery98 is a control measure to 
deal with a different, but highly adjacent, subset of the VOC pollution problem. 
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Commission work towards a proposal for European Community legislation for Stage II 
Vapour Recovery was undertaken in the mid 1990s but was dropped before any formal 
proposal was put before the European Parliament and Council. At the time that the 
work on a Stage II Vapour Recovery proposal was discontinued by the Commission it 
proved impossible to obtain a definitive reason for the work being discontinued. 
However, two, unofficial, reasons were offered by a Commission official to this 
researcher in his role as Technical Consultant to the Petrol Pump Manufacturers' 
Association - a UK based trade association. The first reason put forward was that it 
was proving impossible to gain technical agreement on the requirements for Stage II 
Vapour Recovery among the Member States and the second reason was that this area of 
legislation was suitable to apply the principle of subsidiarity. 
With the Stage II Vapour Recovery situation as described there are certainly two 
possible alternative approaches for a way forward. To legal practitioners it might be 
that a legal challenge could, or possibly should, be initiated on the basis that goods 
lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State (UK) should be accepted in every 
other Member State, the principle of mutual recognition (Kent, 2000) of product 
standards established by the 'Cassis de Dijon' judgement of the European Court of 
Justice (Case 120178). To manufacturers, many of whom are small with limited 
resources and have a need to get their products to market quickly, the legal challenge 
route is not really a practical option - even if they are aware of it. Thus to many 
manufacturers the necessary pragmatic approach to life within, or serving, the EC 
internal market comes down to the following options - build products to satisfy the 
requirements of the most stringent regulations to be found within the Member States or 
have more than one version of a product. The very suggestion that a choice between the 
above options may be necessary does not reflect well on the processes establishing the 
EC internal market for goods. 
97 The Environmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and Substances Etc.)(Amendment)(Petrol Vapour 
Recovery) Regulations 1996, SI 199612678 
98 Stage II Vapour Recovery is intended to prevent escape into the atmosphere of those petroleum vapours 
that are displaced when motor vehicles are re-fuelled. 
118 
Usher (1998) draws attention to both the extended Community competence as the 
European Economic Community (EEC), as originally described99, has developed and to 
the restriction on Community activity through the principle of subsidiarity. The 
principle of subsidiarity was established thirty-five years after the establishment of the 
EEC by Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union, and was re-affirmed as Article 5 in 
the Consolidated text following the Treaty of AmsterdamlOO• The text is reproduced 
below: 
Article 5 
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
As at August 2004 the United Kingdom has not introduced legislation requiring the 
installation and use of Stage II Vapour Recovery systems at petrol filling stations -
although a UK government consultation document (DEFRA, 2002) has been issued. 
Other Member States, most notably Austria and Germany, have in place Stage II 
Vapour Recovery legislation. In these Member States petroleum fuel dispensing 
equipment without a properly functioning Stage II Vapour Recovery system is not 
allowed to operate. Thus equipment that is legitimately on the market in the UK would 
not be acceptable to the Austrian and German sectors of the internal market. An 
unevenness in the internal market has been allowed to occur and tends to support 
Usher's argument (1998), r ••• that any difference between national regulatory 
frameworks may distort competition in the Community. ' and the concept of mutual 
recognition for products legally on the market in one Member State being accepted in 
all other Member States fails. 
99 N.l above 
100 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 1997 C 340/173-308 
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A possible defence for the creation of such a situation may exist in Article 30101 which 
allows: 'restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans ... '. The fundamental problem is that the Commission has failed in its duty to 
provide legislation to foster, rather than harm, the internal market. 
Stage I and Stage II Vapour Recovery requirements are not just concepts, they are each 
also physical systems that are available on the internal market. Manufacturing 
practitioners have some difficulty in reconciling the radically different approaches by 
the Community to such similar problems. In the case of Stage I Vapour Recovery there 
is no distortion to the internal market, whereas Stage II Vapour Recovery clearly creates 
internal market distortions. 
The forgoing suggests that there can be a fundamental incompatibility between the 
effective operation of the internal market and the principle of subsidiarity. From a 
process perspective subsidiarity effectively means that to have any prospect of influence 
on the creation of a level playing field within the Community for their products a 
manufacturer must engage with, and convince, the legislators of each Member State to 
adopt technically similar regulations. Via this process there is no guarantee of 
successfully creating the required level playing field. To engage in this process at all a 
manufacturer is likely to require the deployment of high levels of skilled resources over 
an extensive time frame. This is in stark contrast to that same manufacturer's legitimate 
expectations of the Community's internal market where the playing field is expected to 
be level, albeit the actual level will be set by the appropriate Community legislation. 
The intricacies and uncertainties of the codecision process as laid down in Article 251 
(op. cit.) have been extolled by Earnshaw and Judge (1995) and Usher (1998). 
Shackleton (2000) states that in reality the overall codecision process can involve an 
additional informal, undocumented, procedure known as trialogue meetings. Trialogue 
meetings are attended by members of the Council and the Commission each at 'official' 
level and the European Parliament by the Rapporteur and Chair of the appropriate 
committee. Inter-institutional meetings, such as trialogue meetings, that take place in 
the interests of efficiency and expediency in assisting the passage of legislative acts that 
are caught by dispute after second reading serve a useful purpose. Such meetings do 
101 N.7 above 
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give rise to a measure of concern as a result of their lack of transparency. The existence 
of this process step, not included within the Article 251 102 procedure, may be at least 
part of the reason why the 'Legislative flowchart - codecision procedure', discussed 
earlier remains unpublished. The dilemma about what to publish as a flowchart of the 
procedure may continue to exercise the collective minds of the ED institutions. 
From his vantage point within the Secretariat of the European Parliament Shackleton 
provides a useful insight into the workings and operational benefits of the trialogue 
system. From a process perspective the introduction of this extra procedure, outside of 
the procedures laid down by the Treatyl03 is of concern because it is an almost 
clandestine procedure. It begs the question 'How many similar deviations from the 
rules have been introduced?' and by what authority do two of the major EC institutions 
work outside of the Treaty provisions. Irrespective of how useful to the overall process 
the introduction of the additional procedure may be, its existence suggests an apparent 
disregard for the operating rules at a high level in the process hierarchy. An apparent 
disregard for the operating rules at a high level in the process hierarchy suggests that 
internal market practitioners and others may not be treated openly and fairly by lower 
level procedures administered by the EC institutions. 
If the EC legislative system is to grow 'organically' through the introduction of new 
procedures, by and for the convenience of the EC institutions, then it should be done 
openly and formally. One way that this could be achieved is to have the legislative 
process accredited in some way to the internationally recognised quality management 
system ISO 9001 (ISO, 2000) with its requirement for continuous process improvement. 
Who would be in a position to act as the assessor for the accreditation of such a pan-
national high-level system would doubtless give rise to much debate. Majone (2000) 
with his concept of agencies may be of some value in this debate. 
The current message from the actions of the participants in the top level process, the EC 
institutions; the Council, the European Parliament, the Commission and the Economic 
and Social Committee, is not a message of exemplary compliance. A legitimate 
expectation is that the top level participants would comply with the law, the treaty 
provisions, or have the law changed to allow expedient progress within the law. 
\02 N.7 above 
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As at April 2002 an additional process problem made itself evident as the draft 
Measuring Instruments Directive (MID)(Commission, 2000) was negotiating the 
codecision process. The European Parliament issued its report (EP, 2001) following its 
first reading of the draft MID. A few months later, prior to any action being taken by 
Council, the Commission issued an amended proposal for the MID (Commission, 
2002a) exercising their right, established by Article 250 (2)104, to amend their proposal 
at any time before Council takes action. 
Due to lack of clarity in the Treaty (op. cit.) it is unclear, in taking the Article 250 (2) 
action, which of the following two apparently obvious situations obtains - there may be 
other, less obvious, interpretations for the way forward. The first situation would be for 
the European Parliament to go back for another first reading and submit a report to 
Council, and the second situation would be for Council to consider the new proposal 
together with the report from the European Parliament and opinion from the Economic 
and Social Committee related to a different proposal. The distribution ofthe amended 
proposal (Commission, 2002a), as listed on www.europa.eu.in/prelex, provides only 
limited help. The original proposal (Commission, 2000) was sent, as required by 
Articles 95 and 251 to Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee with an advisory copy to the Committee of the Regions; the revised proposal 
was sent only to Council and the European Parliament. 
From the document distribution described it is not possible to determine, with certainty, 
what procedure will follow. It has been shown that there is a lack of clarity in the 
Article 251, codecision, procedure as a result of Article 250 (2) being invoked by the 
Commission. There is the already admitted Byzantine complexity of the codecision 
procedure, and there exists an unauthorised procedure. Together these do little to 
suggest anything other than that the EC internal market technical legislative process is 
not well controlled. 
This author attended, as an invited participant, a meeting convened by the European 
Parliament Rapporteur for the MID some few weeks after the issue of the Commission's 
amended proposal (Commission, 2002a). The Rapporteur's purpose was to meet with a 
limited number of UK industry based internal market practitioners in an endeavour to 
determine what effects the MID in the revised form might have on their industries and 
104 N. 7 above 
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to solicit suggestions for Parliamentary amendments to the Commission proposal. In 
response to a question from this author at the beginning of the meeting the Rapporteur 
made it very clear that, in the absence of definitive guidance from the European 
Parliament's Secretariat about the effects of the invocation of the Article 250 (2) rights, 
the parliamentarians were working on the basis that the process had been reset to first 
reading within the European Parliament by the Commission's action. The subsequent 
sequence of events, culminating in the adoption by Council of a 'common position' 
(Council, 2003), demonstrated that the expectation that the process would be re-set to 
first reading in the European Parliament was incorrect and the European Parliament's 
next involvement was at second reading. The remainder of the meeting was an excellent 
model for cooperation between a European Parliamentary Rapporteur and industry 
representatives. 
The continuing search for practical expositions on the EC legislative change process has 
met with only limited success. Shaw (2000) includes a short section attempting to 
describe the codecision process and utilises a flow-chart to assist the description. From 
an EC internal market practitioner's perspective the description is of the high level 
process only without identifying where and when practitioners can attempt to exert 
influence. The flow-chart is of limited value in that it uses unexplained, and in some 
instances misleading, abbreviations. Vincenzi and Fairhurst (2002) similarly provide 
no more than a top level overview of the codecision, Article 251 105 process and includes 
no interface data that would be of practical assistance to EC internal market 
practitioners. Neither Shaw (2000) nor Vincenzi and Fairhurst (2002 made any 
comment on the possible influence of any Article 250106 intervention on the codecision 
process. 
3.3.2 PROFESSIONAL AND TRADE LITERATURE 
In this section, examples of, at best, misleading information from a selection of 
professional, trade, journals is presented. These particular examples relate to the 
105 N. 7 above 
106 N. 7 above 
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potentially explosive atmospheres (ATEX) directives107,108. It is recognised that much 
ofthe information offered in professional and trade journals is clearly of a higher 
quality than the following examples. 
Drives and Controls. Thompson, (2002) demonstrates a remarkable lack of 
understanding of the requirements of the ATEX directives109 by the statement 'Users 
are likely to put pressure on suppliers to comply with ATEX and to provide third party 
certification, as a condition of purchase.' Under the second, protection of workers, 
ATEX directive110 users of equipment are required to undertake a hazardous area 
classification, based on the likely presence of a potentially explosive atmosphere, and 
then select appropriate equipment accordingly. Thus the pressure to comply with the 
ATEX directive is on the user of equipment to select appropriate equipment. 
Manufacturers are only required to obtain third party certification for those items of 
their equipment portfolio that are designed for use in areas where high, or very high, 
levels of protection, as defined in Annex I of the product ATEX directive 11 1 is 
necessary. 
Plant & Control Engineering. Nascimento (2002) in a feature article attempts to 
explain important features of the ATEX directives112 that were then due to come fully 
into force on 1 July 2003. Within this article (Nascimento, 2002» there are serious 
deficiencies and errors. The major deficiency is the failure to identify the second, 
protection of workers ATEX directivel13 which is where the requirement placed on 
employers and users for the formal assessment of explosion risk is defined. This author 
would also suggest that, for a UK rather than European publication, the article is 
deficient in that it makes no reference to the transposed national regulations l14,115. The 
serious error by Nascimento (2002) is his statement 'Instead of a certificate of 
conformity and the CE mark on electrical equipment, this [manufacturer] declaration 
107 N.75 above 
108 Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on 
minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from 
explosive atmospheres (15th individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 
89/391/EEC), OJ 2000 L 23/57-64 
109 N.75 and N.108 above 
1I°N.108 
111 N.75 above 
112N.75 and N.108 above 
113 N.108 above 
114 The Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres 
Regulations 1996, SI 19961192 
115 The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2776 
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... will be the "passport" for the circulation of goods. ' Any general advice that 
equipment within the remit of the ATEX directives 11 6 does not require CE marking is, at 
the very least, questionable advice. 
Instrumentation. Francis (2003) begins a short piece with 'From 1 July 2003 a new Ex 
guideline - ATEX 100a - will exclusively govern ... ' whereas the ATEX 100a (now 
ATEX 95) directive 117 was already EC internal market, and transposed UK national 118 , 
law. The suggestion that an EC directive is only a set of guidelines rather than law is of 
great concern since it demonstrates a serious lack of understanding andlor represents 
questionable journalism. 
Each of Drives & Controls, Plant & Control Engineering and Instrumentation are 
intended to be read by professionals in industry, including EC internal market 
practitioners, and it is probable that such professionals are more likely to read this class 
of journal than they are to read academic journals. The mix of correct and incorrect 
information presented in the journals does not serve EC internal market practitioners 
well since there is no clear way for the uninformed to differentiate between the good 
and bad advice on offer. 
Two additional examples of misleading information published in trade journals are 
reported in Section 4.3.2 'Tests of the system'. 
3.4 UK processes related to EC institution processes 
Other than when the UK government is acting in its role as a member of Council, there 
are two periods when the UK government could be expected to interact with UK 
stakeholders. The first is the period leading up to the publication of a formal 
Commission proposal for new legislation. There is anecdotal evidence from 
professional colleagues across Europe that a number of Member States, including the 
UK, actively cooperate with the Commission during this period of formulation of 
legislation. The second period begins on the adoption of an EC internal market 
116N.75 andN.I08 above 
117 N.75 above 
liS N.114 above 
technical legislation directive and continues through the process of transposition into 
UK national law. 
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This author's professional experience of EC internal market technical harmonisation 
directives adopted in the late 1980s, through the 1990s and beyond, confirms that 
successive UK governments had some dialogue with UK stakeholders in each of the 
periods identified above. But that experience also suggested that the process employed 
was an ad hoc process rather than a documented process in that it appeared to be 
different for each directive - even when the processes for two directives were running 
simultaneously. The publication of the Transposition Guide (Cabinet Office, 2003) 
should herald a new era wherein each UK government department, and its officials, 
responsible for a transposition follows this guide. 
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the guide other than to observe that it is quite 
comprehensive and requires at all appropriate stages consultation with stakeholders -
this should include internal market practitioners. It is hoped that assessments of the 
effectiveness of the guide will be made by the UK government via the Cabinet Office 
andlor the National Audit Office as well as by other, independent, commentators. 
3.5 Commentary on the literature 
Within this Section the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are discussed in relation 
to some of the questions included in the structured interview, Appendix II. This 
discussion is a prelude to a full presentation and discussion of the data from the three 
strands of the fieldwork; structured interviews, tests of the system and participant 
observation that is presented in Section 5.3 
3.5.1 THE LAW MAKING PROCESS 
Within this Section the findings in relation to the process, provisions for the use of 
languages and for the transfer of texts to the Official Journal are discussed. 
3.5.1.1 The process 
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The research reported in Chapter 2 was concerned with establishing both the process 
that was to be critically reviewed and some major nodes within that process. Appendix 
I summarises, in chronological order, the development of the infrastructure of the 
European Community. From the chronological tabulation of Appendix I it can be seen 
that the nodes of the current infrastructure; the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the Economic and Social Committee are identified in the 1957 Treaty 
of Romel19 establishing the European Economic Community, albeit what is now the 
European Parliament was, in 1957, called the Assembly. The roots of the Council, the 
Commission and the Assembly go back to the 1951 European Coal and Steel 
Community 1 20 . Working from the Treaty121 there is some doubt as to whether the 
Economic and Social Committee (ESC) was originally an institution of the European 
Community, for clarification refer to the discussion in Section 2.2.1 For the purposes 
of this research the ESC is considered to be an institution along with the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Commission, each playing a part in the European 
Community internal market technical legislative process. 
Tests of the knowledge ofthe four institutions identified as above were used within the 
fieldwork Structured Interview, Question B.2, as an objective measure of knowledge of 
the internal market technical legislative process held by EC internal market 
practitioners. Inability of respondents to identify any of the EC institutions involved in 
the process could be taken to indicate poor process knowledge whereas identification of 
all four EC institutions could be taken to indicate a good knowledge of the process. 
The method by which people become members of each of the four institutions actively 
involved in the internal market technical legislative process was established and is 
summarised in Table 3.3 
The information related to membership of the institutions, as summarised in Table 3.3, 
was used within the fieldwork Structured Interview, Questions B.3 and B.4, as an 
additional objective measure of process knowledge held by the respondents. 
119 N.1 above 
120 Treaty establishing the The European Coal and Steel Community [Treaty of Paris], HMSO, London 
(this is Cmnd. 4863 that reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 1951) 
121 N.1 above 
Table 3.3 Indicating how people become members of the institutions actively 
involved with the internal market technical legislative process. 
Institution Method by which people become 
members of the institution 
Council Ministers of the Member States' 
government appropriate to the subject 
matter attend. 
European Parliament Directly elected by Member State, and 
hence European Union, citizens. 
Commission Commissioners are nominated by Member 
State government and then ratified by 
European Parliament. 
Officials are appointed via processes 
broadly similar to those applicable to UK 
civil servants. 
Economic and Social Committee Nominated by Member State government 
and then ratified by Council. 
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It was expected that somewhere within the primary or secondary legislation there would 
be a description of the EC internal market technical legislative process. The basic 
process description is provided in Article 251 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communityl22 as discussed in Chapter 2. Knowledge, or 
lack of knowledge, of this description again provided an objective measure of 
knowledge and was covered by Structured Interview Question B.5 A response 
indicating knowledge of Article 251, or old Article 189b alone, was taken as sufficient 
to indicate knowledge of the process description even though it is only through Article 
95 (op. cit.) that the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) becomes a mandatory 
consultee in the process. 
Article 95 strongly suggests that within it, and within Article 251, the full description 
for the internal market technical legislative process will be found. It has been shown, 
Section 3.3.1, that this is not in fact the case. Article 250 (2), an article that is not 
referred to in either of Articles 95 or 251, provides the Commission an opportunity, 
under defined circumstances, to withdraw its original proposal and to submit an 
alternative proposal. The particular difficulty that arises when the Commission acts 
under Article 250 (2) entitlement stems from the lack of determinism about where the 
process re-starts with the Commission's revised proposal. What happened in the case of 
the draft Measuring Instruments Directive (Commission, 2000b) was that the 
122 N.7 above 
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Commission used its powers conferred by Article 250 (2) to put forward an alternative 
proposal (Commission, 2002a) after each of the Economic and Social Committee and 
European Parliament had submitted their reports. Thereafter the 'common position' 
document used for the second reading process was constructed from the ESC and 
European Parliament reports on the original proposal and Council's comments on the 
revised proposal. 
No evidence has been found to directly support any suggestion that the Commission 
used its Article 250 (2) powers, as and when it did, to deliberately negate the ESC and 
European Parliament comments. The lack of determinism in Article 250 (2) afforded 
the Commission this opportunity to avoid addressing comments from the European 
Parliament in particular. It can of course be argued that the European Parliament has 
the second reading opportunity to re-establish its comments. The difficulty now arises 
that the European Parliament voting requirements are much more stringent at second 
reading and less likely to be met. This situation makes it less likely that the European 
Parliament can pass resolutions critical of proposals for legislative change at second 
reading. This author would suggest, therefore, that the use of Article 250 (2) sways, in 
favour of the Commission, the balance of power that was thought to have been shifted 
towards the European Parliament by Article 251 123 . 
Even where the requirements of the treaty are clear there is evidence, as discussed in 
Section 2.3.3.3, that Council does not comply with the simple requirement specified in 
Article 249 (op. cit.) that decisions be addressed to someone - the Treaty (op. cit.) does 
not appear to allow any discretion in this requirement and action by the Commission 
could be expected. Hartley (2003) notes 'The true position would seem to be that the 
Commission has a discretion but is also subject to a duty ... to take the most 
appropriate action to ensure that Community law is obeyed ... '. Whatever the merits of 
Hartley's assertion ' ... [for the Commission} to take the most appropriate action to 
ensure that Community law is obeyed ... ' it is clear that Council have been allowed to 
create an extended record of failure of compliance with a Treaty (op. cit.) provision. A 
similar review of Commission decisions showed that the Commission acts properly in 
addressing their decisions. 
123 N.7 above 
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Figure 2.1 shows the interactions between the EC institutions for the preparation of 
internal market technical legislation as set down in Articles 95 and 251 of the Treaty 
(op. cit.). This author would suggest that the drafters of the treaties have missed an 
opportunity to improve clarity and determinism of Articles 95, 250 and 251 by failing to 
incorporate a flowchart within the treaties. There is nothing in Articles 95, 250 or 251 to 
suggest that even limited discretion is available to any of the EC institutions to modify 
the process sequence. The main uncertainty comes from the provisions of Article 250, 
as discussed earlier. The incorporation of a flowchart within the treaties themselves 
would appear to have four major benefits: clarity, succinctness of text that would assist 
consistency of translation, determinism and an improved ability to track progress of any 
proposal for change through the process. 
Even though the process sequence may be considered as defined it is apparent that there 
are two major uncertainties that may affect internal market practitioners in particular. 
These major uncertainties are to be found at the front end of the process - the initiating 
event of Figure 2.1. The first uncertainty relates to the process as defined, it is 
expected that the Commission would produce a proposal within a reasonable period of 
time and then for the remainder of the process to be followed. Experience of the draft 
Measuring Instruments Directive (MID)(Commission, 2000b), for which early 
consultation drafts (Commission, 1991) were available from the early 1990s, show that 
this initial stage can take almost a decade. 
Information on the early stages of the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
Directive124 and the Machinery (MC) Directivel25 , each of which is also a New 
Approach directive, is not available. The new approach to internal market directives 
only came into existence in 1985 126 and within four years the EMC and MC directives 
had been through the entire process and had been adopted as internal market legislation. 
Given such comparative data it is difficult to avoid some conjectures about the 
efficiency of the internal Commission processes related to the drafting of the Measuring 
Instruments Directive proposal (Commission, 2000b). The second uncertainty stems 
from a possible alternative course of action, not provided for in the Article 251 127 
124 Council directive of3 May 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
electromagnetic compatibility (89/336/EEC), OJ 1989 L 139/19-22 
125 Council directive of 14 June 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
machinery (89/392/EEC), OJ 1989 L 183/9-32 
126 N.19 above 
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process, whereby the Commission decides, during the course of its preparatory work, 
not to put forward a legislative proposal but instead to abrogate its responsibilities and 
invoke 'subsidiarity'. This is what happened in the case of Stage II Vapour Recovery as 
discussed in Section 3.3.1 The sector of industry concerned was thereby subjected to a 
long period of uncertainty by the Commission and now suffers the lack of technical 
harmonisation as a result of some, but not all, Member States establishing their own 
national requirements. 
In addition to the above uncertainties there exists the overall uncertainty of time to 
complete the process even when the process as defined is followed. Such uncertainty 
may be unsatisfactory but it is not substantially different from what occurs in the 
Member States in relation to domestic legislation. 
Throughout the period of this research extensive use has been made of the EC 
institutions' websites. Navigation of these websites has not always been easy. 
Undoubtedly some of these difficulties were caused by the researcher himself, but this 
was not always the case. Poor website management by the EC institutions has also been 
a factor, but any attempt here to document all ofthese perceived difficulties would not 
serve any useful purpose. Over the period of this research a number of changes to the 
layout of EC institutions' websites have been observed. Each change has necessitated 
re-learning the site's navigation. Too frequent forced change may be clouding this 
author's judgement on quality of the site. 
It was found that even though European Community directives have been, and remain, 
at the very heart of the legislative framework of the internal market there was no 
requirement to publish the directives until the coming into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 128 - forty years after the establishment of the European Economic 
Community and the birth of its common market. Even without treaty requirements 
primary and secondary legislation has normally been published in the Official Journal. 
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3.5.1.2 Language 
The management of language within the Commission, and to a lesser extent the other 
institutions, undoubtedly presents a major challenge. At the time of writing, April 2004, 
with the EU of fifteen Member States having eleven official languages and working 
languages, the Commission (2000c) employs directly and as freelance contractors about 
1200 translators who, together with managers, secretaries etc make up about 8% of the 
total Commission staff. Bainbridge (1998), however, suggests that approximately one 
third of Commission staff are engaged on interpretation and translation services. The 
Commission (2000c) indicates that it is currently assisting the applicant countries with 
the translation of the aquis communautaire and in the setting up of a system for training 
translators for the future. It is not yet clear how the EC institutions will manage the 
conduct of business with twenty official languages and working languages following the 
2004 enlargement and what the cost will be to the citizens of the EU. 
From a process perspective what is already clear, from knowledge of delays in holding 
Council Working Group meetings to discus the draft Measuring Instruments Directive 
(Commission, 2000b), is that progress can be inhibited by Member States demanding 
full translation facilities. These demands are not just petulant responses to situations 
but appear to be the right of Member States. When resources are limited work has to be 
prioritised and as a result some work has to be delayed. Circumstances such as those 
noted above were quoted by UK Council Working Group members as a reason for 
delays to the progress of the draft Measuring Instruments Directive (op. cit.). With nine 
additional official languages and working languages following the enlargement in 2004 
then this situation is more likely to deteriorate rather than it is to improve129• 
Section 2.2.4 discusses in detail a number of aspects of the overall European 
Community language issues. Within this discussion the CEN model (CEN, 1996, 
Vo1.2) for working with an equivalent diversity of language was identified. In the 
absence of any formalised approach to more efficiently managing the diversity of 
language some evidence of pragmatism in managing the situation was identified. An 
important finding was the failure by each of the institutions that are part of the EC 
129 Dombey (2004) notes that a set oflegislation for the financial services sector failed to meet the 30 
April 2004 translation deadline, as a result it now has to be translated into all of the current, May 2004, 
set of official languages and working languages and is now not expected to be ready until September 
2004. 
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internal market technical legislative process to abide by the requirements of the Manual 
of Precedents (Council, 2001a). 
3.5.1.3 The Official Journal 
The role of the Official Journal is essentially a passive role, that of publication of certain 
legislative acts and some other documents. For some classes of legislation, those for 
which the date of 'coming into force' is determined by the date on which the legislation 
is published in the Official Journal, the Official Journal can to a limited extent affect the 
date of the 'coming into force' of legislation. For the technical legislation of the 
internal market the legislative vehicle is that of directives for which the date of 'coming 
into force' is set within the directive not by its Official Journal publication date. 
The handling of the draft Measuring Instruments Directive (MID) following the 
adoption by Council, on 26 February 2004, of the European Parliament's second 
reading amendments has provided a useful insight into what was previously understood 
to be a simple, straight through, activity. The statement suggests that either the text 
that was voted on by Council was not available in all official languages and working 
languages or that linguists were modifying a text after it was finally adopted. Neither of 
the above possibilities enhances confidence in the Article 251 130 process. Subsequent 
careful comparison of the European Parliament approval of' common position with 
amendments' (European Parliament, 2003), accepted by both Council and the 
Commission, and the final text of the MIDl31 reveals that Amendment 28 (European 
Parliament, 2003) has not been included as expected. It remains at present unclear if 
this omission is related to the protracted work ofthe linguists or to some other activity. 
That a final legislative text differs from the sum of common position and agreed 
amendments suggests a lack of transparency in part of the process. There is no 
evidence to implicate the Official Journal in this discrepancy. 
The change of name from 'Official Journal of the European Communities' to 'Official 
Journal of the European Union', introduced by the Treaty of Nice 132 is acknowledged 
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but is not seen as having any material effect on the European Community internal 
market technical legislative process. 
133 
3.5.2 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONAL AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL 
LITERATURE 
One measure available for the assessment of a process is the quality of the process 
output. In the context of this research a measure of the EC internal market technical 
legislative process is the extent to which the internal market has become functional. In 
attempting to make such an assessment it was found that even the basic construct of the 
internal market was referred to in three different ways. The lack of consistency in 
terminology provides the basis for some concern as to consistency of objectives. It is 
not entirely clear if the common market, the single market and the internal market are 
really the same thing. This concern is highlighted by the use of the terms common 
market and internal market in such high level documents as the Treaty 133 . On the basis 
that common market and internal market are one and the same, then a preliminary 
measure of success in creating a functional common, or internal, market is available 
from the treaties and EC institutional pronouncements. The Treaty of Rome 134 required 
the common market to be progressively established within twelve years, i.e. by 1970. 
In 1985 the Commission (1985) and Council135 each agreed targets to complete the 
internal market by 31 December 1992. Article 13 of the Single European Act136 
introduced a new Article 8a into the Treaty of Rome137 thereby even more formally 
establishing the 31 December 1992 deadline. It is suggested these activities can be 
accepted as an admission that the initial 1970 target had not been achieved. The 
Measuring Instruments Directive138, an internal market directive covering products not 
previously legislated within the EC, allows the Member States until April 2006 for 
transposition, suggesting that on this evidence alone, the internal market cannot be seen 
as complete, at least until April 2006. Overall the above suggests that the EC internal 
market technical legislative process has not yet delivered a completed internal market. 
If the process output, after forty-five years of trying, remains unsatisfactory then it 
seems reasonable to infer that the process has some deficiencies. 
133 N.7 above 
134 N.1 above 
135 N.19 above 
136 N.2 above 
137 N.1 above 
138 N.28 above 

134 
Formal references, such as those made in the treaties, and also some of the less formal 
references, to the Commission make no reference to the Commission's internal 
organisational structure. It has not been the purpose of this research to delve deeply 
into the internal organisational structure of the Commission. It is pertinent to note that 
there are a number of essentially autonomous Directorates General each of which is 
responsible to an individual Commissioner and at the top level of the hierarchy the 
Commission operates in a collegiate manner. Within the structure as outlined there 
exists the 'Enterprise' Directorate General where the new approach technical 
harmonization directives are drafted and the 'Internal Market' Directorate General. 
These two Directorates General are responsible to two different Commissioners, thus 
there is no one person with overall responsibility for the internal market. There is some 
concern therefore that the internal organisational structure of the Commission may be 
part of the problem in the delivery of a completed internal market. It is in areas such as 
this that the paucity of academic literature relating to process, as opposed to the wealth 
of case law literature, becomes evident. No critique of the internal organisation of the 
Commission has been found that assesses the effect of organisational structure within 
the Commission on the delivery of internal market legislative proposals. 
With little more than a superficial look at the pen portraits of authors whose academic 
works are to be found on the shelves of law libraries, e.g. Middlesex University and 
University of Essex, it is clear that these authors are legal academics possibly more 
concerned with the output from the technical legislative process rather than the practical 
details of the process itself. At first sight, when searching for help with the EC internal 
market technical legislative process works such as 'Practitioners' Handbook ofEC 
Law' (Barling and Brealey, 1998) seem to be of value. On closer inspection, it becomes 
clear that in this instance 'practitioner' is referring to members ofthe legal profession 
and the work relates to the finer points oflaw, not really of value to an internal market 
practitioner's search for process information. Similar comments apply to a Chapter 
entitled 'Better lawmaking? An evaluation o/lawmaking in the European Community' 
by Bunn in Craig and Harlow (1998) where there is neither description nor critique of 
the process. 
It would be easy for this author, as an internal market practitioner, to simply criticise the 
lack of literature available to assist his professional work. A more constructive 
approach would be to suggest to the Confederation of British Industry and the Institute 
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of Directors, acting in umbrella roles not unlike that of the Bar Council, to produce and 
publish some form of handbook to assist their members to make inputs to the EC 
internal market technical legislative process at the appropriate times. 
Council (2000), in its annual report to the European Parliament, admits that the internal 
market is incomplete and needs 'rapid work'. The Commission (2001b) paper 
'Working together to maintain momentum', discussed in Section 3.2.1 takes as its 
starting point the premise that the internal market is complete. Such a premise needs to 
be judged by the Commission's (2003) own Internal Market Scoreboard that reports a 
non-zero, and rising, transposition deficit and a transposition deficit target that is not 
even zero. Despite these failures by the current EC Member States, all of whom 
became members on or before 1 January 1995, there is an expectation (Commission, 
2001a) that each of the applicant states shall have all internal market legislation in place 
at the time of their accession in May 2004. The admission in Internal Market 
Scoreboard Number 12 (Commission, 2003) that late transposition' ... leaves a void in 
the regulatory framework. ' provides hope, though perhaps no great expectation, that the 
European Community may take actions that adequately address the problem. 
For this author, an internal market practitioner, real difficulties arise from attempts to 
reconcile personal experiences with any of the reports issued by the EC institutions. 
The Commission would want us to believe that the target for a completed internal 
market by 31 December 1992 was achieved. The Commission (Commission, 2002b, 
2003,2004) admits that there is a transposition deficit. A deficit that appears to suggest 
that the un-transposed directives do not have any adverse effect on the completeness of 
the internal market. If this is the case then the perceived need for these yet to be 
transposed directives is unclear. Council, meanwhile, are prepared to admit continuing 
problems with completeness but do not appear to demand effective corrective action to 
be taken by the European Community's executive - the Commission. Council when 
dealing with requests for action by the Commission does not use robust language. A 
good example is provided in a Council Resolution139 which 'CALLS UPON the 
Commission to report ... ' where the need would appear to be for demands to be made 
of the Commission followed by a real holding to account. 
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Unlike the other EC institutions, Council appears not to take any investigative actions of 
its own. When Council perceives a need for investigations, then Article 208 of the 
Treaty140 provides for these investigations to be carried out by the Commission. The 
independence and thoroughness of any investigation by the Commission, that may 
involve actions, or lack of actions, by the Commission, remains questionable and it 
seems unlikely that there is any real holding to account of individuals or departments 
within the Commission. 
The earlier discussion shows that Council, when it determines that investigations into 
areas such as progress on completing the internal market would be of benefit, relies on 
the Commission to investigate. The Commission, acting here as the executive branch of 
the EC, is less likely to be rigorous and critical in any investigation than a truly 
independent investigator. The independence of major enquiries in the United Kingdom 
is often assured by the appointment of a senior member of the judiciary to head up the 
enquiry. The European Parliament, in contrast, has shown the value of greater 
independence in investigation than is provided by the Commission and has prepared 
reports on the state of the internal market (European Parliament, 1997, 1998) that are 
somewhat at variance with the views promulgated by the Commission. As was shown 
also to be the case with Council, there is little effective control of the Commission by 
the European Parliament to ensure that even the European Parliament's comments and 
criticisms are adequately addressed. Even the powers open to the European Parliament 
to set up a temporary 'Committee ofInquiry', as allowed for in Article 193 141 , only 
extend to inquiry into ' ... alleged contraventions or maladministration in the 
implementation of Community law". '. Failure of the Commission to act on reports 
from the European Parliament would not appear to fall within this scope. 
Craig & de Burca (1998) indicate that the amendments by the Treaty on European 
Union142 and the Treaty of Amsterdam143 to what is now Article 251 of the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community144 have had 
the effect of '". further consolidating the role of the [European] Parliament in the 
decision-making process, ... '. This author would not contradict the Craig & de Burca 
view, but would argue that it is a somewhat simplistic view that fails to adequately 
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recognise the significance of the changed conditions imposed upon the European 
Parliament as part of this process change. Prior to common position the European 
Parliament submits its report to Council on the basis of a simple majority in plenary 
session. There is no binding obligation on Council to accept any proposed amendments 
from the European Parliament in formulating common position. On receipt of common 
position the European Parliament can now only reject the proposal by an absolute 
majority of its component members at a vote that must be taken within three months. 
Not only is such an outcome more difficult to achieve than the earlier simple majority 
but the difficulty can be exacerbated by the manipulation of the timing of the 
submission of common position to the European Parliament. From a process 
perspective there may be an apparent consolidation of the role of the European 
Parliament in the decision making. At the practical level possible influence of the 
process by internal market practitioners has probably not improved. In practice the 
'power of the pen' that rests with the Commission in the initial drafting of legislation 
and Council's control over common position appears to still leave the European 
Parliament some way behind in the inter institutional power struggle. As in many 
endeavours, the greatest influence looks likely to be achieved at the front end of the 
process, here this would mean engaging with the Commission as it prepares its draft 
legislation. For small sectors of industry, where there may not be adequate resources 
for permanent monitoring and lobbying of Commission activities, their sporadic 
interaction with the Commission may not be sufficient for them to be aware that 
proposals that may affect them are being prepared. The views from their sector of 
industry may not be adequately heard early enough in the overall process. 
Other commentators, for instance Dashwood (1994), Earnshaw and Judge (1995) and 
Usher (1998), offer the comment that there are potential EC internal market technical 
legislative process problems caused by lack of clarity in the text of the treaties. These 
commentators offer limited suggestions for change to improve clarity in the text and 
hence improve the process itself. 
The influence that European Community and Member State national legislation can 
have on the internal market, almost by accident through, for example, social legislation, 
seems not to be fully understood. An example of European Community social 
legislation that creates a distortion of the internal market is the explosive atmospheres 
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protection of workers directive145. A similar, national, distortion is created by the 
application ofthe Disability Discrimination Act146. In each ofthe above cases the social 
laws are capable of introducing technical barriers to trade that can become measures 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions between Member States thus 
distorting the internal market. Such measures are contrary to the requirements of 
Article 28 of the Treaty147. Dannenbring (1999) clearly identifies the negative 
influences on the internal market, without specifying whether these are accidental or 
deliberate, as a result of actions by the Member States. 
A limited ability to track progress of a proposed legislative change is provided via the 
Pre-Lex database accessible through the www.europa.eu.int website. From Pre-Lex it is 
evident that proposals for legislative change from any given Directorate General of the 
Commission may be issued to other selected Directorates General. There is no evidence 
that recipient Directorates General, for example DG Enterprise and DG Internal Market, 
recognise andlor respond to threats to the internal market from other Directorates 
General. 
There exists a directive148 establishing a process designed to prevent Member States 
from introducing national technical legislation that would adversely affect the internal 
market. This process is a notification system driven by the Member State intending to 
introduce new technical legislation. The overall efficiency of this process has not been 
fully researched, but this author is aware of a recent change to the technical 
requirements for Stage II vapour recovery systems in Germany that did not reach the 
UK notification point, suggesting deficiencies in the process. In addition to the above 
example the notification system does not appear to be designed to catch the changes to 
social, and other, legislation that can affect the internal market. 
Council and the European Parliament have the power, via the Article 251 149 process, to 
adopt or reject proposals for internal market technical legislation from the Commission. 
Once adopted it is for the Commission, through powers conferred via Articles 211 and 
226 (op. cit.), to enforce the legislation. In the context of directives, that part of the 
enforcement regime controlled by the Commission is transposition. This includes total 
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failure to transpose as well as inaccurate, or inappropriate, transposition. The process 
perspective here has to be that the process, the transposition of Community legislation 
into Member State national legislation, all too often fails. While the Commission 
clearly has the task of enforcement the guilty parties are the individual Member States 
in their failures to uphold requirements agreed to in Article 10 (op. cit.). For ease of 
reference Article lOis reproduced below: 
Article 10 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which couldjeopardise the attainment of 
the objectives of this Treaty. 
The Commission (2002b) admits to registering approximately 2000 new infringements 
of Community legislation per annum. Exactly how many of these infringements are 
related to the internal market for goods is not clear, but it does indicate a lack of respect 
for Community legislation, by the Member States rather than by the general citizenry. 
In its report on the activities of the European Ombudsman the European Parliament 
(European Parliament, 2002) is highly critical of the Commission's policy of 
withholding the entire infringement procedure from public scrutiny. 
In an attempt to understand and overcome some of the transposition problems the 
Commission (2002b) puts forward the view that ' ... [Member States have] domestic 
administrative problems and in particular problems of understanding often complex 
Community legislative texts. ' The Commission (op. cit.) goes on to suggest' ... the 
drafting by the services of the Commission, in certain specific cases, of guidelines for 
transposal, which would be recommended to the national authorities.' Given that 
transposition is only required for legislative texts agreed by Council the first of the 
above Commission quotes could suggest that Council agrees to things it fails to 
understand. An accredited ISO 9001 (ISO, 2000) quality management system 
embracing Council would require, via Clause 6.2.1, 'Personnel performing work 
affecting product quality shall be competent on the basis of appropriate education, 
training, skills and experience. ' With such a quality management system in place there 
should be a better match between level of complexity of the legislative texts and the 
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abilities of those agreeing to it, such that transposition should no longer be a problem. 
The second quote from the Commission appears to be now offering an intermediate 
process step whereby the Commission intervenes to prepare guidelines for transposition 
- undoubtedly at added cost and time to the process. It is possible that a similar result 
would be achieved, more quickly and with more certainty, by the European Community 
agreeing a regulation rather than a directive - a procedure that circumvents the need for 
transposition. 
It was reasoned in Section 3.2.1 that the official view of the internal market should be 
that view promulgated by the Commission. Similarly for the Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) it was reasoned, Section 3.2.2.3, that their view was the most 
independent of the views expressed by the EC institutions involved with the internal 
market technical legislative process. The role of the ESC is purely advisory, even at the 
stage where the ESC is formally part of the internal market technical legislative process, 
The potential usefulness of their inputs is diminished compared to those EC institutions 
with an executive role. Even though other EC institutions are not obliged to act on their 
reports the ESC prepares and publishes, on its own initiative, reasoned reports (ESC, 
1998b) on the internal market. Within this report (op. cit), which is the ESC response to 
a Commission initiative (Commission, 1997) there is the direct suggestion, in certain 
circumstances, to use regulations instead of directives. This suggestion had previously 
been advanced by the Molitor (1995) group of independent experts. It is pertinent to 
note here that via the re-vamped ESC website it has not been possible to find recent 
reports from the 'Single Market Observatory' of the ESC. Additionally emails to the 
ESC via their website remain unanswered after several months - contrary to the 
requirements of their adopted Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. 
The Molitor Group report (1995) and the ESC report (1998) are each directed at the 
Commission and contain positive suggestions for improving the internal market and the 
system that generates its legislative framework. It is not possible for this author to state 
that the suggestions within these reports have been totally ignored by the Commission 
but, similarly, it has not been possible to identify any communication from the 
Commission that fully addresses each of the suggestions put forward. It is perhaps not 
reasonable to suggest that the Commission should respond fully and publicly to such 
reports. What undoubtedly is missing in 2004, more than ten years after the supposed 
completion of the re-Iaunched internal market, is a believable action plan that will 
finally deliver the promise of an internal market. 
141 
One of the criticisms raised within this research has been that some of the reviews of the 
internal market have started from what this author would suggest is the false premise 
that the internal market is complete. Mathijsen (1995, 1999) in the sixth and seventh 
editions of his book makes two quite contradictory statements about the state of the 
internal market: 
Mathijsen,1995: 'It can be said without too much exaggeration, that the freedom to 
move goods throughout the Community has become a reality, but that vigilance is 
required from all the economic operators. ' 
Mathijsen, 1999: 'What explains that seven years after the completion of the internal 
market on December 31, 1992, people still experience difficulties when moving goods 
within the Community?' 
In an ever changing world it should not be expected that opinions are the same in 1999 
as compared to opinions expressed in1995. What is of concern here is that the more 
pessimistic view is the more recently expressed view. These different views, expressed 
by a former Director General of the Commission, together with the statement 
(Mathijsen, 1999): 'There are other areas where the principle of "mutual recognition" 
cannot work, mainly on account of the complexity of the required regulations.' suggests 
that much of the current success of the EC internal market is the result of the 
pragmatism of EC internal market practitioners rather than purely a measure of the 
intended beneficial effect of the outputs from the EC internal market legislative process. 
One difficulty with dealing with any problem that approaches the complexity of 
achieving an EC internal market is that of measurement of the level of achievement 
towards the objective. Even the Commission from its privileged position appears to be 
unable to make a justified assessment of the state of the internal market. In its Internal 
Market Scoreboards the Commission (2001a,c, 2003, 2004) starts from the premise of a 
completed internal market yet discusses serious transposition deficits and continues to 
propose additional new approach directives extending the areas legislated. Additional 
legislation to improve the functioning of what is perceived as an already completed 
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internal market is of course acceptable and to be expected. Any claim that the internal 
market is complete and concurrently work on legislation to embrace additional trade 
sectors may be seen as undermining the claim of completeness. 
The Commission has made an attempt at measurement of the achievements of the 
internal market and for the period 1992-2002 an internal market index has been 
calculated and is published in Internal Market Scoreboard Number 11 (Commission, 
2002b). The index has been calculated using variables specified by the Member States. 
It is presented as a graph showing a rising index. There is little doubt that the internal 
market has some notable achievements but that does not necessarily mean that the 
objective of a fully functioning, barrier-free, internal market has been achieved. 
The quality of information relating to European Community internal market legislation 
as reported in Section 3.3.2, and discussed further in Section 5.2.4, made available 
within the professional, trade, press gives cause for concern. Trade journals, such as 
those reported on, are industry sector specific, and include within their raison d'Nre the 
task to inform their readers of developments in their particular industry sector including 
changes to the environment within which the industry sector operates. When change to 
the operating environment is legislative there is an obligation for the information 
disseminated to be accurate. Acceptance, without independent corroboration, by 
European Community internal market practitioners of the information put before them 
in trade journals can provide a false description of the environment within which they 
are expected to operate. Such false descriptions can lead to inadvertent transgressions 
of the law and/or delays in meeting market needs if, and when, the accurate description 
of their operating environment emerges. 
3.6 Summary 
Within this Chapter the custodian of the official view of the internal market has been 
identified - the Commission. It was established that the internal market was due to be 
completed by 1 Jan 1993 and questions were raised about whether this target can have 
been convincingly met given the acknowledged transposition deficit. 
Problems associated with the organisation of the Commission emanating from the 
involvement of two Directorates General, Enterprise and Internal market, each 
responsible to different Commissioners were discussed. Related to this organisation 
problem were the descriptions of accidental distortions of the internal market 
framework created by social and environmental legislation. 
Comments of the other EC institutions were reviewed and assessments of the 
effectiveness of these comments were made. Of particular interest was the comment 
from the Economic and Social Committee about the possibility of using regulations 
rather than directives to create a more effective framework for the internal market. 
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A review of independent commentators' publications was included although very little 
literature on the EC internal market technical legislative process, and its accessibility to 
internal market practitioners, has been found. Within this corpus of literature a number 
of comments on undue complexity and lack of clarity in both primary and secondary 
legislation were noted. Few direct suggestions for improvements were found. Serious 
deficiencies in information disseminated by the trade press were identified. 
More detailed findings from the work of this Chapter are presented in Chapter 5 where 
they are combined with findings from the fieldwork. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 'The law making process' and Chapter 3 'Literature survey and review' 
together have provided a description of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process, these Chapters have provided data dealing with supporting activities a & band 
parts of supporting activities c & e as described in Section 1. 3.2 
This Chapter discusses the options available, and the final choice made, for the 
methodology for the fieldwork to provide data associated with the remainder of 
supporting activities c, e and supporting activities f & g described in Section 1.3.2, 
dealing with knowledge and perceptions held by EC internal market practitioners. 
This Chapter also records tests made of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process, supporting activity d (Section 1.3.2). The tests within supporting activity d 
were not, indeed could not be, performed to a previously identified plan, they were 
reactions to opportunities that arose during the course of the overall research work. 
Data relating to the above activities was obtained through the cooperation, gratefully 
acknowledged, of individuals who gave time to this research. The analysis of the data 
obtained is provided in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Methodology rationale 
In this Section the methodological approach adopted to fulfil the aim of this research, 
Section 1.3.1 , is discussed and described. From the aim, concerned with the European 
Community internal market, it is clear that this research relates to the real social world. 
The improved understanding of the EC internal market, and of its technical legislative 
processes, that derive from this research has academic value in addition to practical 
value to individuals and to organisations. 
145 
Scott (1998) draws a distinction between basic research and applied research through 
two comments ' ... basic research, is driven more by theory ... 'and ' ... applied research 
is driven by an interest in solving some identified problem '. Bryman (2000) similarly 
suggests that research that 'provides knowledge that can be used by organisations' is 
applied research. Cooper & Emory (1995) clearly support Bryman's view by their 
statement 'Applied research has a practical problem solving emphasis. It is conducted 
to reveal answers to specific questions related to action, performance or policy needs. ' 
A review ofthe aim and supporting objectives (Section 1.3.1) ofthis research in the 
context of the above general descriptions of research suggests that this research be 
treated as 'applied research'. 
Much organisational research (Bryman, 2000) is concerned with an internal study of an 
organisation with, initially at least, the results of the study being used to improve the 
performance of that organisation. In this context Allen's (1991) definition of 
organisation: 'an organised body, especially a business, government department, 
charity etc' suggests that any organisation being studied is clearly bounded. For 
organisations falling within Allen's definition it would seem reasonable to expect that 
there would exist a systematic, orderly, internal structure with what might best be 
described as an individual, or possibly a small group of individuals, providing 
leadership from the top of the structure. It is clear that this research does not fit the 
general pattern of being an internal investigation, nor is it restricted to a single 
organisation. Chapter 2 identified that there are a number of organisations, known 
within the overall European Union structure as institutions, which interact to produce 
European Community internal market legislation. The inter-institutional interactions 
take place within a framework established by the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communityl, but there is no one individual, or group of 
individuals, charged with overseeing the interactions. Also, since no single EC 
institution, acting alone, can generate and implement EC internal market legislation this 
research has had to investigate the operation of a somewhat amorphous sub-set of the 
set of European Union institutions. Since the research is neither internal, nor 
commissioned by anyone or more of the EC institutions, the most that can be achieved 
from the problem solving perspective is the provision of information to better 
understand the EC internal market technical legislative process. The additional 
information has value to assist external practitioners as they undertake their normal 
I Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 2002 C 325/33-184 
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work and to identify weaknesses of, and suggest improvements for, the operation of the 
sub-set of institutions. It is not possible, as part of this research, to solve any EC 
institutional problems in a way that would meet Cooper and Emory's (1995) 
description of applied research. However, Bryman's (2000) requirement of applied 
research, to provide knowledge that can be used by organisations, is achievable. 
Having thus described the context of this research it is now possible to discuss and 
describe in more detail the methodological approach. 
Associated with the domain of applied research, within the broader context of social 
research, there are two distinct models of the research process. Robson (1999) 
describes these two models as follows: 'One is labelled as positivistic, natural science 
based, hypothetico-deductive, quantitative or even simply "scientific"; the other as 
interpretive, ethnographic or qualitative - among several other labels.' While there is 
considerable agreement with Robson's view that there are two distinct models of the 
social research process (Gill and Johnson, 1991)(Audi, 1999)(May, 2001) the choice of 
terminology to describe the dichotomy shows some variation. Irrespective of the 
terminology employed the two models are broadly understood as: 
a) requiring some form of hypothesis as the starting point, the hypothesis is then tested 
and based on the outcome of the test the hypothesis is either upheld or rejected, if 
rejected the original hypothesis may be modified and sUbjected to further testes), or 
b) requiring a detailed study of a particular situation to provide observational data from 
which a descriptive theory can be produced. 
The sequence' a' above is widely recognised as the deductive process (Audi, 1999) 
(Cooper and Emory, 1995) (Gallear, 1999) (Gill and Johnson, 1991) whereas the 
sequence 'b' above is similarly widely recognised as the inductive process (Audi, 1999) 
(Cooper and Emory, 1995) (Gallear, 1999) (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Cooper and 
Emory (1995) further recognise that in any given research the inductive and deductive 
processes may be used in a sequential manner. 
Attempts to describe any implicit rules that are applied to the EC internal market 
technical legislative process, an ethnographic approach to the research, would require 
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the researcher to have significant, indeed almost open ended, access to those working 
within the EC institutions. Clearly such an approach for this research was not a 
practical option. 
For an historically relatively modern system of governance such as that employed by 
the European Union it would be of some concern to be forced to consider that the rules 
governing the EC internal market technical legislative process grew' organically' from 
the bottom up to create a system rather than there being a top down, imposed, system. 
The part of this research concerned with the identification of the EU institutions and of 
their operational rules is reported in Chapter 2 'The law making process'; within this a 
system for the generation of EC internal market technical legislation has been identified, 
albeit a system with limitations and flaws as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
The first steps in this research were to identify those European Union institutions 
involved in the generation ofEC internal market technical legislation and to describe 
their internal processes. The identification and description was achieved through 
qualitative, archival, research (Bryman, 2000) (Robson, 1999), these findings are 
reported in Chapters 2 and 3. In so far as the description thus obtained allows for the 
prediction of what should happen to proposals for new internal market legislation then it 
could be argued that an inductively produced theory of the EC internal market 
legislative process has been generated. However, in this instance it is perhaps more 
appropriate to suggest that what has been achieved is the documentation of a 'model' of 
the EC internal market technical legislative process rather than a theory. Cooper and 
Emory (1995) define 'model' as a 'representation of a system that is constructed to 
study some aspect of that system or the system as a whole '. For the fulfilment of 
Objective 1, Section 1.3.1, of this applied research the author would assert that a 
descriptive representation, model, of the EC internal market technical legislative process 
is of greater value to practitioners than a theory that attempts to explain the workings of 
the process. 
This second, fieldwork, part of the research addresses Objectives 2 and 3, Section 1.3.1. 
This is achieved for Objective 2 by assessing, through supporting activity f of Section 
1.3.2, the knowledge, understanding and perceptions held by internal market 
practitioners of the EC internal market and its associated legislative change processes 
that were identified by Activities a, band c. Similarly Objective 3 is fulfilled by 
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supporting activity g of Section 1.3.2 This research, therefore, constitutes a cross-
sectional study (Cooper and Emory, 1995) and reflects the situation as a 'snapshot in 
time'. A longitudinal study, concerned as it is with 'the assessment of change or 
development of some issue or situation with time' (Robson, 1999), or a study 'repeated 
over an extended period' is not appropriate to this particular research project. For this 
research only an initial assessment of knowledge and perceptions was required. It was 
expected that, based on the results obtained from this initial assessment, 
recommendations would be made aimed at producing improvements in both knowledge 
and perceptions held by EC internal market practitioners. Some form of longitudinal 
study to assess any change in knowledge and perception could then be employed to 
determine if the recommendations, if applied, had been of value. 
No substantive data was available to suggest prior knowledge of the outcome of any 
assessment of knowledge and understanding of the EC internal market technical 
legislative process held by internal market practitioners. Activity f, Section 1.3.2, was, 
therefore, conducted as an open enquiry without any reliance on previously used data 
gathering instruments. As the findings reported in Chapter 2 became clear, a 'scientific' 
method of assessment presented itself. In order for an EC internal market practitioner to 
legitimately claim a sound knowledge of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process it would seem reasonable to expect that the practitioner would be able to 
identify each of the four EC institutions involved. Thus what originally appeared to be a 
qualitative question could now be reconstructed as a quantitative measure of knowledge. 
The second part of Activity f, Section 1.3.2, is concerned with an assessment of 
perceptions of how well the internal market works. As essentially no prior information 
was available it was decided that as broad a sample as possible should be utilised for 
this initial investigation. Within the limited resources available for this research this 
decision lead to the rejection of an ethnographic approach, involving a very limited 
number of case studies, in favour of a broader based attitude survey. The 
operationalisation of the attitude survey was achieved via Likert scales (Cooper and 
Emory, 1985) and is more fully described in Section 4.3.1 
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4.2.1 FIELDWORK OR SECONDARY DATA? 
From the very early stages of this research, searches and enquiries have been made in an 
attempt to uncover existing information on how, and how well, the EC internal market 
technical legislative process operates. No published literature, or other evidence, has 
been found that specifically evaluates the overall EC internal market technical 
legislative process. Similarly no published literature, or other evidence, has been found 
that assesses how much internal market practitioners know about the EC internal market 
technical legislative process. What has been found in the literature, fully reported in 
Section 3.2, is a partial assessment of the top level process (Dashwood, 1994)(Earnshaw 
and Judge, 1995) and an evaluation of the effects of the process output (Commission, 
2001a,c). Within the literature reported in Section 3.2 criticisms are evident that targets 
for the adoption of EC internal market legislation, for all sectors of the internal market, 
were not being met (Commission, 1997). However, within this literature there is no 
explicit suggestion that the EC internal market technical legislative process itself was at 
fault for these failures to meet targets. 
The gaps in the literature, as outlined above, lead directly to the need for this research to 
be carried out on the basis of independent fieldwork rather than being able to rely on 
secondary data. 
4.2.2 FIELDWORK - WHAT APPROACHES WERE CONSIDERED AND 
ADOPTED? 
In the assessment of approaches to fieldwork it was considered essential that whatever 
approach or approaches were finally selected one or more of the approaches allowed for 
making direct contact with a selected group of internal market practitioners to assess 
their knowledge and perception of the EC internal market technical legislative process 
and of the functioning of the EC internal market. Without direct contact there remains 
doubt (Bryman, 2000) about who may have submitted the responses. In the sub-
sections that follow a number of possible specific data collection methods are assessed 
for their relevance to this work and the final decision on the data collection method 
employed is identified. 
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4.2.2.1 Focus groups 
The creation of focus groups was considered as a possibility but was dismissed. 
May (2001) and Robson (1999) each refer to the use of focus groups as an established 
data collection technique. The examples provided by both May and Robson each relate 
to situations where the members of the focus group all possess a characteristic that 
causes them to be in one geographic location, thus making it relatively easy to assemble 
the group at low cost. However, for this research those individuals considered relevant 
for inclusion in a focus group were geographically widely dispersed. It was considered 
highly unlikely by the researcher that these people would consent to the investment of 
possibly a day of their time for such an exercise and any such exercise that did take 
place would be likely to involve the researcher in significant re-imbursement of costs, 
no funds were available for any such re-imbursement. 
Powney and Watts (1987) identify a particular difficulty of the mechanics of data 
recording in a group situation, in particular the difficulty of association of particular 
comments with specific individuals. May (2001) reports differing results obtained from 
groups as opposed to individuals suggesting a convergence of view as a result of 
discussion. May's comment, therefore suggests that group answers to questions which 
relate to the correct identification of those EU institutions involved in the internal 
market technical change process may lead to answers different from those that would 
have been achieved by any individual respondent. The current research is concerned 
with the assessment of individual knowledge rather than the achievement of consensus 
views generated by group activities. 
Focus groups were not, therefore considered further in the methods of data collection 
for this research. 
4.2.2.2 Action Research 
Easterby-Smith et al (Easterby-Smith, 1991) identify two beliefs as being central to 
action research: 
- a belief that the best way of learning about an organisation or social 
system is through attempting to change it, and this therefore should to 
some extent be the objective of the action researcher 
- the belief that those people likely to be affected by, or involved in 
implementing these changes should as far as possible become involved in 
the research process itself. 
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Given that a number of the individuals targeted for inclusion in the fieldwork of this 
research were involved, on behalf of a Member State government, in the negotiation and 
subsequent national implementation of internal market directives, then it may be argued 
that this research meets the intent of the second of the above beliefs. 
However, for the first of the above beliefs there is a need to consider if, in this current 
research, the author is in fact attempting to change the system for generating Ee internal 
market technical legislation. This research is concerned with the identification of the 
Ee internal market technical legislative process, identification of process shortcomings, 
assessment of knowledge and understanding of the process held by internal market 
practitioners and to make some recommendations to correct any deficiencies found. It 
was not the purpose within this research to attempt to actually modify the Ee internal 
market technical legislative process. As a result of the above this research does not 
satisfy the first of Easterby-Smith's beliefs and action research within this work was 
considered inappropriate. 
4.2.2.3 Participant observation 
This research has been pursued concurrently, as a part time project, with the author's 
normal professional work. This normal professional work is carried out with, and on 
behalf of, individual companies and trade associations. This normal professional work 
provides an updating and explanatory service in relation to changes to the Ee internal 
market technical legislative framework. In performing this work it is necessary to 
interact with other individuals, many of whom have an interest in the operation of the 
Ee internal market and some of whom have specific knowledge of Ee new approach 
technical harmonization directives. These individuals have varied interests in, and 
perspectives on, the Ee internal market, including perspectives from manufacturing, 
enforcement and regulation. 
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Robson (1999) suggests that: 'A key feature of participant observation is that the 
observer seeks to become some kind of member of the observed group.' In the context 
of this research the author was indeed a member of several groups that were relevant to 
the research, however membership of those groups had been established for normal 
professional reasons prior to the research. As a result of the professional membership of 
the groups the author met Robson's (1999) definition of complete participant: 'The 
complete participant role involves the observer concealing that she [he J is an observer, 
acting as naturally as possible and seeking to become a full member of the group. ' 
Bryman's (2000) and May's (2001) descriptions of participant observation are in broad 
agreement with those of Robson and each ofthese three authors suggests that the 
participant observer's involvement takes place over an extended period of time -
measured in weeks or months. Involvement such as this would allow for an 
ethnographic analysis of the group. May (2001) suggests that 'participant observation 
is the most personally demanding and analytically difficult method of social research to 
undertake '. There is no suggestion, within this research, of any attempt to use 
participant observation as a means to describe or understand the behaviour ofthose 
groups of which this author was a member. Participant observation within this research, 
as a 'complete participant', made it possible to make observations of the level of 
knowledge and understanding of matters related to the EC internal market and its 
associated processes exhibited by other group members, observations that would not 
otherwise be possible. 
The author's normal professional work facilitates access to Member State (UK) 
directive negotiators and other personnel working on behalf of UK and European trade 
associations, and other organisations. Each of these individuals is likely to have an 
interest in attempting to influence the outcome of the EC internal market technical 
legislative process. Some of these individuals have been heard to express criticism of 
the process, but in general their work within the legislative change process is to try to 
modify the outcome of the process rather than attempting to change the process itself. 
Any attempt by any of these individuals to change the process of legislative change 
would be, at best, a long-term aim. For most individuals caught up in the process, 
pressure on their time is likely to preclude anything other than the short-term objective 
to mitigate unfavourable outcomes of the process. Mitigation objectives, to prevent 
unfavourable outcomes of the process, are likely to be better served by an improved 
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understanding and use of the process that is currently functioning rather than expending 
effort in attempting to modify the process. 
No published literature has been found that assesses how well informed are the 
participants in the EC internal market technical legislative process from Member States, 
trade associations and other organisations. However the author's contemporaneous 
notes taken at meetings with representatives of Member States, trade associations and 
other organisations indicate that, in general, participants are not well informed of the EC 
internal market technical legislative process. 
Participant observation was, inevitably, one ofthe specific methods included in the 
fieldwork of this research. However, as a result of the lack of structure in the data 
collected the data was not expected to be particularly helpful in the primary analyses, 
but was expected to be of considerable benefit in providing corroboration of the primary 
research findings. 
4.2.2.4 Self-completion questionnaires 
Consideration was given to the possible use of self-completion questionnaires for this 
fieldwork. Initially self-completion questionnaires looked to be a straightforward 
option. The necessary sequence of events; prepare questionnaire, identify respondents, 
send out questionnaires, wait for completed questionnaires to return and analyse the 
data; seems quite innocuous and straightforward. In order to evaluate the suitability of 
this specific method for this research it is helpful to consider in more detail some of the 
steps in the sequence identified above. 
The preparation of the self-completion questionnaire itself must be done taking due 
regard of the aim and objectives of the research as set out in Section 1.3.1 In itself a 
relatively straightforward process but a process that, for this research, has two major 
drawbacks. The first of these drawbacks relates to questions about the ED institutions. 
There is a need to ask tiered questions, first about all of the ED institutions and then 
about a sub-set of the ED institutions that are involved in the EC internal market 
technical legislative process. Having thus established the respondent's level of 
knowledge of the basic institutions there is a need to assess the respondent's knowledge 
of how people become members of the institutions that are involved in the EC internal 
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market legislative process. In order not to make the self-completion questionnaire 
unnecessarily burdensome, this assessment should be restricted to those institutions that 
are involved in the EC internal market legislative process. This would involve listing 
the EC institutions of interest, and the information in this list could then be used to 
modify the answers to earlier questions. Any such modification of answers (Bryman, 
2000) would lead to the measured level of knowledge being enhanced beyond the actual 
level of knowledge, for those respondents who may take advantage of these 'hints'. 
Since it would not be known how many, if any, respondents had made use of these 
unintentional hints then the measurement of the level of knowledge would be rendered 
unreliable. 
In order to facilitate a completion rate as high as possible for the self-completion 
questionnaires the effort required by possible respondents should be minimised. This 
would be achieved by keeping to a minimum the number of open ended questions and 
making maximum possible use of 'tick boxes' (Robson, 1999) to indicate the choice of 
answer for questions where the respondent's answer is indicated by a choice within 
some form of multiple choice. The second drawback to the use of self-completion 
questionnaires in research such as this relates to the validation of answers to questions 
that request self-assessment of the level of knowledge in some particular area. In this 
type of question the respondent would be requested to indicate his perceived level of 
knowledge of a defined subject by marking the appropriate tick box from a ranking 
multiple choice. There is then the need to have the respondent write down what he 
knows of the subject under question so that the researcher can make a value judgement 
about the validity of the self-assessment. Responses to such questions may not be 
provided or may be difficult, or even impossible, to decipher. In such cases it would not 
be possible to validate the self-assessment, thereby limiting the value of the self-
assessment. 
For this research the total population of identifiable possible respondents is limited, 
particularly for certain categories of target respondents, this would include Member 
State officials and enforcement officials. Moser and Kalton (1989) suggest that the 
response range for self-completion questionnaires is 10% - 90%. Given that this 
research project is purely small scale private research without any official backing that 
can be quoted to encourage participation, then there exists a real risk that the response 
rate achieved would be towards the low end of the range quoted by Moser and Kalton 
(op. cit.). Moser and Kalton (op. cit.) also suggest that the cost per completed 
questionnaire may be higher than the cost per interview. 
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Additional disadvantages of a self-completion questionnaire approach to this fieldwork 
includes the lack of direct contact with respondents, the difficulty of giving something 
back to the respondents, this would include the opportunity for respondents to ask 
questions of, or enter into discussion with, the researcher. 
It is accepted that for some research projects, where the target population is large, easy 
to identify and access, a low response rate can be tolerated because the total number of 
completed questionnaires can be sufficient for subsequent analysis, then the self-
completion questionnaire can be an appropriate method. However, for this research 
project, for the reasons given above it was decided that the self-completion 
questionnaire was not the appropriate fieldwork method. Many of the disadvantages of 
self-completion questionnaires that have been highlighted here can be satisfactorily 
dealt with by the use of interviews. The next sub-section looks in detail at this method. 
4.2.2.5 Interviews 
One of the requirements for the fieldwork ofthis research, established in Section 4.2.2, 
was the need for direct contact with internal market practitioners. Robson (1999) makes 
the observation that interviews are a kind of conversation, but a conversation with a 
purpose and conversations involve direct contact. Direct contact clearly includes face-
to-face contact with respondents and in this context direct contact will be extended to 
include contact with respondents via a telephone network. Interviews, by telephone or 
face-to-face, can therefore be seen to meet the requirement of direct contact. 
The need for control of the sequence of questions being put to a respondent was 
established in Section 4.2.2.4 The requirement for control of the sequence of questions 
derives from the necessity to ensure that no respondent can use 'hints' from any given 
question being used to assist in answering any other question. This requirement for 
control of the sequence of questions put to a respondent can be met using an interview. 
May (2001) establishes that most surveys concern themselves with either factual 
questions or opinion questions each generating an associated data type. Sections 1.3 
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and 4.1 establish the requirement within this research for the collection of both types of 
data via the fieldwork. The first of these two data types is factual, data that may be 
assessed for correctness. The second data type is opinion or perception, data that 
individually may not be amenable to assessment in the sense of correct or incorrect. It 
is, however, plausible to attempt to assess if perceptions or opinions, held by external 
observers are consistent with any message that an individual, or organisation, is 
attempting to convey. Within this research there is no suggestion that the EC 
institutions are attempting to convey any consistent message about how well they are 
performing in the EC internal market technical legislative process. However, there is 
available a measure of the output from the EC internal market technical legislative 
process - the official view of the EC internal market discussed in Section 3.2.1 Thus, 
for this research, the second data type, opinion, perception, has value in attempting to 
construct an overall qualitative judgement about how well the EC technical legislative 
process functions by comparing the official view of the state of the internal market and 
the overall view as expressed by the respondents. What would then be achieved would 
be an overall judgement that has validity and would be a judgement that could be tested 
for correctness by repeating the fieldwork on other samples of the population. 
A fieldwork method that allows for the inclusion of questions designed to elicit facts 
and opinions (Robson, 1999) is that of the interview. Robson also identifies what may 
be considered to be a spectrum of interview types that range from the unstructured, 
through semi-structured on to the fully structured. The level of control exercised by the 
interviewer increases across this spectrum. An alternative typology, that of respondent 
interviews and informant interviews, is suggested by Powney and Watts (1987). In this 
classification system the interviewer retains control for respondent interviews whereas 
the interviewer relinquishes control to the interviewee in informant interviews. The 
nomenclature used by Powney and Watts (op. cit.) is considered by this author to be 
somewhat misleading in that for the purposes of research questionnaires and interviews 
the words respondent and informant are considered to be synonyms and in turn are 
synonymous with interviewee. As a result there is possible ambiguity in the meaning of 
the terms 'respondent interview' and 'informant interview'. To avoid any such 
ambiguity of terminology in this research the classification system used by Robson 
(1999) will be used here. 
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It was established in Section 4.2.2 that for the fieldwork ofthis research there is a need 
for direct contact with respondents and there is a need for control of the sequence of 
questions put to respondents. Data on each of facts, knowledge, and perceptions are 
required to be obtained from respondents. It has been shown that interviews of all types 
allow direct contact with respondents and that, within the spectrum of interview types, 
the structured interview allows for maximum control by the researcher. For this 
fieldwork it was considered essential that no single question be allowed to provide the 
respondent with clues that would assist them in answering this, or later, questions. The 
necessary level of control can only be achieved through the administration of a 
structured rather than semi-structured or unstructured interview. 
Based on the foregoing summary the decision was made that the primary fieldwork of 
this research project would be accomplished by use of structured interviews. 
To prevent any misunderstanding within this thesis it should be noted that the term 
'structured interview' may be the actual sequence of questions (Appendix II) put to 
respondents and may also mean the act of conducting the interview with the respondent. 
In each case the context of the use of the term structured interview will clarify which of 
the above meanings is intended. The details of why the structured interview takes the 
form that it does and how, and to whom it was administered are given in Section 4.3.1 
4.2.2.6 Evaluations (Tests of the system) 
From the outset of this research it has been the intention to identify the European 
Community internal market technical legislative process and then to make an 
assessment of how well known and understood was this system, more details are 
provided in Section 1.3.1 Within sub-sections 4.2.2.1 to sub-section 4.2.2.5 the 
emphasis has been on identifying a method that allows a structured approach to the 
collection of data from respondents. 
However, a dogmatic adherence to structured approaches to data collection should not 
be allowed to prevent additional data collection by unstructured methods. Participant 
observation, discussed in sub-section 4.2.2.3, is one possible unstructured method as is 
evaluation. Suchman (1967) provides the following definition of evaluation: 'A method 
for determining the degree to which a planned programme achieves its desired 
outcomes.' The Suchman (op. cit.) definition of evaluation in the context of this 
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research could be seen to have the EC internal market technical legislative process as 
the 'planned programme' and a fully functioning EC internal market as the 'desired 
outcome'. The literature review, Chapter 3 (Commission, 1997), indicated the existence 
of an action programme as the method of achieving the fully functioning EC internal 
market. This author would argue, therefore, that for the Suchman (1967) definition of 
evaluation, in this context the 'planned programme' is the Commission's action 
programme rather than the EC internal market technical legislative process. It is to be 
expected that the efficacy of the EC internal market technical legislative process would 
have an effect on the implementation of the action programme, but the action 
programme is not the subject of this research. 
From the forgoing, it would appear that evaluation as a method is inappropriate for this 
research, this research does not meet the Suchman (op. cit.) definition of assessing a 
programme. However, part ofthis research has, almost by accident, been directed at an 
assessment of how accurately the observed process for EC internal market technical 
legislative process mirrors the documented process. The assessments of the observed 
process have been made primarily through legitimate enquiries to the EC institutions 
that are part of the observed process. 
For this research, evaluation as a method has, therefore, been rejected in favour of a 
similar method to be known as 'Tests of the system' where each enquiry made of the 
extended system, defined in Section 2.4, is considered to be a 'Test of the system'. 
4.3 Research procedures 
Within this section, details are provided to explain the way that the decisions to proceed 
with certain fieldwork methods identified in Section 4.2 were implemented. 
Three specific fieldwork methods; participant observation, structured interview and tests 
of the system; were identified in Section 4.2 as appropriate for this research. These 
three specific methods together provide a spectrum of structure to data collection. As is 
to be expected, the structured interview allows the researcher to be very much in control 
of the type and sequence of data collected. The researcher is rather less in control when 
testing the system since the system being tested has a limited number of external access 
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points through which tests can be applied. In addition the researcher cannot be sure 
who will respond to any given enquiry, test of the system. Participant observation can 
only be applied when groups of people, whose views and knowledge are of interest to 
the researcher, meet together for some reason and the researcher is invited, or is 
otherwise allowed, and is able, to attend the meeting. These meetings may be part of a 
series of meetings or they may only be called on an ad hoc basis. Thus, it can be seen 
that the researcher had very little control over participant observation. 
4.3.1 THE STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
The structured interview used in this research (Appendix II) was constructed 
independently, specifically for this research, it did not rely on repeating the work of 
earlier researchers. The general population ofthe European Community, and of any 
individual Member State such as the United Kingdom, has access to products that are 
legitimately available for purchase within the EC internal market. Only a very limited 
sub-set of the general population has a direct responsibility to ensure that products 
available for purchase within the EC internal market comply with all of the relevant 
technical legislation. This sub-set of the general population would be expected to be 
better informed than the general population about the EC internal market technical 
legislative framework and of the processes that create this technical legislative 
framework. This sub-set of the general population became the population from which 
the research sample of respondents was drawn. It was not a practical, achievable, task 
to identify each of the individual members of this population. To adequately identify 
this population would require a detailed knowledge of at least all of the manufacturing 
companies in the UK and also those individuals within those companies with 
responsibility for compliance with EC internal market technical legislation. The sample 
drawn from this population could not, therefore, be a random sample. 
The research population was drawn from the population of internal market practitioners. 
The population of internal market practitioners can be viewed as comprised of four 
groups of people each with different responsibilities: regulatory, enforcement, 
manufacturing and independent technical approval. Each of these groups was 
represented in the research population. The groups as described were not of equal 
numerical size but it was seen as advantageous that data was available from members of 
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each of the groups. With the constraints outlined the initial sample of respondents was 
selected by the author based on his existing knowledge and included representatives of 
each of the identified groups. To achieve the target of forty respondents the strategy 
adopted was that early respondents from each group would be encouraged to suggest 
additional potential respondents - a strategy that met with success. 
With the exception, perhaps, of the regulators who are likely to be found mostly within 
the London region, as national government officials, the groups of people were expected 
to be geographically dispersed across the United Kingdom. This geographic spread of 
potential respondents was a significant factor in determining whether the norm for 
conducting the interviews would be face-to-face or by telephone. The logistics and 
costs likely to be involved in face-to-face interviews were such that an early decision 
was made that the norm would be for the interviews to be conducted by telephone. 
The sample of practitioners selected for this research project was, initially, persons 
already known to the author and subsequently others made known to the author by other 
internal market practitioners. In that the selected respondents were all internal market 
practitioners, rather than randomly selected from the general population, it could be 
argued that the respondents should be described as a 'purposive' sample. Robson 
(1999) describes purposive sampling in the following way: 
The principle of selection in purposive sampling is the researcher's judgement 
as to typicality or interest. A sample is built up which enables the researcher to 
satisfy his/her specific needs in a project. 
As a result of prior personal knowledge of the respondents, or because they were 
personally recommended, each was approached individually and directly. No 
approaches to respondents were made via organisational gatekeepers such as human 
resource management functions. There is some evidence (Whitney, 2003) that some 
companies have a policy of not allowing staff to respond to questionnaires of any kind, 
no barriers of this type were encountered and no potential respondents declined to take 
part in the research at the initial approach. 
Following the initial approach each potential respondent was provided with a copy of an 
introductory letter (Appendix III) setting out the conditions of the interview. At this 
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point in the process one potential respondent felt unable to participate because he felt, 
on reflection, unable to justify to his organisation the use of his time in this way. 
Robson (1999) makes a number of comments about the time aspect of interviews. Two 
comments in particular were taken as important guidelines for the construction of the 
structured interview. The first comment, suggesting that an interview with duration less 
than half an hour would be unlikely to be valuable is a comment with which the author 
would agree. The second of Robson's (op. cit.) two comments was interpreted to mean 
that any interview scheduled to take more than an hour was an unreasonable demand on 
anyone's time, and if declared to a potential respondent, would be likely to reduce their 
willingness to participate. A limit of one hour was therefore set as the target interview 
completion time. 
The final version of the structured interview (Appendix II) was constructed by the 
author after a number of preliminary drafts that were each administered to internal 
market practitioners. In addition to the author's own self-assessment of the success, or 
otherwise, of each trial there was a discussion with the respondent to obtain their 
comments on the trial. During these discussions face validity (Robson, 1999) in 
particular was assessed. Those practitioners who kindly contributed to these trials were 
not invited to take part in the formal research reported in Chapter 5. As the work 
progressed the appropriateness of Bell's (2001) comment: 'though common sense and 
the ability to write plain English will help, that will not be sufficient. ' was reinforced. 
The additional, simultaneous, requirements of clarity, succinctness and relevance to the 
aim and objectives of the research, Section 1.3.1, were also taken into account. Robson 
(1999) and Berdie, Anderson and Niebuhr (1985) each offer general guidance on the 
construction of questionnaires. In particular they stress the need for clarity in the 
questions, stratifying questions to ensure that general questions are asked before 
specific questions and to know the population surveyed so that appropriate language is 
used in the questions. 
The total set of questions was such that they could be assigned to six groups. These 
groups were then ordered to provide core questions (Groups A - E) and a miscellaneous 
set (Group F) of auxiliary questions. Answers to Group F questions were to provide 
data to assist in the interpretation of data generated by the core questions. Structuring 
the questions in this way provided a means of managing the time of each interview. 
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If everything went to plan, each interview would be completed within the nominal one 
hour allocated. Where an interview time overrun appeared to be likely, the interview 
management options available to the interviewer were to either terminate the interview 
at the end of Group E questions or to attempt to negotiate with the respondent to allow 
the Group F questions to be completed. A summary of interview completion times is 
given in Table 5.22 In only two instances were over-running interviews terminated at 
the end of Section E. 
In this research, as in any significant interviewing situation, a decision has to be made 
on the number of interviewers. The basic choice to be made is between the researcher 
conducting all of the interviews personally or to train others to conduct some, or all, of 
the interviews. If a substantial number of interviews is to be conducted then clearly 
there may be a need to delegate the interviewing to a proportionately large group of 
interviewers, such a situation is attended by its own additional problems related to 
consistency that are not evaluated here. For this research, where the number of 
interviews was to be restricted to a nominal forty, it was a practical proposition for the 
researcher to conduct all of the interviews personally. Three benefits of the researcher's 
decision to conduct all of the interviews personally exist. The first benefit is that the 
researcher was not required to devote time to training other interviewers. The second 
benefit was that there was an improved likelihood that each interview would be 
conducted according to the eleven task rules set out by Brenner (1981) as cited in 
Powney and Watts (1987). The third benefit is that the researcher is able to give 
something back to the respondents during the interview, with caution in order not to 
affect the outcome ofthe interview, and after the end ofthe interview. This 'giving 
back' to respondents took the form of an opportunity for the respondent to discuss any 
of the areas covered in the structured interview. 
Arising from the decision to conduct the interviews by telephone is a question relating 
to the quality of the data obtained as compared to the quality ofthe data that would have 
been achieved had the interviews been conducted face-to-face. Powney and Watts 
(1987) suggest that limitations to the channels of communication between interviewer 
and respondent exist when conducting interviews by telephone and these limitations 
may restrict the quality of the data obtained. The interviews for this research were to be 
via simple voice communication, communications were not enhanced by the use of 
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video links. Sykes and Roinville (1985), cited in Powney and Watts (1987), state that 
for simple telephone interviews: 'Communication between respondent and interviewer 
is limited to verbal and paralinguistic utterances with neither person able to see the 
facial expressions, gestures and other non-verbal messages conveyed by the other. ' 
The above quotation infers that, at least for educational research, the context of the 
Sykes and Roinville quote, the limitations of the telephone system for conducting 
interviews produces disadvantages. The author's experience in earlier work (Rogers, 
1998), confirmed by this research, contradicts the view of Sykes and Roinville (1985). 
In this research the concealment of body language by each of the interviewer and 
respondent was seen as an advantage. Such an advantage was most apparent with 
knowledge testing questions. The knowledge testing questions were those that provided 
qualitative answers. Often, through the verbal communication from the respondent 
attempting to answer these questions, it was evident that they were keen to demonstrate 
a high level of knowledge but they sometimes failed to achieve this objective. With a 
broader range of communication than was available using standard voice 
communication over the telephone it is the author's assertion that tension between 
interviewer and respondent could increase. For the author, the face-to-face interviews 
conducted, albeit limited to three, were judged as more difficult to control, and more 
stressful for the interviewer, than those conducted by telephone. A finding confirming 
the early decision to use telephone interviews as the norm. 
For those questions where opinions were sought, giving rise to qualitative data that was 
always 'correct', the restrictions in communication by the use of a telephone rather than 
face-to-face interview were not seen as either advantageous or detrimental to the data 
collection process. This view is held on the basis that the respondents were taking part 
in what was understood by them to be an open enquiry, the respondents were not being 
asked to provide data in support of particular views. Rad respondents been asked to 
provide qualitative data in support of particular views then the 'honesty' of the replies 
could perhaps have been better assessed in face-to-face interviews by observing body 
language. 
Subsequent to the academic decisions about the way interviews would be conducted it 
became necessary to undertake a health and safety risk analysis of the fieldwork for this 
research. The risk analysis concluded that the researcher was exposed to less hazard 
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when the fieldwork was conducted by telephone as compared to the hazard exposure 
when conducting face-to-face interviews. For each of the two possible fieldwork 
methods, telephone or face-to-face interviews, the risk assessment gave an acceptably 
low risk to the researcher. The outcome of the risk assessment can therefore be seen not 
to contradict the decisions made on other criteria. 
Chapter 2 'The law making process' has identified the EC internal market technical 
legislative process. Section 3.2 of the 'Literature survey and review' provides analyses 
of the EC internal market and its technical legislative process as seen by those who are 
part of the system and by external observers of the system. Internal market practitioners' 
views are under represented in Chapter 3, not because of any research bias but because 
little evidence could be found. The fieldwork of this research was conducted to gain an 
insight into the knowledge and views of the EC internal market held by practitioners in 
the EC internal market thus contributing to a reduction in the under representation of 
their views in the literature. 
The structured interview used for this fieldwork is nothing more than a specifically 
designed questionnaire to facilitate the collection of previously identified data. The data 
required for this research was in support of the aim and objectives that were established 
in Section 1.3.1 It is clear from the objectives of Section 1.3.1 that the data to be 
collected would be oftwo types, factual and opinions, perceptions, Section 4.2.2.5. 
The factual data collected was in three forms. The first form was quite clearly 
qualitative and not requiring detailed analysis - name of respondent, contact details etc. 
The second form was knowledge based and was amenable to being recorded in 
quantitative form - for example the number of EC institutions known. The third form 
recorded the presence or absence of a certain characteristic - for example whether or not 
the respondent had been trained by working with colleagues. 
The opinion, perception, data was such that it divided into two classes of data. The first 
class of data being completely open, where there was no restriction on the range of 
opinion to be expressed. This data would remain qualitative for analysis. The second 
class of data was such that the range of opinion had limits and where the opinion fitted 
between these limits could be assessed by the application of Likert scales. 
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An examination of Table 4.1 reveals that not all question numbers of the structured 
interview appear in the table. The data relating to the identity of respondents does not 
relate to any of the particular objectives of the research. Questions in part F of the 
Table 4.1 Link between' Activities in support of the Objectives' and fieldwork 
Activities in support of the Relevant questions of Structured Interviewz 
Aims 
Knowledge of EU/EC What is known by respondent? B.1, B.2; 
a Insti tuti ons. B.3, B.4 
Knowledge of EC What is known by respondent? B.S, B.8, B.9 
b Institutions' processes 
Knowledge of What is known by respondent? B. 7 
c interfaces into EC 
Institutions. 
Suggestions for EC Training A.7, A.8, A.9 
e Institutions process Improvement suggestions E.1, E.2, E.4, E.S 
improvements. 
Perceptions of reality of Internal market - product C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, 
f EC internal market. C.S, C.6, C.7 
Internal market - enforcement C.8, C.9, C.10, 
C.12, C.13 
Knowledge of standards Standards - perceptions D.1,D.2 
g and harmonised - use D.6, D.7, D.8, D.9 
standards. 
. ........ _-
- pr9cess lrn0wledg~ D.3, 1).4, D.S, D.10 
structured interview were included to assist in the interpretation of other data rather than 
being directly linked to the research aims. 
The method of recording data during the structured interview allows for some of the 
qualitative measures of respondents' perceptions to be turned into quantitative 
measures, in this instance using five point Likert scales. Other qualitative data from 
respondents was captured by recording key words, or short phrases, in the relevant 
response box of the structured interview (Appendix II). Where used, each Likert scale 
may be taken as an indicator of a perception. The aggregation of related indicators may 
be used to provide data on what may be considered a dimension of a particular concept. 
In addition several dimensions of a concept may be aggregated to provide a broader 
2 Some questions in the Structured Interview (Appendix II) are sub-divided e.g. question B.5 is sub-
divided into B.5, B.5.1 and B.5.2 Where this occurs all sub-divisions of the question are included where 
reference is made to B.5 
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based measurement of that concept. Table 4.2 shows how three concepts of 
perceptions related to the EC internal market link, in stages, to specific questions of the 
structured interview. 
Table 4.2 Measurement of concepts 
Concept Dimensions Indicators - Range of 
Structured Interview Possible Scores 
Question Numbers 
Completeness of Product C.l, C.2, C.3, C.4 4 - 20 
EC Internal 6 - 30 
Market. Enforcement C.S, C.IO 2 - 10 
Value of Perception D.l, D.1.I, D.2 3 -15 
Standardization. Use D.6, D.7, D.S 3 -15 6 - 30 
Difficulties with Introduction C.5 1-5 
Directives. Age related C.7 
.. I-=- 5 2 -10 
4.3.2 TESTS OF THE SYSTEM 
At the outset of this research there was no intention to systematically test the EC 
internal market legislative process, and the extended system that has been identified in 
Section 2.4 It was not until this research work was well under way that the various 
enquiries made of, and through, the extended system were recognised as an identifiable 
fieldwork method to provide useful data on how enquiries made by practitioners would 
be viewed and dealt with. 
At no time in this research were enquiries made of the system just to test the system, 
each enquiry was the natural follow on to an earlier discovery. When enquiries were 
made they were expressed as simply as possible to provide the respondent, often 
unknown, the best possible opportunity to supply a full and complete answer. At no 
time was there any attempt to trap either the system, or the individual respondent, into 
providing any answer that would show them in an unnecessarily unfavourable light. 
Some of the answers that were received undoubtedly expose the system unfavourably, 
but these occurrences were not the result of the researcher's manipulations to encourage 
unfavourable outcomes. General ethical considerations of this research are discussed in 
detail in Section 4.4 Within these general considerations the method of testing the 
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system, as described above, is not considered by the author to be in breach of any code 
of good ethics. 
The tests, through enquiries, that have been made of the extended system were random 
events in time. Each enquiry was made when it was required, to build on the results of 
earlier discoveries. These enquiries were not made to any pre-determined plan. 
There is no clear, straightforward, taxonomy of the tests made of the extended system. 
However, three broad groups of enquiries have been created to facilitate reporting them. 
The tests in each of these three broad groups are individually explained and, for clarity, 
the summary ofthe final response is provided here rather than in Chapter 5. The overall 
analysis of these results is, however, left until Chapter 5. 
4.3.2.1 Tests related to the authority of an EC institution 
The Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Communitl 
identifies the Economic and Social Committee as one of the institutions of the European 
Community. A publication entitled Monitoring the Single Market (ESC, 1999) was 
obtained to enable study of its analyses of the internal market. Across the front cover is 
emblazoned 'The European Economic and Social Committee'. Within the body of this 
publication there are references to each of 'Economic and Social Committee' and 
'European Economic and Social Committee', there is also a clear statement that this 
publication is available in English, French and German. 
The observations on the publication (op. cit.) give rise to questions related to the 
authority to change the name of the EC institution and concern for language rights of 
citizens when corresponding with EC institutions. The response from the ESC makes it 
clear that the name of the institution has not been formally changed but they use the 
name 'European Economic and Social Committee' to avoid confusion with national 
abbreviations. The response on language rights was that 'Monitoring the Single 
Market' (ESC, 1999) was not an official publication of the European Community and 
therefore was not required to be available in all of the EC official languages, it was 
3 N.1 above 
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pointed out that the documents referred to in the booklet (op. cit.) are available in all of 
the official languages. 
The above data on presumption of authority and how an individual institution deals with 
the problem of many languages is evidence used in Chapter 5. 
4.3.2.2 Tests requiring a simple reply 
Included within this group of tests are written requests in the form of letters, faxes or e-
mails, directly to an institution for simple factual information. All letters sent out 
within this group of tests carried the author's address on the outside so that if they were 
undeliverable they could be returned. No enquiry letters were returned as undeliverable. 
Emails and faxes carry return address data that enables them to be returned if sent to an 
inappropriate place. No emails or faxes were returned as undeliverable. The 
assumption is made, therefore, that all of the enquiries by whatever delivery means was 
employed, reached their destination. 
Examples of these tests include requests for the name of a committee that would be 
reviewing a specific piece of draft legislation or the reference number of a document so 
that it may be accessed through a library system. The data from these tests is presented 
in Section 5.2.4 
Also included within this group of tests are requests for information made via a 
European Information Centre (EIC). The author's local EIC is located within the Essex 
Trade Centre of Essex County Library Headquarters at Chelmsford. The services of the 
EIC were called upon under two sets of circumstances. The first of these circumstances 
was to obtain information that could have been expected from an enquiry directly to an 
institution but the direct enquiry had failed. The second type of request to the EIC was 
for documentation when it was not clear what should be specifically requested, the 
request then relied on being attended to by an 'intelligent' system. The EICs, although 
locally operated, should be seen as a part of the core system as described in Section 2.4 
since the EICs were created by the Commission, however their function is very much a 
support function. Data relating to tests of the system via EICs was, therefore, treated as 
a separate category 
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4.3.2.3 Tests requiring an explanatory reply 
Within this Section reference is made to the three major parts of the conceptual 
extended system, introduced in Section 2.4, for the generation of EC internal market 
technical legislation. The following descriptions of tests applied to the core, non-core 
and support parts of the extended system exhibit a range of complexity of enquiry. 
CORE of extended system 
The Robert Schuman Project. The Robert Schuman Project4 was established to 
facilitate the training of members of Member State legal professions in European 
Community law. Preamble (11) (op. cit.) appears to be much wider in scope than 
Article 2 (1(a)) (op. cit.) and suggests that there is, or should be, a system in place to 
ensure uniformity ofthe penalties for breaches of, and of the application of, the rules 
governing the EC internal market. 
Prior to the fieldwork of this research there was anecdotal evidence of non-uniform 
application of the EC internal market rules. The analysis of the fieldwork suggests that 
there is concern about non-uniform application of EC internal market rules. It appeared, 
therefore, to be a pertinent and legitimate question to ask how those aspects of Preamble 
(11) (op. cit.) not covered by the Robert Schuman Project (op. cit.) were to be dealt 
with. 
Given that the Decision establishing the Robert Schuman Project (op. cit.) was an 
instrument of the European Parliament and of the Council written enquiries were made 
to their respective Secretariats to determine: 'What initiatives are in place to deal with 
the other aspects of Community law outlined in Preamble II?' The treatment of these 
letters of enquiry is significant. The Secretariat of the European Parliament has not seen 
fit to reply and no follow up enquiries have been made. The Secretariat of the Council 
responded as follows: 'We regret to inform you that your request falls outside the 
4 Decision 1496/981EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1999 establishing an 
action programme to improve awareness of Community law within the legal professions (Robert 
Schuman Project), OJ 1999 L 196/24-27 
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competence of the Council of the European Union. Please contact the European 
Commission Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs.' Given the executive role 
of the Commission this was perhaps not an unreasonable reply except that I was not 
asking how the Robert Schuman Project was going to operate but how those parts of the 
system outside of the Robert Schuman Project would be tackled. This response 
suggests that the Secretariat of the Council was unable to differentiate between policy 
and executive action. The Council Secretariat advice was followed and a reply was 
received from Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs stating that: 'Your letter 
does not fall within my department's area of responsibility. It has been reassigned to 
Directorate General Internal Market who will be sending you a reply. ' 
A reply was received from Directorate General 'Internal market' but did not address the 
questions posed. The incompleteness of the reply was brought to the attention of the 
Directorate General 'Internal market' who then advised that my enquiry was outside 
their responsibility and that they had re-assigned my enquiry to Directorate General 
'Justice and Home Affairs'. No-one appeared prepared to accept responsibility for my 
enquiry. The matter was not pursued and no further communications from the 
Commission, or elsewhere, were received. 
The Internal Market Scoreboard. The Internal Market Scoreboard (Commission, 
2001a) provides the Commission view on how well the EC internal market is operating, 
and includes a number of numerical analyses. Of significance for this test of the system 
was the information on transposition failures, pointers to other Commission documents 
and an inconsistency with another Commission document (Commission, 2001d). 
Within the Internal Market Scoreboard (Commission, 2001a) there was an invitation to 
provide feedback to the Director General 'Internal market' at the Commission, such an 
invitation suggests that the system should be receptive to constructive comments and 
questions. 
Constructive feedback, together with some questions, was sent to the Director General 
'Internal market' and a generally satisfactory response was received. However, the 
response relating to failures by Member States to properly transpose EC directives gave 
little indication that enforcement by the Commission would improve. 
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Access to documents. European Documentation Centres (EDC), in the UK at least, 
have traditionally been supplied with paper copies of relevant documents. EDCs are 
housed within university libraries but are open to the general public. In May 2000, on a 
visit to the author's local EDC at the University of Essex (UoE) it became apparent that 
there was a change in policy about the supply of documents to EDCs - they were now 
being supplied on CD Roms. An apparently innocuous change, but a change with 
significant effects. Documentation, on all media, in the EDC is classified as reference 
material, material that is not allowed to leave the library. CD Roms are read via 
computers and due to the DoE software licensing agreements their computers are only 
available to registered UoE students. The net result is that the general public are denied 
access to the more recently received EDC material. For this author at least the interim 
solution, not satisfactory for either the author or the UoE library staff, was for a member 
of the DoE library staff to operate the computer on the author's behalf. Negotiations by 
the author, and on the author's behalf, took place in an attempt to arrange a more 
satisfactory solution - those negotiations failed. 
The author made representations to three points in the core system, as defined in 
Chapter 2, and the outline results of these enquiries are given in Table 4.3 below: 
Table 4.3 Indicating replies from enquiries 
Enquiry to: Date Outcome Outcome 
Commissioner Reding 25-09-00 Extensive response, 
(Education and Culture) but not satisfactory. 
Mr van der Pas 25-09-00 No reply 
(DG Education and Culture) 
Mr R Howitt MEP 02-10-00 30-01-01 a promise No further 
(Eastern Region MEP) of EP parliamentary response. 
question and notice 
of reply. 
For this author, and other users of the EDC at the University of Essex, the situation 
changed for the better when the UoE, on its own initiative and at its own expense, 
elected to subscribe for paper copies of documents for the EDC rather than to rely on 
the CD Roms issued by the Commission. There remains a period of approximately 
fourteen months for which material is not directly accessible. 
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Modernising the internal market. It came to the author's attention from an editorial 
piece in a trade magazine (Anon, 2001) that, via a web based questionnaire, the 
Commission was conducting a consultation on the future of the internal market. The 
online questionnaire was accessed with the intention to complete it, to be seen to be 
actively participating in the process of studying and affecting the future of the internal 
market. There were so many ambiguities in the questionnaire that it was felt that it 
would provide misleading or wrong data if the questionnaire was completed. Instead 
this author sent a letter to Commissioner Liikanen expressing concern at the ambiguities 
and setting out a number of comments on the existing process. From the comprehensive 
reply that was received two extracts are included here. The first extract: 'I would like to 
thank you for your letter of 15 August 2001, which contains very constructive remarks 
on internal market legislation as well as on the way in which the Commission has been 
conducting this consultation on the functioning of the internal market. ' suggests that my 
letter was read carefully. The second extract: 'In addition, the questionnaire exists in 
all official Community languages, which may occasionally create difficulties in finding 
the right terminology for non-specialists. We understand that this might have led to 
some ambiguities.', suggests that the need to service the diversity of official 
Community languages can take precedence over the need for quality data. 
NON-CORE of extended system 
Modernising Petroleum Legislation. An important policy speech was made by 
senior officials ofthe United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE) at the 
Annual General Meeting of the Association for Petroleum and Explosives 
Administration, in April 2001 and was later published (Brazendale and Sargeant, 2001). 
The published text (op. cit.) was full of jargon and imprecise in its references. Based on 
the author's interpretation of the published work (op. cit.) an enquiry was sent to Mr 
Brazendale for confirmation of the interpretation and, if the interpretation was correct, 
for an explanation for the HSE's failure to comply with the transposition deadline of 1 st 
May 2001 set by Article 14 (1) of the protection of workers directives. 
S Council Directive 98/24/EC of7 April 1998 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from 
risks related to chemical agents at work (fourteenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 
16(1) of Directive 89/3911EEC), OJ 1998 L 131111-23 
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The reply confirmed this author's interpretation of the published work (Brazendale and 
Sargeant, 2001) and also stated that: ' ... a revised timetable for the introduction of the 
regulations required by directive 981241EC (Council, 1998) had yet to be agreed by the 
Minister responsible for the HSE.' Failure to comply with directive 98/24IEC (op. cit.) 
within the required transposition time was simply dismissed as a task more difficult, and 
therefore more time consuming, than expected. 
As at 6 September 2001 this author had made no decision about referring this apparent 
maladministration to the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman, a conflict of interest with the 
author's work with the Forecourt Equipment Federation (FEF) existed. This conflict of 
interest was discussed at the FEF Council meeting on 12 September 2001 where it was 
agreed that it was not in the best interests of the FEF to pursue the matter of the failure 
to comply with a transposition deadline. As a direct result of the FEF Council decision 
no further action on this matter was taken by this author. 
SUPPORT of extended system 
New Electronics. In an editorial piece (Pitcher, 2001) providing comment on the 
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) directive6 reference was made to a draft 
amendment to the EMC directive (op. cit.). No information was provided to clearly 
identify the draft amendment nor was it suggested where a copy of this draft could be 
obtained. An enquiry was made of New Electronics for the Official Journal of the 
European Communities, or other sufficient, reference to track down the draft 
amendment. A reply was received but all it contained was a reference to a private 
organisation that should be able to supply the necessary details. 
Plant and Control Engineering. An editorial piece (Nash, 2001) included several 
incorrect statements about the machinery directive7 and a standards document (CEN, 
6 Council Directive of3 May 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
electromagnetic compatibility (89/336/EEC)(EMC Directive), OJ 1989 139/19-26 
7 Directive 98/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to machinery (Machinery Directive), OJ 1998 L 
207/1-46 
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1996). The errors and suggested corrections were brought to the attention of the editor 
together with an enquiry as to how these errors together with any necessary corrections 
would be brought to the attention of readers. On the day of receipt of the author's letter 
the editor telephoned the author, he apologised for the errors, wanted to publish some 
form of correction and requested of the author a short article explaining the difference 
between legislation and standards. The author submitted a short article that was 
accepted for publication, albeit after editing (Rogers, 2002). 
4.3.2.4 Test of the European Ombudsman's complaint system 
The literature review of this research has relied, in parts, on access to EC institutions' 
documentation. With the Commission in particular there have been difficulties in 
gaining access to documents, some of these difficulties arise as a result of lack of 
knowledge, by the author, of the structure of internal Commission committees. Council 
Decision 1999/468/EC8 sets out a framework of procedures for Commission committees 
and in particular, via Article 7 (4) (op. cit.), required the Commission to publish a list of 
all committees which assist the Commission in the exercise of implementing powers. 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC came into effect on 18 July 1999, within six months of 
that date the Commission was required to have published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities (OJEC) the list of the relevant committees. 
In May 2000 it appeared that access to the Commission list of committees would 
facilitate this research. Literature, and online, searches were made to locate the list of 
committees but these searches were unsuccessful. A letter was sent to the European 
Commission Representation in the United Kingdom for an OJEC reference to this list of 
committees. The reply made it clear that the list of committees had not been published. 
Consideration was given to how pressure might be applied to expedite pUblication of the 
list of committees. A letter of complaint from an individual citizen to the Commission 
was seen as unlikely to have any noticeable effect. However, the European 
Ombudsman has a complaints procedure (European Ombudsman, 1999) to deal with 
complaints of maladministration. The information to hand appeared to meet the criteria 
for a complaint of maladministration to be accepted by the European Ombudsman and a 
8 Council Decision of28 June 1999 (1999/468/EC) laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 1999 L 184/23-26 
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letter of complaint was sent on 1 st June 2000. This letter of complaint would, hopefully, 
fulfil two objectives. The first objective was to obtain access to the list of Committees. 
The second objective was to provide first hand knowledge of the European 
Ombudsman's complaint system. There then followed interim correspondence, some of 
which invited the complainant to comment on the Commission's response to the 
European Ombudsman. 
The case was closed, just over one year after the author's original letter, by the author's 
receipt of a letter from the European Ombudsman (Appendix V) upholding the 
complaint, this letter included a critical remark to the Commission. A 'critical remark' 
is defined by the European Ombudsman (Soderman, 2002) as: 'appropriate for cases 
where the instance of maladministration appears to have no general implications and 
no follow up action by the Ombudsman seems necessary.' This author would not 
disagree with the definition of critical remark provided by the Ombudsman but does 
disagree that it is applicable to this case. Maladministration based on a claim of being 
too busy to comply with the law seems to this author to have general implication. The 
outcome from the author's complaint may be seen as a small victory but unfortunately 
the information that was initially requested, the list of Commission committees, was not 
revealed by the Commission. 
The information that had originally been requested from the Commission was published 
in the Official Journal of the European Communities (Commission, 2000c) in August 
2000, two months after the initial complaint was registered and three months before the 
Commission responded to the European Ombudsman's enquiry. The Commission, in 
their response to the Ombudsman, made no mention of the publication of the data that 
had been requested. All that the Commission put forward was a series of what they saw 
as valid reasons for failing to fulfil their obligations. The concept of assisting a citizen 
of the ED by providing a reference to what was by then in the public domain did not 
appear to occur to the Commission. 
4.3.3 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
The researcher, through his normal professional work, has been and remains in a 
position to act as a participant observer in a number of different forums. Five forums 
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have been identified as being of significance in providing data to complement and 
corroborate the data obtained by structured interviews. Attendance at the forums 
allowed assessments to be made of the knowledge and understanding of the EC internal 
market technical legislative process held by internal market practitioners for whom it 
was not possible to be included in the set of internal market practitioners individually 
interviewed. Of the forty to fifty additional practitioners whose views could be at least 
partially assessed in this way about seventy five percent were non-UK internal market 
practitioners. 
The five forums that have been identified as being of significance to this research are 
individually described in sub-sections 4.3.3.1 thru 4.3.3.5 Confidentiality constraints 
limit the ability to divulge the precise list of participants, and the detail of the subject 
matter discussed, at these forums. None of these forums put records of their forum 
meetings in the public domain. The only research records are, therefore, in the form of 
contemporaneous, unpublished, notes taken at these forums. The data that was 
collected at these forums allows some triangulation of data collected via the structured 
interviews in support of objective 1, the data is discussed in Section 5.2.5 
4.3.3.1 UK trade association (PPMAIFEF) meeting with National Weights and 
Measures Laboratory (NWML) 
In recent years the Engineering Committee of the UK trade association the Petrol Pump 
Manufacturers' Association (PPMA), reconstituted in April 2001 as the Technical 
Committee of the Forecourt Equipment Federation, has met periodically with staff at the 
National Weights and Measures Laboratory (NWML) to discuss various issues related 
to the legal metrology of fuel dispensers and other items of petrol filling station 
equipment. NWML is an executive agency of the Department of Trade and Industry, 
itself a ministry of the UK government. One ofNWML's roles is to advise the 
appropriate government ministers on many aspects of legal metrology as practised in 
the UK and to take the lead on behalf of the UK government on negotiations within the 
European Community on directives that relate to legal metrology. As expected the 
NWML team at meetings with the PPMAIFEF included those people with direct 
responsibility for determining the UK government's position in European Commission 
and Council Working Groups. The Technical Committee of the FEF comprises senior 
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engineering representatives from its member companies. The member companies are 
UK manufacturing and service companies. The author attends these meetings as 
Chairman of the FEF Technical Committee. 
Working drafts of proposals for a European Community Measuring Instruments 
Directive, which when adopted will be part of the internal market legislative framework, 
have existed for several years. The meetings between FEF and NWML provide 
opportunities to make enquiries of the present situation and to make suggestions, where 
appropriate, for possible changes to the current negotiating stance. As at May 2004, 
with the Measuring Instruments Directive9 now adopted discussions between NWML 
and FEF continue but with a shift in focus away from the negotiating stance to that of 
understanding all aspects of the transposition into UK national law. 
The normal NWML team attending these meetings were aware of the author's 
concurrent research interest. However, some NWML staff who only attend for parts of 
any given meeting may not have been aware of the author's concurrent research interest. 
4.3.3.2 European trade association (CECOD) 
The European trade association to which the author has ready access is the Committee 
of European Manufacturers of Petroleum Measuring and Distributing Equipment 
(CECOD). CECOD, whose membership is drawn from ten EC Member States and two 
non-EC Member States, operates at three distinct levels. The first of these three levels of 
operation is the General Assembly. The General Assembly is held once per annum and 
is attended by chief executive officers of the member companies and does not concern 
itself with details of the EC technical legislative environment within which products are 
traded. The second level of operation is via a five person executive committee 
appointed by the General Assembly, this executive committee deals with matters as and 
when they arise. CECOD's third and most important level of operation is its Technical 
Committee. This Technical Committee is comprised of senior engineering 
representatives from CECOD's member companies. The author is invited to attend 
meetings of the Technical Committee, and its subsidiary 'Study Groups', as a result of 
9 Directive 2004/22/EC ofthe European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on measuring 
instruments (Measuring Instruments Directive), OJ 2004 L 135/1-80 
his direct involvement with the equivalent UK national trade association, FEF. No 
other people attend CECOD Technical Committee meetings by invitation. 
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For research such as that reported here meetings of the CECOD Technical Committee 
are significant in that they provide an opportunity to enter into discussions among 
colleagues from nine EC Member States other than the UK, one EU applicant state and 
one European Free Trade Association country. These discussions allow the author, 
albeit in an unstructured way, to make assessments of the level of knowledge and 
perceptions relating to the EC internal market and its associated legislative process that 
exist in countries outside the UK. 
It should be noted that the prime reasons for the author attending these CECOD 
Technical Committee meetings are to assist the Technical Committee by bringing broad 
UK knowledge to the discussion and to take away, for dissemination to the FEF 
membership, information from other countries. Some of the people attending these 
CECOD meetings were not aware of the author's concurrent research interest. 
4.3.3.3 Western European Cooperation on Legal Metrology (WELMEC) 
WELMEC is an inter-governmental organisation bringing together the legal metrology 
policy units of European states. EU Member States are full members, EU applicant 
states and EU aspirant states are admitted as Associate Members. 
WELMEC operates at two levels. At the higher level those attending are Directors, or 
equivalent, of national legal metrology policy units possibly accompanied by technical 
advisers. The European Commission sees such meetings as being meetings of Member 
State governments and requires to be present. At a lower level WELMEC operates 
through a series of Working Groups (WG) that have been established to deal with 
specific tasks within the broad field oflegal metrology. Of these WGs one, WG8 
dealing with the draft, and more recently the adopted, Measuring Instruments 
Directive I 0 was of particular interest to this research. 
ION.9 above 
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Until relatively recently each of the EC Member States had units within their national 
governments that dealt with legal metrology policy and technical laboratories where 
testing and type approval examinations of equipment could be undertaken. Some EC 
Member States have carried out various degrees of privatisation of their national legal 
metrology services. The result of these privatisations is that at WG8 meetings some EC 
Member State national policy officials may be accompanied by technical experts from 
private sector enterprises. WELMEC WG8 has extended invitations to European trade 
associations with a major interest in legal metrology to send representatives to WG8 
meetings. Those European trade associations that do attend are allowed to take some 
part in the discussions but have no vote and, therefore, do not take part in any formal 
decisions. CECOD is one ofthe European trade associations invited to participate in 
WELMEC WG8 meetings and on occasions the author has been a member of the 
CECOD delegation. 
From the above description it can be seen that WELMEC WG8 meetings are attended 
by EC Member State legal metrology policy experts together with technical experts 
from government departments and from private sector industry. Commission officials 
are also invited to attend. 
WELMEC Working Groups, and indeed WELMEC itself, have no statutory role to play 
in the EC internal market technical legislative process. According to the UK National 
Weights and Measures Laboratory's Director for international affairs: 'WELMEC 
decided on its own to make an examination [of the MID j, WELMEC had not been 
invited by the Commission to submit any formal opinion on the draft MID.' However, 
meetings of WELMEC WG8 provide a useful forum for this research given that many 
of the EC Member State government legal metrology policy experts who attend WG8 
are also members of a Council Working Group studying the draft, and adopted, MIDII. 
This Council Working Group is part of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process but it is not open to anyone other than EC Member State delegates and officials 
from the Commission. Attendance at WELMEC WG8 therefore provides an 
opportunity to assess the level of knowledge and perceptions of the EC internal market 
and its technical legislative process of some officials from EC Member States. 
11 N.9 above 
Some of the people attending these WELMEC WG8 meetings were not aware of the 
author's concurrent research interest. 
4.3.3.4 European trade association meeting with European Commission 
officials 
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European trade associations have some rights of access to the European Commission to 
personally put their case about Commission proposals. In September 2000 the formal 
proposal for a Measuring Instruments Directive (MID)(Commission, 2000b) was 
published. At the October 2000 CECOD Technical Committee meeting agreement was 
reached on a number of criticisms of the proposed MID (op. cit.). It was agreed by the 
CECOD Technical Committee that a multinational delegation should arrange to meet 
with the relevant Commission officials to put to them the case for changes to be made to 
the proposed MID (op. cit.). This author was appointed as a member of the 
multinational delegation which met, as planned, with the relevant Commission officials 
in December 2000. CECOD's case for changes to the proposed MID was based on the 
Commission's perceived failure to follow each of several of the rules governing the 
content of EC internal market technical legislation. 
The discussion following CECOD's opening presentation at this meeting provided an 
opportunity to explore the level of knowledge of, and attitudes towards, some of the EC 
secondary legislation that supposedly governs the work of Commission officials. 
Some of the people attending this meeting were not aware of the author's concurrent 
research interest. 
4.3.3.5 UK trade associations meeting with NWML 
A number of UK trade associations, whose members would be affected by any proposed 
Measuring Instruments Directive (MID)(Commission, 2000b), had concerns about the 
content of the Commission proposal for a MID (op. cit.). As a result of these concerns 
five UK trade associations met to discuss their perceived problems with the proposal in 
an attempt to identify common concerns. A number of common concerns were indeed 
identified. It was agreed that these same trade associations should make joint 
representation to NWML, the UK's legal metrology policy unit and home of the UK's 
negotiators for the proposed MID. The purpose ofthe meeting was to attempt to 
persuade the UK negotiators to modify their objectives of the negotiations to take 
account of the problems perceived by those sectors of UK manufacturing industry 
represented by the five trade associations. In addition to the MID negotiator, senior 
management ofNWML attended. 
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The author attended each of the meetings outlined above as the representative of the 
Forecourt Equipment Federation and was thus afforded an opportunity to make some 
assessments of the level of knowledge and perceptions of the EC internal market and its 
legislative process. The findings, from participation in the above groups, relating to 
knowledge and perception of the EC internal market and its associated technical 
legislative process are reported in Section 5.2.5 
Some of the people attending this meeting were not aware of the author's concurrent 
research interest. 
4.4 Ethical considerations 
Kent, in Burton (2000), outlines two basic theories in ethical philosophy. In the first of 
these, the deontological theory, the argument is that 'morals ought to be based on 
obligations to others '. Whereas in the second, consequentialist theory, people, 
including therefore researchers, 'should seek to act in accordance with the 
consequences of their behaviour and minimise suffering and maximise well being'. 
Kent subsequently suggests (op. cit.) that rather than engage in debate on the merits of 
the two theories it is more constructive to focus on four principles; autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, to guide ethical analysis. In the context of 
this research these four principles provide for the right of self-determination for 
respondents and other participants, obligations on the researcher to do good and not to 
cause harm and that people should be treated fairly. This author fully embraces the four 
principles promulgated by Kent when interpreted within the framework of the 
consequentialist theory. 
It is the opinion of the author that no significant ethical issues were raised by, or during, 
this research. Justification for this statement is provided by a review of the 
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requirements of 'Ethical Principles for Conducting Research with Human Participants 
(British Psychological Society)' reproduced in Robson (1999). The nature ofthis 
particular research renders inappropriate many parts of the 'Ethical Principles', for 
example '3.2 Research with children ... '. The ethical nature of the research reported 
here is demonstrated by identifying those parts of the 'Ethical Principles' taken from 
Robson (op. cit.), broadly mapping those of Kent, that could be considered to apply to 
this research and by providing one or more statements in response to each of those 
identified requirements. In addition to the specific ethical considerations set out below 
all normal courtesies were extended to the respondents, even when last moment 
postponements occurred. Similar courtesies were extended to all others attending forum 
meetings as described in Section 4.3.3 
No inducements were offered to the potential, and actual, respondents to the structured 
interview other than the option for some informed discussion immediately post 
interview and an opportunity to receive a copy of any separate report issued covering 
the fieldwork of this research. There was a very high take up of the offer of any report. 
Under each of the headings 4.4.1 to 4.4.4, whose requirements are taken from Robson 
(op. cit.), a statement is needed for one or more of the following three groups of people. 
The first of the three groups of people being the respondents to the structured interview, 
the second of the two groups being those people to whom requests for information were 
sent and the third group being those comprising the various forums where participant 
observation took place. 
4.4.1 GENERAL 
In all circumstances, investigators must consider the ethical implications and 
psychological consequences for the participants in their research. 
Response for respondents to structured interview. 
The inclusion of the Introduction of the Structured Interview, this clearly sets out the 
objectives of the research. This Introduction was read to each participant immediately 
prior to conducting the Structured Interview, only when the participant responded in the 
affirmative that they were prepared to proceed did the structured interview begin. 
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The text of the Introduction of the Structured Interview had also been included in a 
letter (Appendix III) provided to each respondent, following their initial, informal, 
agreement to assist in the research had been obtained. Thus each participant had been 
provided with an opportunity to be aware of the conditions of the interview some time 
before the interview actually took place. 
Response for those to whom requests were sent. 
The researcher was aware that he had no right to waste the time of those working in the 
EC institutions by fabricating obscure tests of their systems. Each of the requests to EC 
institutions for information or clarification were legitimate requests that arose from the 
need to have access to information to complete what was incomplete information or to 
allow a proper understanding of published information. 
From the records maintained by the researcher it was possible to determine how quickly 
and how thoroughly the EC institutions responded to requests for information. At no 
time were those within the EC institutions harassed for information. However, in some 
instances where there had been no response at all to a request, a repeat request was 
made some months later. 
The one exception to the above was the exercise of the complaint procedure via the 
Office ofthe European Ombudsman. The European Ombudsman's complaint 
procedure requires that any complaint must meet a number of criteria before the 
complaint is accepted for investigation (European Ombudsman, 1999). My complaint, 
discussed in detail in Section 4.3.2, met the screening criteria and was accepted by the 
European Ombudsman for further investigation. The European Ombudsman 
subsequently upheld my complaint and thereby justified my action in raising the 
complaint. 
Response for those comprising the forums where participant observation took place. 
The author attended these forums in his professional capacity and participated in a 
manner entirely consistent with behaviour exhibited at similar meetings prior to 
embarking on this research project. At any given forum a number of the other 
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participants were aware of the author's concurrent research interest and none of these 
people at any time raised any objection to my presence. It was judged inappropriate to 
declare, at the beginning of any forum, that the author was attending in two capacities, 
participant observer researcher in addition to normal participant. In the normal course 
of events it would have been necessary to take account of the views and opinions of the 
other participants during the ongoing discussions. The only difference my additional 
role as participant observer made was, perhaps, increased note taking. 
4.4.2 CONSENT 
Whenever possible, the investigator should inform all participants of the objectives of 
the investigation. The investigator should inform the participants of all aspects of the 
research or intervention that might reasonably be expected to influence willingness to 
participate. 
Response for respondents to structured interview. 
The inclusion of the Introduction of the Structured Interview, this clearly sets out the 
objectives of the research. This Introduction was read to each participant immediately 
prior to conducting the Structured Interview, only when the participant responded in the 
affirmative that they were prepared to proceed did the structured interview begin. 
The text of the Introduction of the Structured Interview had also been included in a 
letter (Appendix III) provided to each respondent, following their initial, informal, 
agreement to assist in the research had been obtained. Thus each participant had been 
provided with an opportunity to be aware of the conditions of the interview some time 
before the interview actually took place. 
Response for those to whom requests were sent. 
Legitimate enquiries of the extended system, as described in Section 4.3.2, were not 
considered by the author as requiring the consent of the recipient of the enquiry. 
Response for those comprising the forums where participant observation took place. 
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To those participants who were not aware of my dual role it was not considered possible 
to explain that the information made available at the forum may be used for two 
purposes. Given that all of the forums allowed for subsequent disclosure of the 
discussion the participants were deemed to have given consent to their views being 
recorded and disseminated. 
4.4.3 WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INVESTIGATION 
At the onset of the investigation investigators should make plain to participants their 
right to withdraw from the research at any time. 
In the light of experience of the investigation, or as a result of debriefing, the 
participant has the right to withdraw retrospectively any consent given, and to require 
that their own data, including recordings, be destroyed. 
Response for respondents to structured interview. 
The inclusion of the Introduction of the Structured Interview, this clearly sets out the 
objectives of the research. This Introduction was read to each participant immediately 
prior to conducting the Structured Interview, only when the participant responded in the 
affirmative that they were prepared to proceed did the structured interview begin. 
The text of the Introduction of the Structured Interview had also been included in a 
letter (Appendix III) provided to each respondent, following their initial, informal, 
agreement to assist in the research had been obtained. Thus each participant had been 
provided with an opportunity to be aware of the conditions of the interview some time 
before the interview actually took place. 
Response for those to whom requests were sent. 
Legitimate enquiries of the extended system, as described in Section 4.3.2, were made 
in the expectation of reply, given that the enquiries were made of nominally open 
organisations. No reply, a de facto withdrawal, was then seen open to any reasonable 
interpretation by the author without breaching any ethical code. 
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Response for those comprising the forums where participant observation took place. 
This situation has proven to be the most difficult to rationalise. The forums attended, 
including those where negotiations rather than just an exchange of views took place, 
always catered for those attendees who did not wish to actively participate, thus their 
right to withhold their opinions from the author was not diminished by the author's dual 
role. 
4.4.4 CONFIDENTIALITY 
Subject to the requirements o/legislation, including the Data Protection Act, 
information obtained about a participant during an investigation is confidential unless 
otherwise agreed in advance. 
Response for respondents to structured interview. 
The inclusion of the Introduction of the Structured Interview, this clearly sets out the 
objectives ofthe research. This Introduction was read to each participant immediately 
prior to conducting the Structured Interview, only when the participant responded in the 
affirmative that they were prepared to proceed did the structured interview begin. 
The text of the Introduction of the Structured Interview had also been included in a 
letter (Appendix III) provided to each respondent, following their initial, informal, 
agreement to assist in the research had been obtained. Thus each participant had been 
provided with an opportunity to be aware of the conditions of the interview some time 
before the interview actually took place. 
Some of the questions of the Structured Interview were open questions looking for the 
participant to provide answers in their own words. Additionally, some of the ranking 
questions provided for the participant to supply additional data. Each participant who 
had agreed to take part in the Structured Interview was asked if they agreed to the use, 
anonymously, of quotes from any of their responses. All participants agreed to this 
request, one participant however only agreed on the basis that he was informed that any 
quotes from his responses would be notified to him before its inclusion in any report or 
thesis. No quotes from this participant have been used by the author in any report or 
thesis. 
Response for those to whom requests were sent. 
None of the replies received contained the caveat 'confidential' and were thus 
considered to be effectively in the public domain. The reasonable use of such public 
domain information was not seen as breaching any ethical code. 
Response for those comprising the forums where participant observation took place. 
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The declaration of affiliations of individuals to specific organisations was effectively a 
requirement of participation and became part of the public record of the forum. No use 
was made of such information in the analysis of views expressed. All attributions of 
views in the analysis were kept at the general level of type of participant; manufacturer, 
regulator, enforcer etc; to ensure anonymity and no breaches of confidentiality. 
4.5 Summary 
Sections 4.2 to 4.4 inclusive provide clear statements of what was required from the 
fieldwork, what was done, why it was done, who was involved and how potential 
challenges to the validity of the methodology were considered. 
It was recognised from the outset of this fieldwork that of the total number of 
respondents for the structured interview relatively few, if any, would be drawn from the 
core and non-core parts of the system, Section 2.4. The data available via participant 
observation, while less structured than the data from the interviews, goes some way to 
redress the imbalance. 
An important question remains: 'Would this overall methodology have validity if there 
was a complete imbalance in the source of respondents, for example if all of the 
respondents were drawn from manufacturing?, The author's view is that even with the 
situation described above the research findings would have validity. If the findings, 
with a sample of respondents drawn entirely from manufacturing or some other group 
outside of the core system, were to demonstrate a perfect knowledge of the EC internal 
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market technical legislative process and if the findings were to demonstrate a high level 
of satisfaction with the functioning of the EC internal market then the core system could 
take satisfaction in a job well done. Converse findings would have equal validity. If 
the findings were to indicate poor system knowledge and/or a low level of satisfaction 
with the functioning of the EC internal market then the core system could be 
legitimately challenged to perform to a higher standard. 
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Chapter 5 Fieldwork findings and overall analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 'Introduction' identifies the aim, and supporting objectives, of this research. 
The' Cone of Refinement' of Figure 1.1 shows in outline how Chapters 2, 3 and 4, each 
with data collection elements, contribute to the pool of data that is available for the 
overall analysis carried out within this Chapter. 
Chapter 2, 'The law making process', identified the European Community internal 
market technical legislative process, itself a necessary pre-requisite for a critical review. 
This foundation established what may be considered the target for the critical 
investigation, objective 1, and thus enables proposals for improvements to the process 
to be made. The foundation also provided the basis for the investigation of the 
knowledge of the EC internal market, and its associated technical legislative process, 
held by internal market practitioners, objective 2. 
Chapter 3, 'Literature survey and review', documents the published literature. No 
significant literature was identified that assisted this research in its assessment of the 
knowledge and understanding of the European Community internal market technical 
legislative process held by internal market practitioners. The findings of the literature 
review are analysed in detail in Section 3.5 It is noteworthy that the literature review 
was only of limited value in the establishment of a launching point for the fieldwork. 
Chapter 4, 'Methodology', discussed the possibilities that existed as methodological 
options and identified the selected, and applied, fieldwork methodology - structured 
interview applied to a purposive sample of internal market practitioners. The findings 
from the data collection endeavours, which includes data in support of objective 3, are 
reported and analysed in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 
The remainder of this Chapter presents a summary of the overall findings and offers an 
analysis of the findings. 
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5.2 Fieldwork 
The rationale of the fieldwork is fully described in Chapter 4 and the Structured 
Interview instrument that was employed for the primary data collection is reproduced in 
full in Appendix II. Additional fieldwork data was collected via tests of the system and 
participant observation. The data collected by each of these three techniques will be 
discussed separately. 
5.2.1 STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
The structured interview is in several distinct pm1s as described in Section 4.3.1 The 
data collected is presented in the sequence of the parts. 
5.2.1.1 Overview of sample (Part A of Structured Interview) 
The sample was comprised of 40 male but no female respondents. The lack of female 
respondents was not a characteristic of the sample deliberately introduced by the 
researcher. As explained in Chapter 4 the starting point for the sample was a limited 
number of potential, and actual, respondents already known to the researcher, some of 
the respondents provided suggestions for other respondents, all of whom were male. 
There is no reason to suggest that the gender imbalance in the sample affects the 
validity of the subsequent findings. However, it does suggest that the job functions 
from which this research sample was drawn are predominantly a male domain. Within 
this research no attempt was made to investigate the cause, or causes, of this sample's 
gender imbalance. 
The distribution of job functions of the sample is given in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 shows 
the sample to be heterogeneous, not drawn from only one job function sub-set of 
European Community internal market practitioners. It is also clear from Table 5.1 that 
each of the four sub-sets of EC internal market practitioners are not equally represented . 
in the sample. This is not seen as a deficiency in the overall sample since the 
populations of the sub-sets of EC internal market practitioners are themselves not equal. 
The sample taken is a reasonable purposive sample of European Community internal 
market practitioners. 
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It was not expected that the entire sample would have the same initial professional 
training. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of initial professional training of the sample 
and shows that EC internal market practitioners may possess any of several initial 
professional training backgrounds, albeit a preponderance of engineering as the initial 
professional training is evident. 
Table 5.1 The distribution of the sample as a function of job function 
Number Job Function 
3 Legislators (UK civil servants) 
9 Enforcers (Local authority Trading Standards Officers and 
Petroleum Licensing Officers) 
11 Manufacturers (Employees of manufacturing organisations) 
17 Representatives of Trade Associations, Test and 
Celiification Bodies, Standards Bodies and other UK 
government employees. 
40 Total 
-
Table 5.2 The distribution of the sample as a function of initial 
professional training 
Number Type of Initial Professional Training 
5 Law 
8 Science 
22 Engineering 
5 Other (Accounting, Building, Fire safety, Management and Marketing) 
40 Total 
-- --
--_ ............ _-
The initial group of questions, the responses to which are reported above, were 
straightforward factual questions that provided an opportunity for the respondents to 
settle down and not feel threatened by either the process or the specific questions. The 
Structured Interview then moved on to assess an opinion before moving on to deal with 
a further tranche of factual questions. 
The first 'opinion' question was to determine if the respondents were receptive to the 
idea of formal training related to their job function in addition to their initial 
professional training. Thiliy six of the sample were in favour of such formal job related 
training. Further questions were then asked to determine the method, or methods, by 
which the individual respondents were trained for their current job function. Table 5.3 
is a tabulation of the responses obtained, the four respondents who had indicated that 
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they were not in favour of formal training for their CUlTent job each indicated that they 
had themselves received some training. Four other respondents who had indicated that 
they were in favour of formal job related training claimed to have received no such 
training. It is clear from Table 5.3 that 'working with colleagues' was the most 
common method ofreceiving training for their current job. For 7 out of the 31 giving 
the 'working with colleagues' response it was the only method by which the respondent 
received specific training for their CUlTent job. 
Table 5.3 Tabulation of the sample's response as to how they 
were trained for their current job function 
Number of Training methods employed 
responses 
24 Formally - courses 
31 Working with colleagues 
14 Written procedures 
5 Other training 
4 Not trained 
Recognising that EC internal market issues may be only a part of the CUlTent job 
function of respondents more specific questions were then asked about training related 
to EC internal market technical legislation. Only 12 respondents had received specialist 
training in the understanding and/or interpretation ofEC internal market technical 
legislation. A summary of the methods by which the specialist training had been 
received is given in Table 5.4 
Table 5.4 Tabulation of responses about method by which specialist 
training was received 
Number of Method by which specialist training was received 
responses 
6 External seminar 
4 Internal seminar 
2 European Commission Workshop 
1 From Trade Association representative 
~---
Of the 28 respondents who had not received any specialist training in the understanding 
and/or interpretation ofEC internal market technical legislation 25 indicated that they 
would be pleased or very pleased to receive such training, the other 3 respondents 
offered no opinion as to its value. 
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The next series of questions was related to the EC internal market technical legislative 
process rather than the output from the process. Five respondents said that they had 
received specialist training about the EC internal market technical legislative process 
and all of them agreed that the training had been helpful or very helpful. All 5 
respondents indicated that the training had been received via an external seminar, one of 
these seminars had been provided by their professional institute and the others by 
independent trainers. 
Of the 35 respondents who had not received specialist training 29 indicated that they 
would be pleased or very pleased to receive such training, the other 6 respondents 
offered no opinion as to its value. The 29 respondents who expressed the opinion that 
they would be pleased or very pleased to receive specialist training in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process were then asked what they saw as the benefits of 
such training. Table 5.5 provides a tabulation of their responses, in some instances 
more than one per respondent, which collectively can be interpreted to suggest that the 
respondents feel that they could do a better job if they were better informed of the EC 
internal market technical legislative process. 
Table 5.5 Tabulation of responses about value of EC internal 
market technical legislative process training 
-- - --_ ... _-------
---
---_ ... _----_ .. _--
Number of Comment 
responses 
9 No comment 
9 Present understanding is poor 
9 Helpful or save time if process is known 
9 Generally useful or able to influence 
outcome if process known. 
The final general piece of information obtained from the respondents was the number of 
EC new approach technical harmonization directives that can have an effect on their 
work. This data is summarised in Figure 5.1 and shows that the work of all respondents 
was affected by at least one EC new approach technical harmonization directive. All 
respondents were legitimate members of the sample as internal market practitioners. 
The maximum number of EC new approach technical harmonization directives 
indicated as affecting their work was 13, this was the case for one local authority 
enforcement officer. 
Figure 5.1 The number of respondents as a function of the number of EC new 
approach technical harmonization directives affecting their work 
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5.2.1.2 EC internal market legislative process knowledge exhibited by the 
respondents (Part B of Structured Interview) 
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This Part of the Structured Interview lies at the very heart of the assessment of the 
knowledge of the respondents of the European Community internal market legislative 
process. It was clearly impractical, within the maximum intended interview time of one 
hour, to undertake a detailed examination of each respondent's knowledge of the overall 
processes so a proxy measure for this detailed knowledge was used. Within the EC 
internal market legislative process four EC institutions are actively involved. The 
institutions correctly identified by each respondent were then summated to provide a 
measure of the knowledge of the EC internal market legislative process that could be 
attributed to each respondent. This focussed question, B.2 of the Structured Interview, 
was preceded by the more open question, B.1, inviting the respondent to identify as 
many as possible of the institutions of the European Union. The data obtained from the 
responses to questions B.1 are summarised in Table 5.6 
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The data of Table 5.6 suggests that few respondents were aware, beyond the 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of Justice, of the 
names of European Union institutions. An alternative way of viewing the data is 
provided in Figure 5.2 showing the distribution of the number ofEU institutions 
correctly named. From Figure 5.2 it is also possible to determine that the median score 
for respondents when asked to name EU institutions was 2.5 
Table 5.6 The number of responses for each of the European Union Institutions 
and number of incorrect responses 
Number of European Union Institution 
Responses 
31 Commission 
30 European Parliament 
19 Council 
13 Court of Justice 
3 Economic and Social Committee 
2 COUli of Auditors 
1 Committee of the Regions 
18 Incorrect responses 
Figure 5.2 The number of respondents as a function of the number of EU 
Institutions correctly named 
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Table 5.6 indicates that in addition to the total of 101 instances ofEU institutions being 
correctly named there were 18 occurrences ofnon-EU institutions being named. Table 
5.7 gives a tabulation of the incorrectly named organisations and Table 5.8 provides a 
consolidation of the incorrect responses where the types of incorrectly quoted 
organisations are grouped together. 
Table 5.7 The number of responses for the various incorrect organisations quoted 
as being European Union Institutions 
Number of Organisation Quoted 
Responses 
7 CEN - a European Standards Organisation 
3 CENELEC - a European Standards Organisation 
3 Directorate General - of the Commission 
2 Working Group - of the Council 
2 Court of Human Rights 
1 CECOD - European Manufacturers' Association 
The data of Table 5.8 suggests that there is a level of confusion exhibited by EC internal 
market practitioners between EU institutions and what are two European standardisation 
organisations. European standardisation organisations are not EU institutions, their 
function is not pati of the legislative process but, subsequent to the adoption of technical 
legislation, is to write technical standards underpinning the technical legislation. 
Additionally, parts, or subsets, ofEU institutions, Directorates General of the 
Commission and Working Groups of Council, were not perceived as being part of the 
Commission or of Council but as separate institutions. Each of these two interpretations 
suggests a lack of process understanding. Such a lack of process understanding could 
cause failure of attempts by EC internal market practitioners to effectively input 
comments into the legislative process. 
Table 5.8 A consolidation of Table 5.8 into Types of Organisation Incorrectly 
Quoted as European Union Institutions 
Number of Type of Organisation Incorrectly Quoted I 
Responses 
10 European Standards Organisation 
5 Parts of EU Institutions ! 
1 European Trade Association 
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The second, more focussed, question in Part B of the Structured Interview was 
concerned specifically with the European Community internal market technical 
legislative process although the form of this question was similar to the first question. 
The data of Table 5.9 indicates that of the four EC institutions involved in the internal 
market technical legislative process only two of the institutions were known by more 
than half of the respondents. The data in Figure 5.3 shows that only two respondents 
were able to identify all four institutions and that the median number of institutions 
known was two. For the purposes of this research an objective measure of knowledge 
of the EC internal market technical legislative process has been taken to be knowledge 
of the EC institutions involved. Of the four EC institutions involved in the internal 
market technical legislative process the median number of these institutions conectly 
identified was two. The data of Table 5.9 and of Figure 5.3 together suggest that the 
level of knowledge of the EC internal market technical legislative process is poor. 
The data of Table 5.1 0 echoes that of Tables 5.6 and 5.7 and provides further evidence 
of confusion about the role of European Standards Organisations and the status of 
Directorates General of the Commission. 
Table 5.9 The number of responses for each of the European Community 
Institutions and number of incorrect responses 
Number of European Community Institution 
Responses 
31 Commission 
28 European Parliament 
15 Council 
3 Economic and Social Committee 
4 Other, inconect, responses 
Figure 5.3 The number of respondents as a function of the number of EC 
Institutions correctly named 
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Table 5.10 Types of Organisation Incorrectly Quoted as European Community 
Institutions 
Number of Type of Organisation Incorrectly Quoted 
Responses 
2 European Standards Organisation 
2 Parts of European Community Institution 
Knowledge ofthe individual institutions, while essential to an overall knowledge of the 
process, alone is insufficient for internal market practitioners who may wish to engage 
with the process. It is suggested that contributions to the process can best be made 
when there is also an understanding of who the players are within each of the 
institutions. Question B.3 of the Structured Interview was, therefore, designed to make 
a more detailed assessment of the respondents' knowledge of the membership of the EC 
institutions concerned with internal market technical legislative change. Figure 5.4 
shows, for each of Commissioners, Commission officials and members of Council, the 
Economic & Social Committee and the European Parliament, the claim made for 
knowledge of the process by which people become members of the forgoing 
institutions. Respondents were requested to self-assess their knowledge on a five point 
Likert scale ranging from 'Complete Ignorance'(score 1) through to 'Full Knowledge' 
(score 5). The median score for each of the four institutions is shown in Table 5.11 
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Figure 5.4 The number of respondents claiming knowledge of how people become 
members of EC institutions (Commissioners, Commission officials, Members of 
Council, Economic & Social Committee and European Parliament) 
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Table 5.11 Median scores achieved when self-assessing knowledge of how people 
become members of various EC institutions 
II Median Score EC Institution 
5 European Parliament 
3.5 Commission - Commissioner 
2.5 Commission - Officials 
2 Council 
1.5 Economic & Social Committee 
Acceptance of self-assessment data without some testing of the self-assessment would 
provide data of questionable reliability. Question B.4 was therefore included in the 
Structured Interview to provide a rough assessment of whether the claims of knowledge 
were exaggerated. Only 11 out of the 200 self-assessments made were judged to be 
exaggerated claims, the distribution of the exaggerated claims is shown in Table 5.12 
Within the remaining 189 self-assessments no significant under-assessments of 
knowledge were identified. 
Table 5.12 Number of exaggerated claims of knowledge of how people become 
members of EC institutions 
Number of EC Institution 
, 
exaggerated 
claims 
5 Commission - Commissioner 
3 Economic & Social Committee 
2 European Parliament 
1 Commission - Officials 
0 Council 
• 
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Further enquiries to try to measure knowledge of the EC internal market technical 
legislative process were made via Question B.5. The data of Figure 5.5 shows that only 
half of the respondents agreed with the proposition that the 'EC internal market 
technical legislative process is a process that is formally described somewhere.' Of the 
20 respondents agreeing with this proposition only 3 were able to correctly identify that 
the description is in the Treaty 1. The more detailed knowledge that it is Article 251 as 
amended by Article 95 and by Article 250 was not seen as necessary in order to be 
scored as a correct response. 
Figure 5.5 Distribution of responses to the request for opinion of the statement 
'The EC internal market technical legislative process is a process that is formally 
described somewhere.' 
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There then followed a self-assessment question on the respondents' knowledge of the 
process, these responses are summarised in Figure 5.6 
1 Consolidated Version ofthe Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 2002 C 325/33-184 
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Figure 5.6 Distribution of responses to a self-assessment of knowledge of the EC 
internal market technical legislative process 
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The method of testing the self-assessment answers, summarised in Figure 5.6, was to 
tell each respondent that the EC internal market technical legislative process was 
formally described and then to ask the respondent ifthey knew where this formal 
description was to be found. The results of this question, for the sample of respondents 
as a whole, and for the subset of the sample who agreed with the proposition that the 
process is formally described somewhere, are given in Table 5.13 
Table 5.13 Distribution of responses about the formal description of the EC 
internal market technical legislative process 
Number of Number of Classification of Response 
Responses Responses from 
sub-set of Sample 
7 6 No response 
21 9 Incorrect 
4 2 Partially correct 
8 3 Correct 
40 20 Total 
From the above Tables and Figures it can be seen that only 50% of respondents thought 
that the EC internal market technical legislative process was important enough to be 
formally described, of this sub-set of the sample (20) only 3 correctly identified where 
the process was described. Of the 20 respondents who did not agree with the 
proposition that the EC internal market technical legislative process was important 
enough to be formally described 5 were, nevertheless, able to correctly identify where 
the process was described. 
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Of particular interest are the responses from respondents from manufacturing, 11 of the 
sample of 40 (See Table 5.1). As a result of legislative requirements and/or customer 
pressure each of these respondents from manufacturing works in an environment with 
ISO 9000 (ISO, 2000) series accreditation with its attendant process documentation 
needs. Only 4 of these 11 respondents expected to find a formal description of the EC 
internal market technical legislative process, the reason(s) for such a low expectation of 
formalism in the process that demands formalism from manufacturers' processes are not 
understood. 
Question B.6 of the Structured Interview was included to investigate the expectations, 
and the reality, of receipt of information relating to proposals for change and how 
frequently responses are made to proposals for change. Table 5.14 shows the 
distribution of responses for what was considered to be what should happen. The data 
suggests that internal market practitioners do not perceive UK government departments 
or the EC institutions alone as being responsible for the dissemination of information 
about impending changes to legislation. 
Table 5.14 Distribution of responses to the question 'Who has responsibility for 
ensuring proposals for change are known? 
Number of Who has responsibility for ensuring 
Respondents proposals for change are known? 
25 UK Government Depmiment 
10 Trade Associations 
7 Own responsibility 
4 Own Organisation's Management 
3 National Standards Body 
1 The Commission 
1 Trade Press 
As a corollary to the data of Table 5.14, Table 5.15 shows the distribution of responses 
for how information on new proposals normally becomes known to internal market 
practitioners. 
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Table 5.15 Distribution of response to the question 'How do proposals normally 
become known? 
Number of How do proposals normally become 
Respondents known? 
20 Trade Associations 
17 UK Government Depmiment 
16 Networking 
4 Trade Press 
3 Own Company Management 
2 National Standards Body 
2 The Commission 
2 Luck/Chance 
The data of Table 5.15 suggests that trade associations, UK government departments 
and networking are seen as almost equally important in the dissemination of legislative 
change information. Only four respondents noted the trade press as a method of 
receiving such information. This research is unable to provide any clarification about 
the amount of legislative change data carried by the trade press. No specific enquiries 
were made to determine if the trade press see it as part of their function to be a reliable 
resource for the dissemination of such information or if the readers of the trade press 
reliably pick up any messages related to new legislative proposals that might be carried. 
The data of Figure 5.7 suggest that a significant majority, 33 out of 40, internal market 
practitioners 'often' or 'always' comment on proposals for legislative change that they 
become aware of. 
Figure 5.7 Distribution of response of attempts to modify any 
proposals for change 
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The data of Table 5.16 suggests a recognition that there are several routes into the 
system for their comments on proposals for legislative change. Coupled with the data 
of Tables 5.13 and 5.14 the picture that emerges is that internal market practitioners see 
UK government departments and trade associations as their main contact points with the 
EC internal market legislative process. 
Table 5.16 Distribution of responses on input points for views on proposals 
Number of Input point for views on proposals 
Respondents 
25 UK Government Department 
21 Trade Association 
9 The Commission 
4 National Standards Body 
-
3 European Parliament 
~ __ ... _1 ___ ~otified Body __ ~~ 
5.2.1.3 Perception of the internal market (Part C of Structured Interview) 
The application of Pmt C of the Structured Interview has allowed measurements to be 
made of the views of EC internal market practitioners on the internal market as it 
existed at the time of their interview. Appendix II, Part C, contains the detail of the 
individual questions put to respondents and Table 5.17 shows how the responses to 
some of these individual questions are aggregated to provide a measurement of the 
concept of completeness of the internal market. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the 
distributions ofresponses to questions C.1 - CA and to questions C.8 & C.1 0 
respectively. 
Table 5.17 Measurement of concept of completeness of the EC internal market 
Concept Dimensions Indicators - Total Range of 
Structured Interview Number Possible Scores 
Question Numbers Questions 
Completeness of Product C.1, C.2, C.3, CA 4 4 - 20 
EC Internal 6 - 30 
Market. Enforcement C.8, C.10 2 2 - 10 
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Figure 5.8 Distribution of responses for Questions C.l - C.4 
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From Figure 5.8, where the four sets of columns represent the responses to each of 
questions C.1 thru C.4, it can be seen that there is a bi-modal characteristic to the 
responses for each of Questions C.1 and C.2 In the case of Question C.l, concerned 
directly with the perception of the extent of removal of baniers to trade, it could be 
argued that respondents did not find it easy to differentiate between 'Most' and 'Some' 
baniers being removed. However, what is clear is that only one respondent felt that all 
baniers to trade had been removed. In the case of Question C.2, related to the 
acceptability of essential paperwork to accompany products, EC type examination 
documents and manufacturers' declarations of conformity, the responses may be related 
to respondents' knowledge relating to differing sub-sets of Member States. The 
underlying reason(s) for this difference in perception was not investigated within this 
research but it could be that officials in some Member States may be more amenable to 
the concept of an internal market than the officials in other Member States. 
European Community internal market technical legislation is, according to the 
provisions of Atiicle 942, achieved through the use of directives. Post 1985, New 
Approach, directives are concerned largely with the definition of safety or other 
2N.l above 
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consumer and worker protection objectives for products and the way that manufacturers 
are to demonstrate conformity with these objectives. 
The demonstration of conformity with directives involves the affixing of a CE marking 
which in many instances is underpinned by third party type examination documentation 
or own responsibility declarations of conformity. New Approach directives in general 
provide little, if any, guidance on enforcement regimes, as a result Member States 
enforcement regimes do not become apparent until Member States each complete the 
transposition of directives into their own national law. 
As a direct result of enforcement regimes not being set within EC directives there may 
be two dimensions for variation of enforcement. The first dimension is created by the 
Member States who are left to choose the enforcement regime. A major part of the 
choice of enforcement regime is whether it is to be proactive or reactive. In practice 
this means a choice of officials being involved in checking goods before use or whether 
officials only become involved in response to some form of complaint. The second 
dimension may be created within any given Member State. In the UK, for example, 
transposition usually results in legislation taking the form of a Statutory Instrument 
which, amongst other things, determines who will enforce the legislation. For most 
goods, this includes fuel dispensers and weighing instruments, enforcement of 
appropriate legislation is entrusted to local authorities. 
In the UK the actual enforcement of any given New Approach directive now is 
dependent upon possible variations in interpretation of the legislation between different 
local authorities and to the priority assigned to the different pieces of legislation that are 
enforced by resource limited local authorities. The net result of the existence of the two 
dimensions for variation in enforcement means that any product fulfilling all necessary 
provisions of applicable directives may meet with varying administrative obstacles in 
different locations within the European Community. 
The data of Figure 5.9, constructed from responses to Questions C.8 and C.lO, allows 
an assessment of the perceived effect of these possible variations in enforcement regime 
on the EC internal market. Question C.8 asked for an opinion on the statement' Within 
any given Member State there are no variations in installation and use requirements.' 
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and C.lO asked for an opinion on the statement 'Enforcement regimes, for any given EC 
internal market technical harmonisation directive, are the same in all Member States.' 
It can be seen from the data of Figure 5.9, where the two sets of columns represent the 
responses for questions C.8 and C.9 respectively, that the respondents were of the 
opinion that variations in enforcement regimes do exist along each of the dimensions 
outlined above. 
Figure 5.9 Distribution of responses for Questions C.S and C.10 
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It is now possible to construct consolidated views of the concept of completeness ofthe 
EC internal market. Consolidated views will be constructed in two slightly different 
ways. The first way is by providing an aggregate distribution of responses to questions 
C.l - C.4, C.8 and C.l 0 This aggregation, within which there are 240 data points, is 
shown as Figure 5.l0 and indicates that approximately 75% of the responses are of the 
opinion that the EC internal market is incomplete. 
Figure 5.10 Aggregate distribution of responses for 
Questions e.l- CA, e.8 & e.lO 
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The second way of looking at the perception of the completeness of the EC internal 
market was to construct, for each of the 40 respondents, a score developed via the 
procedure indicated in Table 5.17 from their own individual responses to the set of 
questions C.1 - CA, C.8 and C.10 The data thus obtained is summarised in Table 5.18 
and suggests that more than 85% of the respondents see no significant improvement of 
the EC internal market over the previous system that was dependent on national rules. 
No respondents had a score that suggested that their perception was of a fully 
functioning EC internal market. Three UK legislators are included in the sample of 
internal market practitioners. 
Table 5.18 Distribution of individual respondents' aggregate scores relating to 
their perception of the completeness of the EC internal market 
Number of Range of Respondents' Perception of the Completeness of EC 
Respondents Aggregate Scores from Internal Market 
C.l - CA, e.8 & C.lO 
12 6 -12 Some improvement over system reliant 
on national rules 
23 13 -18 No significant improvement over 
system reliant on national rules 
5 19 -24 Many barriers removed 
0 25 - 30 All barriers removed - internal market 
fully functioning 
This author fully accepts that new internal market directives, whether in areas of the 
internal market not previously covered by directives or as some form of amendment to, 
or extension of, existing directives are likely to impose more stringent technical 
.. 
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requirements on products than previously existed for those products. Such tightening of 
technical requirements is entirely consistent with public expectations of improvement in 
public protection. 
Given the emphasis, in the UK at least, on de-regulation generally and European 
Community programs such as SLIM (Simpler Legislation for the Internal 
Market)(Commission, 1996) internal market practitioners could reasonably expect to 
find that, technical requirements excepted, new directives be no less easy to understand 
and apply than earlier directives. Administrative burdens of new internal market 
directives should be clearer and be no more onerous than those of earlier directives. 
Internal market practitioners' perceptions of problems associated with the introduction, 
after EC adoption and national transposition, of new directives was assessed and the 
results of this assessment are shown in the following Figures and Table. 
The results summarised in Figure 5.11 suggest that 95% of practitioners would agree 
that new directives cause them some sort of problem as they become law. New 
Approach directives typically have three main aspects to them: the Articles which 
describe the legal basis, some background, a statement of any necessary repeals and 
statements about coming into force; a definition of the essential requirements that must 
be fulfilled by products falling within the scope of the directive and finally the methods 
by which conformity with the directive shall be demonstrated. It was with these three 
aspects in mind, each of which can cause quite different problems for internal market 
Figure 5.11 Response to requests for opinion of the statement 'The introduction 
of new, or modified directives, never provides any problems.' 
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practitioners, that Questions C.6 and C.6.1 were put to respondents. The results shown 
in Figure 5.12 show that more than 80% of respondents supported the suggestion that 
some aspects of new directives are more difficult for them to deal with than other 
aspects. The data of Table 5.19 now provides some clarification as to which aspects of 
directives are seen as problematical. It can be seen that no one aspect has emerged as 
clearly the most difficult aspect to deal with. 
Figure 5.12 Response to requests for opinion of the statement 'Some aspects of 
EC internal market new approach technical harmonization directives are more 
difficult to deal with than others.' 
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What is pointed to, by the comments relating to identification of those parts of the 
essential requirements that apply to any given product, is the value of standards in 
general and to the sub-set of harmonised standards. Harmonised product standards have 
the particular benefit of including within them informative annexes showing the links 
between the clauses of the standard and the appropriate parts of applicable directives. A 
difficulty that arises is that work on harmonised standards only begins following a 
mandate from the Commission to the appropriate European standardisation body and 
this mandate is not generated until after directives are formally adopted. The time taken 
to prepare standards in response to Commission mandates often means that published 
standards do not exist until well after the time that the application of a directive 
becomes mandatory. 
The problems associated with the transition period following the adoption of a directive 
generally fall into either of two categories. In any given Member State there is a need 
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Table 5.19 Summary of comments made by respondents when asked to identify 
the difficult aspects of directives 
Number of Comment 
Responses 
11 Essential requirements - understanding application to 
specific products 
9 Transition - what rules apply when in period before 
directive becomes mandatory 
8 Conformity assessment for any given product 
8 Generally difficult to understand 
for clarity in the definition of the requirements of the new regime including when the 
new regime may be invoked by a manufacturer and when it becomes mandatory for 
manufacturers. There is no synchronisation between Member States on transition 
arrangements and as a result confusion across the internal market can exist about what is 
acceptable. The lack of synchronisation in transposition is exacerbated by the effects of 
the transposition deficit already discussed in some detail in Section 3.2.1 
The comments of the last two rows of Table 5.19 may be, to some extent at least, 
related. If practitioners are unable to fully understand the entirety of a directive then 
they may experience difficulty in determining where their products fit in the overall 
scheme of the directive and thus not be able to clearly identifY the necessary conformity 
assessment procedures. Given that there may be difficulties in the general 
understanding of directives then the level of help available to practitioners may become 
an issue. One other comment was made by 10 respondents. This comment is not really 
one of the aspects of the directive itself and so is not included in Table 5.20, instead it is 
related to the interpretation of the requirements of directives by officials. This concern 
was expressed in terms of differences of interpretation between Member States and also 
in the lack of clarity in replies when questions were asked of officials in the UK. 
This would suggest that the data of Table 5.19 divides into two distinct categories. The 
first category contains essentially manufacturers' problems. Initially their problems are 
concerned with identifYing the various hazards that their product poses and then in 
marrying up these identified hazards with the requirements of the appropriate directives. 
For existing classes of products harmonised standards may be of benefit to 
manufacturers. For iml0vative manufacturers, leaders in their sectors of manufacturing, 
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any difficulty in identifying the hazards of their product and dealing with them to meet 
the objectives of the essential requirements of directives is part ofthe price of market 
leadership. This first category also includes conformity assessment because it is 
primarily the manufacturer who makes the decisions on hazards and then the 
appropriate conformity assessment regime to deal with the identified hazards. There 
may be subsequent problems with other groups of internal market practitioners if 
manufacturers do not adequately make their case for the actions that they have taken. 
Adequately trained practitioners, in all internal market practitioner roles, would assist in 
minimising these problems. 
The second category of data identified in Table 5.19, covering transition and general 
understanding, is really beyond the control of practitioners. The solutions here depend 
on the Member States abiding by the rules of the internal market and for the European 
Community and Member State drafters of legislation to provide clarity in their texts. 
The data of Figure 5.13 strongly suggests that the views expressed by respondents are 
valid for several directives, i.e it is not a view generated by experience of one directive 
only. The results in Figure 5.14, which relate to opinions about relative simplicity of 
technical legislation, are of some concern. These results cannot be interpreted to 
suggest that the consensus view is that more recent directives are simpler than earlier 
directives. A legitimate alternative interpretation is that no significant simplification of 
directives has been noticed by internal market practitioners, this despite the introduction 
of SLIM (Commission, 1996). 
Figure 5.13 Response to the question 'In your experience are the difficult aspects 
that you have just described similar from one directive to another directive?' 
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Figure 5.14 Response to requests for opinion of the statement 'More recent EC 
internal market technical legislation is simpler than earlier EC internal market 
technical legislation. ' 
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A result of the use of directives for the establishment of the EC internal market is the 
expectation that transposed national laws in each of the Member States, based on each 
internal market directive, are the rules to which internal market practitioners work. An 
intention was to assess the extent to which practitioners had a need to see the transposed 
national law in Member States other than their own Member State. Unfortunately the 
lead question, Question C.9 of the Structured Interview, contained an ambiguity that 
was not detected at the pilot stage. This ambiguity has given rise to questionable data 
from which no sustainable findings can be drawn. 
5.2.1.4 Understanding of harmonised standards (Part 0 of Structured 
Interview) 
The primary purpose of this part of the Structured Interview was to make an assessment 
of respondents' knowledge ofharmonised standards, their significance and the process 
by which they are generated. This primary purpose was achieved via Questions D.2 -
D.5, the remainder of the questions within this part provide some context for the 
primary responses with the first questions gauging the respondents' views on the value 
of standards in general. Figure 5.15 shows that 31 respondents, greater than 75%, agree 
that all relevant standards have value and from Figure 5.16 it can be seen that 37 
respondents, greater than 90%, agree that European standards are of value in relation to 
New Approach technical harmonisation directives. Twenty five respondents, 62.5%, 
claim to 'often' or 'always' use available harmonised standards and 27 respondents, 
67.5%, claim to 'often' or 'always' respond to draft standards available for public 
comment. 
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Figure 5.15 Distribution of responses to the request for opinion of the statement 
'All relevant standards are of value.' 
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Figure 5.16 Distribution of responses to the request for opinion of the statement 
'European standards are of value in relation to internal market new approach 
technical harmonisation directives.' 
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These initial results suggest that respondents have a reasonable level of contact, either 
directly or indirectly, with standards bodies and via this contact may have become 
familiar with much of the overall standards making process. 
The results shown in Figures 5.15 and 5.16 also suggest that there is general suppOli for 
relevant standards, particularly European standards. This general support for standards 
is consistent with the findings from Part C of the Structured Interview where problems 
with understanding the application of essential requirements of directives to specific 
products were identified. 
Standards of great value, to manufacturers in particular, in the context of the EC internal 
market, are 'harmonised standards' as a result of the 'presumption of conformity' that 
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compliance with harmonised standards, or pmis of harmonised standards, bestows on 
products. The results in Figure 5.17 suggest that 36 respondents, 90%, claim either 
partial or full knowledge of the special status of harmonised standards. The claims of 
knowledge were then tested, via Structured Interview Questions D.2 and D.2.1, with the 
results of these tests being presented in Tables 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22 
Figure 5.17 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of the 
special status of 'harmonised standards' 
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Table 5.20 Assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming full knowledge of 
the special status of harmonised standards 
Number of Validity of claim to full knowledge I 
Respondents 
8 Correctly identified presumption of conformity 
3 Failed to identify presumption of conformity 
11 TOTAL in this category 
Table 5.21 Assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming partial knowledge of 
the special status of harmonised standards 
Number of Validity of claim to partial knowledge 
Respondents 
9 Correctly identified presumption of conformity 
10 Correct as far as they went but did not identify 
presumption of conformity 
6 Made incorrect statements 
25 TOTAL in this category 
Table 5.22 Aggregate assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming full or 
partial knowledge of the special status of harmonised standards 
Number of Independent assessment of respondents' self-
Respondents assessment 
17 Correctly identified the presumption of conformity 
10 Claimed and demonstrated partial knowledge 
9 Over assessed their own knowledge 
36 TOTAL 
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Earlier findings suggest that problems with understanding the application of essential 
requirements of directives to specific products exist. General support was expressed for 
standards and European standards. From the data of Table 5.22, it can be seen that only 
17 respondents, 42.5%, correctly identified that harmonised standards provided 
presumption of conformity for products to directives. 
Fmiher investigation of respondents' knowledge of the process by which harmonised 
standards are prepared was undertaken. A respondent's self-assessment of which 
standards bodies are authorised to prepare harmonised standards was first requested, 
Question D.3 This was then followed by a test that involved a request for identification 
of the appropriate standards bodies, Question D.4. The data obtained is presented in 
Figures 5.18 and 5.19 and tends to confirm respondents' self over assessment of 
knowledge identified earlier. Table 5.23 allows assessment of the data in a rather 
different manner and shows that ETSI, the telecommunications standards body, is less 
well known that Cenelec, the electrical standards body and CEN the standards body for 
non-electrical standards. 
Figure 5.18 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of which 
standards bodies are authorised to prepare harmonised standards 
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The final strand of the assessment of knowledge related to harmonised standards looked 
at process knowledge, first by asking about how the European standards bodies are 
authorised to prepare candidate harmonised standards and then of the overall process for 
standards to become harmonised standards, Questions D.5.1 and D.1 0.1. This data is 
Figure 5.19 Distribution of number of correctly identified standards bodies for 
those respondents claiming more than 'Complete Ignorance' of which standards 
bodies are authorised to prepare harmonised standards 
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Table 5.23 The number of times each of the standards bodies who may prepare 
harmonised standards was identified 
Number of Name of Standards Body 
Respondents 
26 CEN 
22 CENELEC 
7 ETSI 
presented in Figure 5.20 and 5.21 and in Tables 5.24 and 5.25 Only 13 respondents, 
32.5%, were able to correctly identify the source of authority for the production of 
harmonised standards and only 9 respondents, 22.5%, were able to identify the basic 
process steps in the production of harmonised standards. 
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Figure 5.20 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of how the 
standards bodies authorised to prepare harmonised standards obtain this 
authority 
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Table 5.24 Assessment of lillowledge of respondents claiming full or partial 
lillowledge of how the standards bodies authorised to prepare harmonised 
standards obtain their authority to do the work 
Number of Independent assessment of respondents' self-
Respondents assessment 
13 Correctly identified the source of authority 
10 Claimed and demonstrated partial knowledge 
1 Over assessed their own knowledge 
24 TOTAL 
---
Figure 5. 21 Distribution of responses to request to rate own knowledge of the 
process by which a standard can attain the special status of harmonised standard 
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Table 5.25 Aggregate assessment of knowledge of respondents claiming full or 
partial knowledge of the process by which a European standard can attain the 
special status of harmonised standard 
Number of Independent assessment of respondents' self-
Respondents assessment 
9 Correctly identified the process steps 
11 Claimed and demonstrated partial knowledge 
6 Over assessed their own knowledge 
26 ,TOTAL ~ -~ ---~ 
---
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The open question, D.11, at the end of Part D, allowed for respondents to put forward 
other views on harmonised standards not already covered. Four respondents each made 
a significant comment: 
i) There is a need to stress that whilst harmonised standards are one way of 
demonstrating compliance with directives they are not, in general, the only way to 
demonstrate compliance although special rules do apply for the Electromagnetic 
Compatibility Directive3 and for the Construction Products Directive4. 
ii) There is a need for easily accessible published process flowcharts. 
(Discussed in Section 3.3.1) 
iii) Difficulty in determining which standards are harmonised standards. 
(This data is available via: 
v{ww.europa.eu.int/col11l11/enterprise/newapproach/standardization/harl11stds/reflist.htl11! ) 
iv) Not all harmonised standards are sufficiently convincing to demonstrate compliance 
- this was an enforcer's view that fundamentally challenges the 'presumption of 
conformity' provided by compliance with a harmonised standard. 
The view expressed in iv) above is of course a legitimately held and expressed view. 
The standards making process, via national and European standards bodies, is a 
transparent process that is open to all and is subject to a number of 'quality' checks. 
3 Council directive of 3 May 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
electromagnetic compatibility (89!336!EEC), OJ 1989 L 13911 9-22 
4 Council directive of 21 December 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to construction products (891106!EEC), OJ 1989 L 40112-26 
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That an individual enforcement officer felt strongly enough about this perceived 
deficiency, in some standards, to make this comment helps to understand how it is that 
there is a perception that the enforcement regime shows variation, Figure 5.9 
The questions that provided the data within this section have not provided, indeed were 
not intended to provide, complete and detailed information on the knowledge of 
respondents relating to harmonised standards. Nevertheless the data does suggest that, 
despite widespread recognition for the role that standards can play in supporting EC 
internal market directives, the general level of knowledge of the status of harmonised 
standards and of the standards making process is not high. Without a good 
understanding of the benefits of standardisation, together with a good knowledge of the 
process of standardisation, then engagement with the process to maximise the benefits 
of the process output, standards and harmonised standards, is likely to be impaired. 
5.2.1.5 Suggestions for improvements to the process (Part E of Structured 
Interview) 
This section of the Structured Interview was included in an effort to encourage 
respondents to make a positive contribution for change for the better. Thiliy one 
respondents, 77.5%, indicated that they had suggestions for improvement to the process. 
From these 31 respondents 47 comments were received. The seven most frequent 
responses, covering 40 of the responses, are listed in Table 5.26 
The remaining seven comments were each made by only one respondent. With the 
exception of one comment, suggesting that all existing internal market legislation 
should be repealed and done again and better, the comments were somewhat petulant 
responses to what had clearly been isolated problems rather than offering genuine 
system improvements. 
The first item in Table 5.26 provides some confirmation of the earlier finding that 
practitioners are not well informed about the overall internal market legislative process. 
The only official high level process information currently available is that provided in 
the treaties and this information has already been shown to lack determinism. 
Unofficial sources of process information, provided by other commentators, should be 
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viewed with caution since they are at best an interpretation that has no legal standing 
and for which no one can be held to account. The views expressed by respondents 
about the need for written guidance on the process reinforces the finding, Section 3.5.2, 
that the EC internal market technical legislative process would benefit from being 
within an accredited quality management system so that it is both deterministic and 
enforced. 
The second item in Table 5.26 may be considered to be related to the first item in that if 
there was a well defined and operated process then the need for early, wide ranging, 
consultation could be made a mandatory requirement. This view expressed by internal 
market practitioners, together with the suggestion in the third item of Table 5.26, 'that 
there should be better access to and dissemination of information at all stages of the 
process. ' is entirely consistent with Proposal 8 of the Molitor Report (1995) 
Table 5.26 Responses to a request to suggest process improvements 
Number of Suggestion for improvement 
Respondents 
11 Written guidance on the process should be available 
8 The drafters of legislative change proposals should 
encourage an early input from all interested pmiies 
7 There should be better access to and dissemination of 
information at all stages in the process 
4 Ways to speed up the process should be found 
4 Objectives of the proposed legislation should be clearer 
3 Formal training in the process should be available for all, 
pmiicularly the drafters 
3 The number of languages used should be reduced -
would help to speed up the process 
discussed in Section 3.3.1 The data of Table 5.26 was obtained from respondents 
before they were asked the following question (E.2) 'What would your opinion be if all 
users of EC internal market technical legislation (Enforcers, manufacturers, consumer 
groups etc.) were to be given active roles in the technical legislative change process?' 
Thirty three respondents, 82.5%, supported or strongly supported the notion of such 
involvement, a finding corroborating the view expressed in response to the more open 
question. 
It would be unreasonable for the Commission, as legislation drafters, to be expected to 
consult directly with all potentially interested individuals. Thus some form of tiered 
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consultation becomes necessary. Such tiered consultations already take place, via 
Member States with their industry at large and at the same time via European employers 
and trade associations. This author's professional experience suggests that there are two 
major drawbacks to the tiered consultation routes as described. First, at the very early 
stages the consultation tends not to go right the way through the chain and is dealt with 
at the entry points into the Member States and European organisations. The effect is 
that practitioners in general fail to get to know that a particular proposal is being worked 
on and their views are not sought. The second problem, occuning later in the process 
when the entire consultation chain is exercised, is the loss of clarity in, and dilution of, 
the input as it goes back up through the chain. Associated with the dilution of input is 
the added problem that it is now later in the process so that significant change in 
response to external inputs has become less likely. 
The third item in Table 5.26 is, to a certain extent, a reflection on respondents' own 
failure to access existing, open, databases. The European Union Pre-Lex database, 
accessible via www.europa.eu.int, is an excellent source of information on legislative 
proposals as they move forward. The drawback of Pre-Lex is that it does not contain 
data on any early, informal drafts within the Commission, it only starts with an official 
draft and access to the database is much easier when an official document number is 
identified. It is of course a 'pull' system so that practitioners wanting to track progress 
on any given proposal have to either access the system themselves, and on many 
occasions expect to find no change in status. Alternatively they may rely on a trade 
association or other organisation to perform this task for them and for the trade 
association to repOli on change. 
The remaining topics identified in Table 5.26 will not be discussed in detail here except 
to note that the desire to speed up the process is not entirely compatible with extensive 
early consultation. 
Within Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.2.3 and 3.3, attention was drawn to the possibility of 
using regulations rather than directives for internal market legislation. Question E.3 
asked respondents if they understood the difference between EC directives and EC 
regulations. Only 16 respondents, 40%, claimed to understand the difference, and when 
tested only 12 demonstrated conect knowledge of the difference. Of the 12 
respondents who had demonstrated conect knowledge of the difference between EC 
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directives and EC regulations 8 respondents, 75%, agreed or strongly agreed that the EC 
internal market would be achieved more completely if the technical harmonisation was 
in the form of EC regulations rather than EC directives. 
The finding that, of internal market practitioners who understand the difference between 
EC directives and EC regulations, 75% agree with the proposition that the EC internal 
market would be achieved more completely if the technical harmonisation was in the 
form of EC regulations rather than EC directives could be seen as a serious indictment 
of the process choice made and embodied within the treaties. Debate on the appropriate 
legislative mechanism for the internal market has already been held by the Economic 
and Social Committee but no changes have been made up to and including those 
changes introduced by the Treaty ofNice5. Future Inter-Governmental Conferences set 
up to review the treaties may find it necessary to deal with this issue since enlargement, 
with the present internal market legislative framework of directives, can only lead in the 
direction of more, rather than less, diversity in transposed legislation - counter 
productive to a true internal market. 
It is recognised within this research that simply suggesting that EC internal market 
directives should be replaced by regulations risks insufficient attention being paid to 
some important issues that would have to be addressed if such a change were 
contemplated. Among the important issues to consider would be the process to be used 
for making the internal market regulations and how the Member States could continue 
to exercise their prerogatives for enforcement methods and penalties for infringements. 
The final question in Part E provided respondents with an opportunity to offer 
suggestions as to how enforcement information on EC internal market directives could 
be made more generally available. Twenty nine respondents, almost 75%, availed 
themselves of the opportunity to offer suggestions, those suggestions put forward are 
summarised in Table 5.28 
At present EC internal market directives, for example the Explosive Atmospheres 
5 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [Treaty of Nice], OJ 2001 C 80/1-87 
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directive6 and the Machinery directive7, require copies of the transpositions of directives 
to be submitted to the Commission. This author's professional experiences of obtaining 
copies of transpositions of directives from the Commission have not proved successful. 
It is almost as though the Commission sees such information only as input data for 
transposition tracking and statistics, not as information that may be made available for 
dissemination to enquirers. 
Table 5.27 Responses to a request to suggest ways to improve availability of 
enforcement information 
--_._.-
Number of Suggestion for improvement to availability of 
Respondents enforcement information 
17 Use a website, or internet, to access the information 
10 Use of a centralised administration point, but no 
mention was made of the internet for access 
1 Use an intranet for enforcers only 
1 Use Newsletters as BSI do 
Each of the first two entries of Table 5.27 are, in effect, suggesting the establishment of 
a central collection point and differ only in the means of subsequent access to this data. 
With the technology, such as the Europa website, already available to the Commission, 
the means, but perhaps not the will, exists to provide an accessible database of 
transposed directives. At present there are no requirements in directives for Member 
States to provide to the Commission the text of transposed directives in any language(s) 
other than each Member State's own officiallanguage(s). This highlights again the 
ongoing problem of official languages and overall language diversity within the 
European Union. 
Of the last two entries in Table 5.27 the first suggests a disturbing, parochial, view of an 
enforcer and the final entry again suggests confusion between legislation and standards 
- BSI's 'push' system of dissemination only works because it can identify its whole 
target base. 
6 Directive 94/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in 
potentially explosive atmospheres[ATEX directive], OJ 1994 L 10011-29 
7 Directive 98/37/EC of the European Parliament and of Council of22 June 1998 on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to machinery, OJ 1998 L 20711-46 
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5.2.1.6 Structured Interview times 
The target interview time was 60 minutes. Figure 5.22 shows the distribution of actual 
interview times, rounded up to the nearest five minutes. From Figure 5.22 in can be 
determined that the Mean and Median interview times were 65 and 70 minutes 
respectively. Even though the target time was exceeded on 22 occasions (55%) this did 
not appear to cause any undue problems to the respondents beyond the two for whom 
the interview was terminated at the end of Section E. 
Figure 5.22 Distribution of actual Structured Interview times 
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5.2.2 TESTS OF THE SYSTEM 
The most significant of the system tests was that made via the European Ombudsman. 
Appendix V contains a summary of the case as provided in the European Ombudsman's 
decision letter. This test shows that, provided that the European Ombudsman's well-
defined, easily accessible straightforward conditions and rules are adhered to, an 
individual citizen can have a complaint of maladministration against a European Union 
institution investigated by the European Ombudsman. In this instance the complaint 
was against the Commission whose response to the European Ombudsman was both 
undated and un-attributed. Given that the European Ombudsman contacted the 
Commission President it was reasonable to infer that the reply was with the 
Commission President's authority, such a response by the Commission suggests a 
measure of disregard not just for a private citizen but also for the office of the European 
Ombudsman. This straightforward case took twelve months to be resolved, suggesting 
that appeals to the European Ombudsman cannot be used as a corrective measure, as 
part of the real time process, if EC institutions are thought to be guilty of 
maladministration during the internal market technical legislative process. 
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The author's original complaint was upheld and the European Ombudsman issued a 
'critical remark'. No one was held to account and there was no specific requirement 
imposed upon the Commission for corrective action to be taken, the case was closed. A 
systems failure had been identified but those with authority and who could do 
something positive to improve the situation failed to demonstrate an interest in system 
improvement. An accredited ISO 9001 (ISO, 2000) quality management system 
embracing the Commission would have required, via Clauses 7.2.1 and 8.1, account to 
be taken of the European Ombudsman's comments. There is now some prospect that 
system improvements may accrue from the European Ombudsman's investigations. In 
his repmi for the year 2001 the European Ombudsman (2002), states that from the 
beginning of 2002 he would start to follow up on critical remarks issued to any 
institution. This proposed action has been endorsed by the European Parliament 
(European Parliament, 2002). 
Possible improvement in the way the overall system operates derives from the existence 
of the 'EU Code of Good Administrative Behaviour' (European Ombudsman, 2000). 
This code was adopted by the European Parliament (EP, 2002) for its own use, and at 
the same time called upon the European Ombudsman to apply it. 
Article 1928 bestows upon the European Parliament power to call on the Commission to 
propose a new law. An email enquiry was sent to the European Parliament's office in 
London in an attempt to determine if the Commission had agreed to act in the particular 
case of the European Parliament's request related to the 'EU Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour'. The reply from Furmess, a parliamentary librarian, stated: 
'It [The Commission] had not done so in this instance. ' Such a failure to act by the 
Commission suggests that the EC inter-institutional balance of power remains with the 
Commission. At face value Aliicle 192 (op. cit.) appears to give powers to the 
European Parliament to require action by the Commission. For ease of reference the 
relevant extract of Aliicle 192 is provided: 
8 N.1 above 
Article 192 (Extract) 
The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its Members, request 
the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters which it 
considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing 
this Treaty. 
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There appears to be no obligation on the Commission to act positively, and to draw up a 
proposal as requested. The Commission is free to refuse to act, thereby maintaining 
tight control of the process. 
In the 'Foreword' to his annual report for 2002 the European Ombudsman (2003) noted 
that of approximately 11000 complaints so far received by the European Ombudsman, 
since the office of European Ombudsman was established in 1995, only 3300 fell within 
its mandate. From the 3300 cases investigated only something in excess of 200 
investigations have given rise to the issue of 'critical remarks'. The Foreword continues 
{ ... one must remember that every case has a preventative effect, paving the way for a 
better procedure ... ' In the annual report for 2002 the European Ombudsman (op. cit.) 
has not identified any results of follow up actions to critical remarks he has issued. It is 
too early to make any assessment as to whether faith in { .. . paving the way for a better 
procedure ... ' is justified. Similarly no repOlis on follow up actions to critical remarks 
are to be found in the European Ombudsman's report for the year 2003 (European 
Ombudsman, 2004). The reason(s) for the failure to include repOlis on follow up 
actions is as yet unclear. On the assumption that success with follow up actions would 
have been repOlied it is, at least tentatively, concluded that an initiative with such 
promise has foundered. 
Other tests of the system made during the period of this research included 36 requests to 
various EC institutions. The majority of these requests were uncontroversial. The main 
exception being a request for clarification of language provision, discussed in Section 
2.2.4 At the commencement of the research a somewhat arbitrary decision was made 
to consider that any request to a European Community institution that failed to receive 
some form of acknowledgement within three months of the request being made would 
be considered as a failure by that institution. Of the 36 requests made only 15 (41 %) 
received satisfactory replies, 4 (11 %) received replies that were essentially irrelevant to 
the question posed and the remaining 17 (42%) failed to elicit any form of 
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acknowledgement from the institution. Overall these results do not suggest a European 
Community institutional infrastructure content to deal directly with citizens of the 
European Union. 
5.2.3 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
The individuals present in the forums described in Section 4.3.3 can, for the purposes of 
this research, be divided into two basic categories; those with a purely industrial interest 
and those with some form of legislative authority at either national government or 
European Community level. 
For those individuals with the industrial interest, this included non-UK nationals, the 
findings of their knowledge and perception of the internal market were in broad 
agreement with the fieldwork findings repOlied in Section 5.2.2 Knowledge of the 
European Community institutions involved in the internal market technical legislative 
process was at best uncertain as was their knowledge of the interactions between these 
institutions. These individuals experienced difficulty in identifying what actions could, 
and perhaps should, be taken to maximise the contribution from their input to the 
system. It was often possible to detect a laissez-faire attitude based on low expectations 
of ability to change, or make a contribution to change of, any part of the legislative 
proposals. The low expectations appeared, in part at least, to be related to a perception 
that the internal market, as it then stood, had made little difference - manufactured 
products were still being customised for some of the European Community Member 
States to meet the requirements of local regulations. This general attitude from industry 
is consistent with a statement made by the Commission (2002b) that: 'Almost one in five 
of Swedish companies encounter barriers to trade. 85% choose to get round the 
problems by modifYing their products to comply with the rules in the receiving country. ' 
It is possible that the lack of detailed knowledge of the internal market inhibits 
manufacturers from challenging the local requirements that can cause distortions of the 
European Community internal market. 
For those individuals with legislative authority it was rather more difficult to formulate 
judgements about knowledge and perception of the internal market and its process. The 
overriding, but not universal, impression gained was that as legislators they worked on 
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the basis that they had a free hand to impose their conditions on the situation. There 
was at best reluctance to recognise the existence and authority of a framework of 
secondary legislation9,lo that determines how European Community internal market 
secondary legislation should be formulated. Some of this group were openly 
antagonistic towards the principles of the new approach to technical harmonization 
being applied in the field of legal metrology. The defence put forward was that legal 
metrology was somehow different, the general philosophy of the new approach should 
not, indeed could not, apply. When such views were challenged, for professional 
reasons, by requesting an audit trail to the exclusion of legal metrology from the 
Council Resolution on the New Approach to technical harmonisationll there were no 
reasoned responses. Under the circumstances it was not possible to make sustainable 
judgements on the level of knowledge of the overall process or perception of the 
completeness of the internal market. A significant number of those with legislative 
authority appeared to look forward to the adoption of the Measuring Instruments 
Directive l2 as a means of unifying control, rather than as a means of enhancing trade 
between Member States, one of the objectives of the internal market. 
Unifying legal metrological control is of course a legitimate aim but New Approach 
internal market directives using Article 95 13 as their legal basis have as their purpose 
harmonisation of the rules for 'placing on the market'. An internal market directive is 
an inappropriate vehicle for 'in use' controls even if the subject equipment itself is 
under legal metrological control. Support for the inclusion of inappropriate controls 
within Article 95 (op. cit.) directives provides some evidence of lack of appreciation of, 
or disregard for, the rules governing EC internal market technical legislation. 
5.3 Findings in relation to research aim 
Within this Section explanations and/or links will be provided for each of the supporting 
objectives of the aim of the research, set out in full in Section 1.3.1 
9 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards, OJ 
1985 C 13611-9 
10 Council Decision of22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity 
assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity marking, which are 
intended to be used in the technical harmonization directives (93/465/EEC), OJ 1993 L 220/23-39 
II N.9 above 
12 Directive 2004/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of31 March 2004 on measuring 
instruments (Measuring Instruments Directive), OJ 2004 L 135/1-80 
13 N.l above 
Objective 1, Section 1.3.1, was: 'To critically investigate the EC internal market 
technical legislative process. ' This objective has been addressed by supporting 
activities a, b, c, d and e identified in Section 1.3.2. 
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The first supporting activity 'a', Section 1.3.2, was to: 'IdentifY the EU institutions that 
are involved in the drafting of EC internal market technical legislation, and to establish 
the authorities of these institutions, then to identifY any functions in support of the 
technical legislation. Identification of the appropriate European Union institutions 
provides a focus for the remainder of the research. ' This has been achieved in full 
within Chapter 2 'The law making process' and the associated Appendix I 
'Chronological list of European Union and Economic Community major legislative 
events.' The information contained within the identified Chapter and Appendix 
provided the basis against which any process deficiencies, and knowledge deficiencies, 
could be assessed. 
The second supporting activity 'b', Section 1.3.2, was to: 'IdentifY the existing process 
descriptions of the EU institutions involved in the drafting of EC internal market 
technical legislation and of the functions in support of technical legislation '. Chapter 
2, and its associated Appendix I, identify Articles 95, 250 and 251 of the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Communityl\ as the top level process 
description for the generation of European Community internal market technical 
legislation. At the next level down in the hierarchy there exists a set of Rules of 
Procedures for the EC institutions, for those EC institutions involved in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process. These Rules of Procedure are summarised in Table 
3.2, from there it can be seen that these Rules of Procedure are publicly available via 
websites. It was found, via the Commission Rules of Procedure, that the information 
that is likely to be of greatest value to internal market practitioners is only to be annexed 
to their Rules (Aliicle 25). No links to these expected Annexes have been found and 
for practical purposes they are not in the domain of internal market practitioners this 
of course is based on the premise that they have in fact been produced. 
Also in existence are a number of other documents intended to determine a set of 
working rules for the preparation of EC internal market technical legislation. These 
14 N.l above 
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documents include a Council Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonization 
and standards l5 , the Modules Decision16 concerning the modules for the various phases 
of the conformity assessment procedures that are intended to be used in the technical 
harmonization directives and a Council Resolution17 on the quality of drafting of 
Community legislation. These documents are clearly in the public domain. 
The third supporting activity 'c', Section 1.3.2, was to: 'IdentifY the routes by which the 
groups most directly affected by any Ee internal market technical legislation (Member 
State governments, mamifacturing industry and Member State enforcement agencies) 
may intel/ace with the institutions and functions identified in supporting activities a & 
b '. Within the overall structure of the European Union, and for the European 
Community internal market in particular, the Commission is the institution that initiates 
legislative change. However, no specific mechanism for determining in which part of 
the legislative framework the next legislative change will take place has been identified. 
Field intelligence relating to the EC internal market is clearly available to the 
Commission from its various contacts with Member State officials and other 
organisations. If, and when, this field intelligence provides sufficient pressure for 
action to be taken by the Commission it is they who, acting under the powers bestowed 
upon them by Article 211 18, prepare draft legislation. This draft legislation should then 
be subjected to the processes defined in Articles 95, 250 and 251 (op. cit.). The 
progress of legislative proposals through the major steps of the process are available for 
public inspection via the Pre-Lex website. Evidence has been provided in Chapter 3 
that the process steps and their associated timescales are not necessarily taken by the 
various European Union institutions to be binding on them. 
Further evidence of a lack of adherence to timescales determined within the Treaty (op. 
cit.) is available in regard to the second reading of the draft Measuring Instruments 
Directive (Commission, 2000). Receipt of 'Common Position' was recorded by the 
European Parliament on 4 September 2003 and according to the provisions of Article 
251(2)19 there is then a three month period for the European Parliament to respond. 
15 N.9 above 
16 N.lO above 
17 Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community legislation, OJ 1993 C 
16611 
18 N.l above 
19 N.l above 
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Failure to respond within the three month period is deemed to represent European 
Parliament acceptance of the common position. In my professional capacity this author 
had been invited to attend a second reading hearing on the MID to be chaired by the 
rapporteur of the European Parliament Committee on Industry, External Trade, 
Research and Energy at the European Parliament in Brussels. The rapporteur had 
already made it clear that the European Parliament will be submitting fmiher proposed 
amendments on the MID common position to the Council and to the Commission, these 
amendments were scheduled to be submitted 18th December 2003 - beyond the three 
month deadline set within Aliicle 251 (2) but within the one month extension to this 
period allowed by Aliicle 251 (7). 
Non-judicial functions in support ofEC internal market technical legislation exist in 
two modes. The first of these two modes is at the Member State level, where there 
exists a requirement that the European Community internal market technical legislation 
be transposed into national laws, both accurately and within defined time constraints. 
The publication of the European Community internal market law, in the form of 
directives by the Official Journal of the European Union, acts as the formal interface 
between the European Community and the individual Member States to initiate the 
individual transposition processes. Article 249 (op. cit.) includes the following extract 
that defines a directive in the following terms: 'A directive shall be binding, as to the 
result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave 
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.' Given the preceding 
definition there can be no precise interface between the European Community as an 
entity and the constituent Member States about the process of transposition other than 
the requirement that it be performed in an accurate and timely manner. Section 3.5.2 
discusses in some detail failures of the transposition process. 
The second mode of non-judicial function in support of EC internal market technical 
legislation is in the provision of suppOliing standards. There are in existence European 
standards bodies, bodies that are not part of the infrastructure of the European Union 
but, nevertheless, work closely with the European Union. These standards bodies 
prepare and publish standards covering a wide range of activities. Directive 98/34/EC2o 
makes a general provision for specified European standards bodies, CEN, CENELEC 
20 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, OJ 1998 L 
204/37-48 
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and ETSI, to prepare and publish standards specifically in support of EC internal market 
technical legislation. This work is initiated when specific mandates from the 
Commission are received and subsequently accepted by the relevant European standards 
body. After acceptance of a mandate then work to prepare standards proceeds 
according to the normal processes and procedures of the European standards body. 
There is, however, an additional intervention by a 'Consultant'. For any given standard 
this consultant acts on behalf of the Commission to ensure that the quality of the 
standard is sufficiently high so that the Commission may deem that compliance with the 
standard calTies with it a 'presumption of conformity' with the relevant parts of 
directives. Standards meeting the necessary quality and accepted by this procedure are 
refelTed to as 'harmonised standards' and obtain this important status when references 
to the standards are published in the Official Journal. Access to lists ofharmonised 
standards for both legislators and internal market practitioners are available from: 
http:// europa. eu.intl comml enterprise/newapproachl standardization/harmstds/reflist.html 
The ability of internal market practitioners to affect the overall EC internal market 
legislative process is very much a function of which specific group within the overall 
group of internal market practitioners they belong. The earlier in any overall process 
that views are expressed, and justified, the more likely it is that they will be acted upon. 
In the context of change in EC internal market legislation the very early pati of the 
process appears to be essentially internal to the Commission, but with external contacts 
to individuals and organisations that the Commission already has knowledge of and 
familiarity with. Member State views are therefore likely to be heard early in the 
process. Some other organisations with permanent representatives, either their own 
staff or some professional lobbying group, based in Brussels may also become aware of 
the commencement of the legislative process. This may provide these organisations 
with an 0ppOliunity to make early input into the process. For other EC internal market 
practitioners, unable to suppOli any direct permanent representation in Brussels, their 
initial knowledge of proposals for change may come too late to allow them to have any 
significant effect on the outcome of the process. It is of course easy to be critical on 
behalf of internal market practitioners about this part of the process but the solution( s) 
to the problem of access and influence are not simple. 
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In effect there are at present two routes to involve internal market practitioners in the 
legislative process, Part E of the fieldwork indicated that 82.5% of internal market 
practitioners would support or strongly support active participation in the process. The 
first of these routes is via Member State governments, but here there are immediate 
questions about how Member State governments can interface with the whole of 
industry. For well financed, and/or well recognised, established sectors of industry, the 
interface to national government can be a well managed process. However for less well 
financed sectors of industry, possibly start up technologies, the process is less well 
managed and exclusions, which may appear to be deliberate, can occur. Similar 
difficulties can be seen to arise when the second route, via trade associations rather than 
Member State governments, is examined. Not all companies are members of trade 
associations, and even within the UK not all trade associations are affiliated to European 
groupings that are recognised by the Commission as potential consultees. 
As companies are born, change strategic direction and even go out of existence, it is not 
reasonable to expect the Commission, Member State governments or European based 
trade organisations to be aware of the needs of the multitude of companies that exist. 
Any inability of the Commission, or any other organisation to track all of the legislative 
needs of the companies, or other groups of internal market practitioners, should not 
automatically be seen as a failure by the Commission. Even if the Commission was 
aware of each and every company or other group of internal market practitioners and 
distributed enquiries to determine their areas of legislative interest the response rate to 
such enquiries is likely to be substantially less than 100%. An important finding of this 
research is its failure to identify any mechanism that allows easy public access to some 
form of directory of aU legislative proposals that are at an embryo stage. Even if such a 
directory existed it would of course be of limited value unless its presence could be 
made very widely known, this would be true even if the data was made available on a 
reliable website. 
Involvement of internal market practitioners in the legislative process after the very 
early stages becomes more of an option for them as a result of the tracking available via 
Pre-Lex. However the ability to use the available information and to feed constructive 
comments into the overall process is clearly limited by the lack of process knowledge 
demonstrated by internal market practitioners, reported in Section 5.2.1.2 
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The fOUlih suppOliing activity 'd', Section 1.3.2, in support of objective 1, was to: 
'Where practical, apply tests to the Ee internal market technical legislative process to 
determine if the actual process follows its description and if the process is accessible to 
those outside of the EU institutions.' This activity was successfully fulfilled and is 
reported in Sections 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.3 
Objective 2 of Section 1.3.1: 'To investigate the knowledge and perceptions of the 
internal market held by Ee internal market practitioners. ' has been achieved by the 
fieldwork via the application of a Structured Interview to a sample of the UK population 
of EC internal market practitioners and the data is presented in Sections 5.2.1.2 and 
5.2.1.3 
Objective 3 of Section 1.3.1 was: 'To investigate the role of European harmonised 
standards in the application of Ee internal market technical legislation.' Section 
5.2.3.4 summarises the extent to which internal market practitioners understand and 
support the concept of publicly available standards in general and harmonised standards 
in particular. The level of understanding of the value of harmonised standards in 
demonstrating conformity with EC internal market directives was considerably less than 
had been anticipated. 
The extent of paliicipation by internal market practitioners in the generation of 
harmonised standards is very much at their option. Directive 98/34/EC (op. cit.) defines 
those processes of CEN, CENELEC and ETSI which may culminate in the existence of 
harmonised standards - these processes being equally open to all groups of internal 
market practitioners. Importantly, within directive 98/34/EC (op. cit.) no enabling 
provisions are made for the use of other processes that might lead to the provision of 
other classes of documents that might have a similar status to that of harmonised 
standards - the legal presumption of conformity of products with directives when the 
requirements of harmonised standards can be shown to have been met. It is of concern 
that various of the EC institutions involved with the drafting ofEC internal market 
technical legislation are circumventing the provisions of directive 98/34/EC (op. cit.). 
The Measuring Instruments Directive21 establishes an alternative route by which a 
presumption of conformity can be achieved. This alternative process will rely on 
documents that, like standards, will be publicly available, but the documents will be 
21 N.12 above 
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established by processes, unlike those for generating standards, that are not open to all 
groups of internal market practitioners. This could be seen as a regression back to the 
methodology for the preparation of common market directives that existed prior to the 
introduction of new approach directives in 198522 . Within this earlier methodology 
only legislators were involved in the preparation of the technical specifications. It is to 
be hoped that the adoption of the MID does not mark the beginning of a regressive trend 
in the establishment of technical specifications in suppOli of EC internal market 
directives. 
The second pati of the aim, Section 1.3.1, was, through suppOliing activities 'b' and 'e' 
of Section 1.3.2: 'To put forward possible improvements to the current process '. The 
first of these supporting activities 'b' identified the existing process thereby enabling an 
assessment of its operation. The second of these supporting activities 'e': Investigate 
methods of improving the processes of the EU institutions involved with the drafting of 
Ee internal market technical legislation 'has been achieved through a study of the 
literature and through fieldwork based on the findings from activity 'b'. 
At almost all stages through this research difficulties were experienced as a result of 
what were considered to be legitimate expectations not being met. These expectations 
related to actions of individuals and/or organisations deviating from defined processes 
or from processes being poorly specified. Various examples have been identified within 
this text but for clarity two of the examples will be re-stated here. For the first example 
it is unclear what should occur when the Commission legitimately exercises its powers 
under Aliicle 25023 , there should be no lack of determinism in this process. The second 
example is the failure of the Commission to perform a simple act of publication within a 
determined timescale, the subject of this author's complaint to the European 
Ombudsman and described in full within Section 5.2.2 Based on these two typical 
examples of process failures it would seem reasonable to assume that what processes do 
exist within the overall European Union organisational machinery are not well 
controlled. 
A case can be made that the European Union processes should all be within a well 
controlled quality management system - a system subject to regular internal and 
22 N.9 above 
23 N.! above 
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external audits. It is recognised that there may be difficulties of accreditation and 
sanctions against the management of the quality system should it fail its audits. Without 
a strong, predictable, management system in place there seems little prospect that the 
potential for the European Community internal market to develop fairly, and to its full 
potential will be realised. It is yet to be seen what effect the enlargement of the 
European Community in 2004 to 25 Member States will have on systems that are 
already not working well. At present it would seem that the European Ombudsman's 
commitment (European Ombudsman, 2003) to follow up criticisms of 
maladministration is the best hope for process improvement. This process is limited in 
that it is only intended to apply to areas where someone has taken the trouble to register 
a formal complaint of maladministration against a European Union institution and has 
had the complaint upheld. The definition of maladministration, as agreed between the 
European Ombudsman and the Commission (European Ombudsman, 2003) is quite 
narrow so even the follow up procedures currently promised by the European 
Ombudsman leaves large sections of the overall European Community processes 
without external audits. The prospect of the European Ombudsman operating in such a 
way approaches Majone's (2000) concept of an agency with authority for rulemaking 
and taking binding decisions as discussed in Section 3.3.1 On the basis that' great oaks 
from little acorns grow' hopes must be kept alive that the European Ombudsman's 
endeavours bear fruit. 
Additionally a variety of oppOliunities to test the overall system of internal market 
legislative change arose during the period of this research and these 0ppOliunities were 
exercised. The information obtained from these tests is reported in Section 5.2.2 
5.4 Summary 
References have been made to the lack of accredited quality management systems in the 
European Community institutions. In an analysis of the need for, or the effectiveness 
of, quality management systems it is first necessary to understand the type of 
organisation under discussion. Private sector organisations, and some specialist 
functions within government, may be required by some external agent to operate within 
an accredited quality management system. This requirement may derive from the 
regulatory environment, as in the case of organisations manufacturing certain products 
to European Community new approach directives. The existence of such a quality 
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management system to fulfil a regulatory need makes the quality management system 
an order qualifier (Hill, 1993) for entry into the market place. Even where regulatory 
needs for a quality management system do not exist potential purchasers may require 
potential suppliers to have an accredited quality management system such that the 
accredited quality management system becomes an order qualifier albeit now as a 
business requirement (Burgess, 2002). 
Many public organisations, including regulators such as: the EC institutions as a system, 
Member State national government and Member State local government, operate in 
non-market environments (Downs, 1965) in which the concept of an accredited quality 
management system as an order qualifier does not exist. Product quality, in this case for 
regulations, is not a process driver because the products, regulations, are not entered 
into a competitive market place. A free market is commonly seen as a method of 
maintaining quality and simultaneously keeping costs down, such an environment is not 
an appropriate model for the regulatory framework of the EC internal market. Without 
the pressure of an accredited quality management system as an order qualifier the EC 
institutions, both individually and as a system, require some other incentive to operate 
within a product quality and quality improvement structure. 
Section 5.3 demonstrates the extent to which the aim ofthis research has been fulfilled 
through its supporting 0 bj ectives. The main' failure of the research is in relation to 
supporting objective 1. No method has been identified by which internal market 
practitioners can acquaint themselves with some form of directory of all legislative 
proposals that are at the very early stages of their development, that is before there are 
documents that appear on the Pre-Lex database. An ability to tap into such a directory 
and enhance opportunities to make an early input into the internal market technical 
legislative process would satisfy some of the criticisms by internal market practitioners 
and would help to improve the overall quality of internal market technical legislation. 
A number of issues within the overall EC internal market technical legislative process 
are identified in Sections 3.5,5.2 and 5.3 and some of these arise in a variety of 
contexts; clarity of text, languages and lack of process control are examples. The 
various views on these issues are drawn together in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
The original impetus for this research arose from, and the current context of this 
research remains, the difficulties perceived by this author, himself an internal market 
practitioner, in dealing with the European Community internal market for goods. On 
the assumption that the concept of an EC internal market is to remain in force it is 
suggested that it is in the interests of the European Community as a whole that the 
internal market develops to its maximum potential as rapidly as possible. It is further 
suggested that the achievement of these objectives requires that the development of its 
necessary legislative framework should take place through the use of well designed and 
controlled processes and to make maximum possible use of all available resources. 
To contribute to the successful development of the internal market this thesis presents a 
critical review of the processes that are currently in place to create the EC internal 
market technical legislative framework. The collection of data by fieldwork has 
enabled an assessment of the knowledge and perceptions of the internal market held by 
internal market practitioners. 
This Chapter sets out the conclusions drawn from the research findings. These 
conclusions are then refined in terms of the research problem and the identification of 
specific weaknesses. Limitations on the conclusions are then discussed prior to the 
delineation of 'Recommendations'. The recommendations are intended to assist an 
improvement in the functioning of the EC internal market technical legislative process 
and of the internal market for goods. The inclusion of recommendations specific to 
internal market practitioners suggests that this research has found that it would not be 
reasonable to lay at the doors of legislators and enforcers all of the responsibility for the 
perceived difficulties. 
The thesis proceeds to set out 'Suggestions for further work' each of which, if 
implemented, would tend to reduce the limitations. The research project is completed 
by a brief summary. 
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6.2 Conclusions from the research findings 
To provide structure to the presentation of the conclusions this Section uses a 'top 
down' approach starting with conclusions about the top-level processes of the treaties, 
the second level of involvement by the EC institutions through to internal market 
practitioners and the trade/professional press. 
6.2.1 TOP LEVEL PROCESSES 
As the first step in developing conclusions from this research it is useful to go back to 
basics and to understand the target for the European Community internal market. The 
CUlTent target for the EC internal market was established by Article 13 of the Single 
European Act (1987)1 that inserted Article 8a into the European Economic Community 
Treaty (1972f The target is re-stated as Article 14 of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (2002)3, for ease of reference Article 14 
is reproduced below in full: 
Article 14 
1. The Community shall adopt measures with the aim ofprogressively 
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 
1992, in accordance with the provisions of this Article and of Articles 15, 
26, 47(2), 49, 80, 93 and 95 and without prejudice to the other provisions 
of this Treaty. 
2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the ji'ee movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured 
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, shall determine the guidelines and conditions necessary to 
ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned. 
From the above it can be seen that Article 14(1) required that the objectives set out in 
Article 14(2) be achieved by 31 December 1992. Any judgement about the completion 
of the internal market can only be made satisfactorily if there is first a clear 
understanding of the end point - how should Article 14(2) be interpreted? In trying to 
answer this question it is instructive to take a wider look at the Treaty (op. cit.) to 
I Single European Act, OJ 1987 L 16911-29 
2 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [Treaty of Rome], HMSO, London (this is 
Cnmd. 4864 that reproduces, in English, the text of the Treaty as originally published in 1957) 
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, OJ 2002 C 325/33-184 
241 
determine if it generally exhibits clarity. Evidence has been presented, in Section 
2.2.4.3 on languages and in Section 3.3.1, with reference to the effect of Article 250 (op. 
cit.), which suggests that the Treaty lacks both clarity and determinism. Further 
evidence on lack of clarity presents itself in the Treaty (op. cit.) in that there are 32 
references to the 'common market' and 18 references to the 'internal market' - are these 
really the same concept within the treaties? Based on the above examples there must be 
some doubt about the interpretation of Article 14(2) (op. cit.) in deciding if the internal 
market is complete. 
The evidence presented in this research suggests that the internal market is not yet 
complete. The Commission (2003) admits to a non-zero and rising transposition deficit 
and the measuring instruments directive, first proposed in 1991 (Commission, 1991), 
and more recently proposed in 2000 (Commission, 2000), has only recently been 
adopted4. The perception of the internal market held by internal market practitioners as 
reported in Section 5.2.3.3 further suggests that the internal market is not yet complete 
and therefore the requirement of Article 14(2)5 remains unfulfilled. More than a decade 
after the planned completion date for the internal market this finding suggests that the 
processes of legislative change have not yet provided an adequate legislative framework 
within which the internal market may function fully. However, this research was 
initiated to provide a critical review of the EC internal market technical legislative 
process and the conclusions from this critical review may help to explain why the 
internal market is seen as not yet complete. 
The reference point for this research has been the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (op. cit.). This research recognises that the 
treaties deal with a number of subject areas, only one of which is the EC internal 
market. Chapter 2, therefore, was focussed on the law making process for the EC 
internal market. This procedure, described in Article 251 and colloquially known as the 
codecision procedure, has been described as of Byzantine complexity (Usher, 1998) yet 
within this complexity it fails to make reference to another Article that directly affects 
the process it describes. Article 250 allows the Commission, under defined 
circumstances, to interrupt the process flow as described by Article 251 but fails to 
define what the subsequent process shall be. This non-deterministic perturbation of the 
4 Directive 2004/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on measuring 
instruments, OJ 2004 L 135/1-80 
5 N.3 above 
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process is a possibility for all areas of activity where Article 251 is the controlling 
process. For EC internal market technical legislation relating to the free movement of 
goods then Articles 251 and Article 250, together, still do not fully define the process 
since Article 95 requires a consultation with the Economic and Social Committee. 
Whilst this additional consultation is a process step beyond what is specified in Aliicle 
251 it at least has the benefit of being deterministic. Because of the unspecified effect 
on Article 251 by Article 250 it is reasonable to conclude that the Article 251 process is 
not deterministic. 
It would seem reasonable to expect that the set of languages that citizens may use to 
communicate with the EU institutions and the set of 'official languages and working 
languages' would be the same, so that the institutions' translation services would have 
one clear definition of what is required of them. As demonstrated in Section 2.2.4.3, 
these two sets of language are different. A difference of only one language between 
these two sets of language may not seem very great but the underlying cause of this 
difference is important. 
Article 314 (op. cit.) specifies twelve languages for which there are authentic copies of 
the treaties6. Article 21 (ex Article 8d) was modified, by Article 2(11) of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 7, to link citizens' rights to use the twelve languages specified in Article 314 
when communicating with the institutions. This change clearly requires the institutions 
to have competence in twelve languages and has been introduced in a way that appears 
to have taken no account of the authority that has existed via Article 217 of the Treaty 
of Rome8. This authority, re-affirmed by Article 290 of the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Communitl, provides for Council to determine the 
official languages and working languages of the European Community. Council's 
determination of the official languages and working languages lO lists only eleven 
languages. The drafters of the treaties have created a situation where, with apparent 
equal authority, two separate mechanisms exist where each of these mechanisms can 
determine the number of languages with which the institutions are required to have 
6 Section 2.2.4 explains the effect on languages of the May 2004 EU expansion. 
7 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, OJ 1997 C 340/33-184 
8 N.2 above 
9 N.3 above 
10 Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning 
the accession of new Member States to the European Union (95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC) OJ 1995 L 111-13 
243 
competence. While this example exhibits neither lack of clarity nor lack of determinism 
it is evidence of poor quality drafting that can lead to confusion. 
The processes of drafting amendments to the controlling treaties establishing the 
European Union and the Economic Community remain, to this author, unknown. It has 
not been an objective of this research to study these processes. Almost by accident the 
output from the processes, the treaties that establish the rules for use lower down the 
hierarchy, have been shown to lack clarity and determinism and to possess duality that 
can lead to confusion. This is an important finding because the treaties are at the 
pinnacle of the hierarchy of the processes and procedures that exist to control the 
generation of EC internal market technical legislation. From the top of the hierarchical 
structure of the EU and EC the message about acceptable levels of quality could be 
more positive. Those further down the hierarchy do not have the power, even ifthey 
have the will, to correct any fundamental errors and deficiencies. 
It is accepted that for some activities of the European Union, for example activities 
associated with the second and third pillars (Roney, 1998) some intentional lack of 
precision in the treaties may be an advantage. However, for the treaties to exhibit the 
characteristics described where the treaties define the top level of a legislative process 
is, at best, unhelpful and suggests that the processes involved in drafting the treaties are 
not well controlled. 
6.2.2 SECOND LEVEL INVOLVEMENT 
In addition to the function served by the treaties in establishing the top level procedure 
for the EC internal market technical legislative process the treaties described, and 
continue to describe 11, tasks common to several institutions and some of the important 
functions of the individual EC institutions. Also included in the Treaty are the 
requirements that the EC institutions adopt their own Rules of Procedure (op. cit). 
Section 3.2.3 identified the relevant Rules of Procedure and discussed some 
shOlicomings of those Rules of Procedure. It was found that in some instances there is 
much that is not readily accessible to the public. 
11 N.3 above 
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With the roles of the institutions as they are it could be expected that tensions between 
the institutions exist. However the institutions do have shared responsibility for the 
final output, new European legislation. Little cooperation has been evident in setting 
common standards for drafting, until recent years. The first formal recognition of this 
need appeared in the 1993 Council Resolution on the quality of drafting of Community 
legislationl2 . 
This Council Resolution was later incorporated, by reference to it, into Declaration 39 
of a series of Declarations appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam 13, a Declaration that 
was not rescinded by the Treaty ofNicel4 . Having been re-affirmed in this way there 
should be no doubt as to the continuing applicability of the Council Resolution to the 
EC institutions and to their officials. An extract from Clause 3 of the Council 
Resolution15 reads: ... the same term shall be used throughout to express the same 
concept; The earlier discussions on the common market, single market and internal 
market suggest that no real regard is paid by EC institutions to rules that are intended to 
govern their behaviour. Since 1993 the EC institutions, and the treaty drafters, have 
been obliged to use the same term for what is sometimes referred to as the internal 
market. 
Evidence of the continuing failure of the Council to comply with Article 24916 treaty 
provisions for the issue of Council decisions, by not addressing its decisions, was 
provided in Section 5.2.1.1 Further evidence of failure to comply with treaty 
provisions was advanced, Section 3.2.2.3, in relation to the Economic and Social 
Committee that has taken upon itself a re-naming to be the European Economic and 
Social Committee, a change not provided for by the Treaty. The exercise of the 
European Ombudsman's complaint system, reported in Section 4.3.2.4, demonstrates 
how the Commission too does not always show due regard for obligations legitimately 
placed upon them by other authorities. 
12 Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community legislation, OJ 1993 C 
16611 
\3 N.7 above 
14 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, OJ 2001 C 8011-87 
15 N.12 above 
16 N.3 above 
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With the evidence demonstrating that the EC institutions have some apparent disregard 
for the treaties it is not clear how external observers such as EC internal market 
practitioners are expected to know when any EC institution, or its officials, are 
operating ultra vires and perhaps should be challenged to justify their behaviour. 
The results reported in Table 5.26 show that 27.5 % of respondents to the structured 
interview offered the opinion that written guidance on the EC internal market technical 
legislative process would be an improvement that they would welcome. Guidance on a 
process that lacks determinism as a result of unauthorised deviations would, however, 
be of limited value. 
No evidence has been found to counter the evidence suggesting that the processes of the 
EC institutions are non-deterministic and at times ultra vires. Optimists might point to 
the European Ombudsman's intention (European Ombudsman, 2003), endorsed by the 
European Parliament, to follow up on those findings where a 'critical remark' was 
issued as evidence of process improvements to come. It is not yet possible to tell if the 
European Ombudsman and the European Parliament have the will, and authority, to 
force change for the better in the application of the EC institutions' systems. In the 
interim those EC internal market practitioners who may wish to engage with the 
legislative process should expect to deal with each proposal that they encounter in a 
reactive rather than proactive manner because predictions of how the process will 
unravel cannot be precise. 
6.2.3 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
INTERNAL MARKET 
Before looking at the strategic management of the EC it is helpful to understand where 
some problems for manufacturers arise. For ease of reference for this discussion Article 
14(2)17 is reproduced below: 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the Fee movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured 
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
17 N.3 above 
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From the perspective of EC internal market practitioners in general, and for 
manufacturers in particular, is the definition of the EC internal market provided by 
Article 14(2) both necessary and sufficient to create an internal market? This author 
would suggest that it is certainly a necessary condition but is not sufficient to create a 
genuine internal market. For simple goods such as ordinary wood/lead pencils Article 
14(2) is necessary and sufficient in that a manufacturer may move quantities of pencils 
within the internal market and when finally purchased by an end user the pencils may be 
used. 
For more complex goods, petrol pumps are a useful example, the right of unhindered 
movement across the EU exists as for other types of goods. However problems may be 
encountered in some Member States when it comes to installing and using the 
equipment because local regulations, legitimately in place under the provisions of 
Article 30 (op. cit.), prevent the use of the equipment, thereby negating the benefit of 
free movement. It has been shown that Article 14(2), while necessary for an internal 
market, is insufficient to create a true internal market. Manufacturers are then left with 
the dilemma of manufacturing different models for different Member States, which is 
not the intention of the internal market, or producing one model to the most stringent 
Member State requirements thus raising prices unnecessarily in some Member States. 
An intention of a unified market, the internal market, was to keep prices down. 
In the case of petrol pumps, discussed in the preceding paragraph, regulations in place 
in some Member States for Stage II Vapour Recovery, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, 
have a significant negative influence on the internal market. Here the problem was not 
initiated by the Member States but created by the Commission who, after some years of 
attempting to prepare a Stage II Vapour Recovery directive, declared that the local 
pollution problems associated with Stage II Vapour Recovery should be dealt with 
under the provisions of 'subsidiarity'. Under the provisions of subsidiarity the 
individual Member States are free to choose if any legislation is required and, if so, then 
also to choose what would be in the legislation. 
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Section 3.3.1 also noted the potential negative influence of individual Member State 
social legislation, such as the UK's Disability Discrimination Act18 on the EC internal 
market. 
In the foregoing it has been argued that Article 14(2), while a necessary condition for an 
EC internal market, is insufficient on its own to create an EC internal market. Each of 
Article 30 and the application ofthe principle of subsidiarity by the Commission may 
have effects contrary to the effective creation of the internal market. 
Manufacturers are obliged to work within the existing framework of legislation and it 
has been shown that this framework of legislation can cause a distortion, or 
fragmentation, of what is supposed to be one internal market. The strategy for the 
successful operation of the internal market thus appears to be one of relying on the skills 
of manufacturers to be aware of the needs of each Member State and of making 
available a basket of products to meet these needs. This apparent strategy is somewhat 
different from the expected strategy of legislation specifically designed to create a 
'lowest possible cost, one product fits all' internal market. 
6.2.4 MANAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS BY THE 
COMMISSION 
Within this Section reviews of four different aspects of the management of European 
Community affairs are discussed. 
6.2.4.1 Distortion of the internal market 
The EC internal market is a construct that has been agreed by the signatories of the 
treaties. The current Treaty19 maintains the previously established role of the 
Commission as the custodian of the treaties and of the collegiate nature of the 
Commissioners. The Treaty does not go on to define the internal working organisation 
of the Commission, this remains for the Commission to determine. Thus any criticisms 
of the internal organisational structure of the Commission are legitimately directed at 
the Commissioners rather than at the Treaty. 
18 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
19 N.3 above 
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Within Section 5.2.2 concerns were raised about the organisational structure within the 
Commission that provides for a Directorate General 'Enterprise' and a Directorate 
General 'Internal market', each responsible to different Commissioners, rather than an 
organisational structure with one Commissioner responsible for all aspects of the 
internal market. This concern is reinforced by information from the europa/Pre-lex 
website indicating that DG Health and DG Budget were consulted about the draft 
Measuring Instruments Directive (Commission, 2000) prepared by DG Enterprise but 
DG Internal market was not consulted. 
Accidental distortion of the internal market can occur as a result of social legislation, as 
discussed in Section 6.2.3 Expected cooperative links between Directorates General, 
for example from 'Enterprise' to 'Internal market', can be shown not to exist. There is, 
therefore, no reason to expect that robust links from other Directorates General to invite 
DG Internal market to vet proposals in non internal market legislative areas for possible 
effects on the internal market will exist. This research has been unable to identify any 
evidence of a robust system within the Commission intended to ensure that accidental 
distortions of the internal market are prevented - a requirement of Article 3(1)(g)(op. 
cit.) which requires' a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted '. 
6.2.4.2 Transposition deficit 
The failure of the Commission to act more positively to deal with the transposition 
deficit together with the acceptance of a non-zero transposition deficit target was seen 
as an indictment of the management of the internal market by the Commission. It is 
accepted that the situation regarding acceptable levels of transposition deficit might be 
confused by pronouncements from European Council meetings but it was shown in 
Section 5.2.2 that the Commission has the obligation, and powers, via Article 211 and 
Article 226 to uphold the Treaty (op. cit.) by instigating enforcement proceedings 
against Member States via the Court of Justice. 
Article 213 of the Treaty requires the Commission members to be of' ... general 
competence and whose independence is beyond doubt. ' and to be { ... completely 
independent in the pelformance of their duties. ' Despite this supposed independence 
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the management of Commission affairs appears to be affected by what is best described 
as political interference by Council. 
6.2.4.3 Other enforcement action 
Article 211 (op. cit.) includes the requirement that the Commission shall: 'ensure that 
the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto 
are applied; '. In Section 2.3.3.2 it was shown that Council repeatedly fails to comply 
with the requirements of Article 249 (op. cit.) by not addressing all of its decisions. No 
evidence has been found of the Commission taking action against the Council for this 
series of failures. On the basis of this lack of evidence the Commission appears to be 
guilty of failing in their role of maintaining the provisions of the Treaty. 
6.2.4.4 Notification 
Within Sections 3.3.1 and 5.2.2 there was discussion ofthe 'notification' system, a 
system designed to mitigate against the effects on the internal market of Member State 
national laws. Two deficiencies of this system were identified. The first arises from 
those Member State officials with some direct responsibility for the internal market not 
acting as they should. The second arises from a lack of knowledge of the notification 
system or lack of appreciation that Member State social or environmental legislation 
might distort the internal market. Even if Member State social or environmental 
legislation were notified to the Commission its possible distorting effects on the internal 
market might go unnoticed. 
6.2.5 ACTIVITIES OF THOSE OUTSIDE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
INSTITUTIONS 
Within this Section the activities of sections of the community outside of the European 
Community institutions are assessed for their involvement with the overall process. 
6.2.5.1 Internal market practitioners 
The research findings on the overall knowledge and perceptions held by EC internal 
market practitioners about the EC internal market and its legislative process are repOlied 
in detail in Section 5.2.3 Overall these findings suggest that EC internal market 
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practitioners are not well informed about the process and are, therefore, ill equipped to 
maximise their input to the process. Given that the findings shown in Figure 5.10 
suggest that the perception of EC internal market practitioners is that the EC internal 
market is very far from complete then perhaps more input from this group of 
practitioners could assist in the improvement of the functioning of the internal market. 
The data of Table 5.4 suggests that 'working with colleagues' is a significant training 
method for EC internal market practitioners. This, coupled with the overall finding that 
EC internal market practitioners are not well informed about the legislative process, 
suggest that the next generation of EC internal market practitioners may show little 
improvement over their mentors in knowledge of the legislative process. 
The concept of harmonised standards to underpin EC internal market technical 
legislation was brought about as a means to allow the legislation to become broader 
based, objective setting and hence easier to agree within the EC institutions. Thereafter 
standards bodies such as CEN, with open access for all internal market practitioners via 
their Member State national standards body, would prepare harmonised standards 
restricted to individual products or families of products. The level of support for 
standards in general and harmonised standards in patiicular, see Figures 5.15 and 5.16, 
was encouraging. However, less than 50% of respondents were fully aware of the 
'presumption of conformity' afforded by compliance with harmonised standards. 
6.2.5.2 The trade press 
The findings in relation to information on the EC internal market published by the trade 
press are repOlied in Section 5.2.2 Sufficient enoneous information was reported to 
suggest that EC internal market practitioners should be cautious in relying on 
uncolToborated statements obtained from the trade press. 
6.3 Conclusions about the research problem 
The research problem, fully described in Section 1.2, arose from the formalisation of 
concerns that had been developing as this author was undertaking his normal 
professional activities as an EC internal market practitioner. 
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From this research project it is reasonable to conclude that there are problems with the 
European Community internal market legislative process and with the current degree of 
completeness of the European Community internal market. The problems appear to 
arise in three main areas; the top level process description, the management of the 
process and the knowledge and understanding of the European Community internal 
market possessed by EC internal market practitioners. Within this framework a number 
of specific weaknesses can be itemised: 
1. Lack of clarity and determinism in the process as defined in the Treaty. 
2. Failure of the Commission to effectively enforce the Treaty against 
recalcitrant Member States and European Community institutions. 
3. Inappropriate management structure of, and control by, the Commission 
and Member States that allows the introduction of measures having 
negative influences on the European Community internal market. 
4. Failure of the Commission to make readily available for public access its 
lower level process information. 
5. Inadequate engagement with the European Community internal market 
technical legislative process by European Community internal market 
practitioners. 
6.4 Limitations 
This research, while complete in itself, must be put into context. In particular there are 
two limitations on the conclusions. The first concerns the fieldwork sample. This was 
restricted to UK European Community internal market practitioners. The results from 
this sample may not be typical of similar samples drawn from other Member States 
where training programs in support of professionals who become internal market 
practitioners may be different, leading to different levels of knowledge. Also the 
characteristic attitude of other Member State citizens towards the European Community 
in general may have an effect on the attitude of their EC internal market practitioners' 
perception of the completeness of the internal market. The second limitation relates to 
the findings about the clarity and determinism ofthe Treaty Cop. cit.). This research has 
been limited to a study of the legislation establishing the EC internal market for goods, 
albeit this involved a broader review of the Treaty to investigate language provisions 
within the European Union. This research has not provided any evidence to directly 
suggest that other parts of the Treaty suffer from the same lack of clarity and 
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determinism as identified in relation to the internal market and language. However the 
process deficiency identified by the possible interference of Article 250 (op. cit) with 
the Article 251 process will be common to other areas of the Treaty that invoke the 
Article 251 process. 
Possible ways to lift the limitations described above are offered in Section 6.5 
'Recommendations' and in Section 6.6 'Suggestions for further work'. 
6.5 Recommendations 
Within the body of the text some criticisms have been levelled at other commentators 
for identifying problems with the EC internal market legislative change process but 
failing to offer sufficient specific suggestions for improvement. Within the following 
Sections a number of specific recommendations are made to different groups of people 
in a manner intended to bring about improvement to the European Community internal 
market technical legislative process, to the process output (new approach internal 
market directives) and to other groups for their general improvement. 
6.5.1 TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MEMBER STATE LEGISLATORS 
1. Those parts of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community which delineate procedures, or may affect 
procedures, should be reviewed thoroughly with a view to proposing 
amendments to improve clarity and determinism. Consider the use of 
alternative methodologies for conveying process information. 
(Section 5.2.1.1) 
2. Introduce effective quality management systems, based on ISO 9000, 
into the European Community institutions, possibly based on an 
accreditation from, and continuing auditing by, the European 
Ombudsman. (Section 5.2.4) 
3. Review organisational structure of the Commission - with perhaps the 
appointment of one Commissioner with overall responsibility for all 
aspects of the European Community internal market. (Section 5.2.2) 
4. Improve enforcement of the Treaty - this should follow automatically 
from the introduction of 2. above. (Section 5.2.2) 
5. Review the current practice of 'directives' rather than 'regulations' for 
establishing the internal market and if seen as having advantages then 
propose any necessary amendments to the Treaty. (Section 5.2.2) 
6. Establish effective systems to protect the European Community internal 
market from threats posed by subsidiarity, social legislation and other 
legislation. (Section 5.2.2) 
7. Agree an improved arrangement for the use of languages within the 
European Community that preserves national heritage but recognises the 
burden of a large number of official languages and working languages. 
(Section 5.2.1.2) 
8. Make the European Community technical legislative process more 
inclusive of internal market practitioners, possibly via amendments to 
European Community institutions' Rules of Procedure - collectively the 
population of internal market practitioners are a significant resource. 
(Section 5.2.3.5) 
9. Improve stability of web sites , navigation to allow internal market 
practitioners to become familiar with them and then to make more use of 
them. (Section 5.2.1.1) 
10. Provide a website database of proposals being worked on at very early 
stages to facilitate engagement with all stages of the European 
Community technical legislative process by internal market 
practitioners. (Section 5.4) 
6.5.2 TO INTERNAL MARKET PRACTITIONERS 
1. Become better informed about the European Community internal market 
technical legislative process to enable more, and more informed, 
engagement with the process. (Section 5.2.3.2) 
2. Engage with the process of European Community internal market 
technical legislative process as much as possible, particularly at the early 
stages of proposals. 
(Section 5.2.2) 
3. Take every opportunity to make the European Community internal 
market technical legislative process more aware of problems that exist 
with the process or with its output to assist in generating improvement. 
(Section 5.2.3.5) 
6.5.3 TO COMMENTATORS 
1. Authors whose work appears in academic journals and books could do 
more to suggest changes to the Treaty to correct the underlying 
problems that are discussed rather than conjecturing on what might 
happen under the existing text. (Section 5.2.2) 
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2. Authors, and editors, whose work appears in the trade press should take 
greater care to validate the completeness and correctness of references 
to, and about, European Community internal market legislation. 
(Section 5.2.1) 
6.5.4 GENERAL 
1. Suggest to the Confederation of British Industry and to the Institute of 
Directors that publication of a handbook for internal market practitioners 
could provide an advantage to British industry. (Section 5.2.2) 
2. Introduce into UK undergraduate science/engineering courses 
compulsory modules on European Community internal market law. 
(Section 5.2.3.1) 
3. Introduce into UK undergraduate science/engineering courses 
compulsory modules on quality management systems. (Section 5.2.3.1, 
by extension of argument) 
6.6 Suggestions for further work 
Within this Section six suggestions for further work are offered based on the overall 
findings, conclusions and limitations of this research. 
1. Investigate why the Commission and internal market practitioners' 
views on the functioning, completeness, of the internal market are so 
divergent. 
2. Repeat the fieldwork in other Member States to determine if the data 
obtained from the purposive sample used for this study is different 
from that of similar purposive samples in other Member States. 
3. Identify the processes and procedures involved in the drafting of 
European Union and European Community treaties with a view to 
making improvements to better ensure high quality output from the 
processes and procedures. 
4. Investigate why females were under represented in the purposive 
sample. 
5. Investigate the effect on the European Community processes of follow 
up action on 'critical remarks' made by the European Ombudsman. 
6. Repeat the structured interview fieldwork in the UK as part of a 
longitudinal study to determine if the level of knowledge of the 
European Community technical legislative change process and the 
perceptions of the functioning of the internal market among UK 
internal market practitioners has changed. 
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6.7 Summary 
This research fully recognises that treaties are framework documents within which there 
may be imprecision. The Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (op. cit.) provides a framework for the European Community. Within this 
framework some Articles, where clarity and determinism might be expected, have been 
shown not to sufficiently exhibit these expected characteristics. The lack of clarity and 
determinism within these Articles creates ambiguity in the top-level process description. 
The management strategy of the Commission, with their initiating and executive role 
within the overall European Community institutional structure, exhibits weaknesses. It 
is suggested that the management strategy is not sufficiently clear and effective for 
maintaining and enhancing the internal market. This deficiency is of particular concern 
in view of the enlargement of the European Union and European Community with ten 
new Member States in 2004. Some of this deficiency may stem from the organisational 
structure of the Commission at the senior levels. 
The overall level of knowledge of the EC internal market technical legislative process 
exhibited by EC internal market practitioners was low. This may be explained in part 
by EC internal market practitioners not being proactive in engaging with the process. 
The responsibility for the effective operation of the EC internal market should not be 
seen as solely a domain for officials, engagement by informed EC internal market 
practitioners with the officials is likely to lead to improvement. The paucity of 
infOlmation about the EC internal market technical legislative process in both the trade 
press and in academic journals does not assist internal market practitioners to improve 
their knowledge. 
An attempt to improve on the existing European Community technical legislative 
process and the effectiveness of the EC internal market for the benefit of consumers and 
industry has been made by a series of recommendations. 
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APPENDIX I 
Chronological list of European Union and European Community 
major legislative events 
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INTRODUCTION 
I am a research student at Middlesex University Business School undertaking research 
related to European Community internal market technical legislation. This research has 
been divided into two sections: a literature review and practical research that requires 
the gathering of information from persons closely involved with EC internal market 
technical legislation. 
This Structured Interview is part of the information gathering process. The individual 
responses to the questions will remain confidential to me and to my research supervisors 
but they will be used in conjunction with the responses from other interviewees to help 
generate an overall picture. Excerpts from this interview may be made part of the final 
research report, but under no circumstances will your name or any identifYing 
characteristics be included in the report. 
Participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to answer any question and 
you are free to withdraw at any time. At any time during or after the interview you 
retain the right to retrospectively withdraw and for your data to be destroyed. At the 
end of the interview, if there are any questions that you would like to discuss further 
please identifY them. 
Are you prepared to proceed on the basis set out? Yes (1) No (2) 
Are you prepared to allow me to quote, anonymously, 
brief extracts from any of your responses? Yes (1) No (2) 
Date: ........................... . 
Do you wish to receive a report on 
the results of this pati of the research? Yes (1) No (2) 
A number of the questions in this interview require you to make a choice out of several 
options for your response. The different formats for these options were set out in the 
attachment to the introductory letter, it would be helpful if you had this attachment to 
hand as we go through the interview. 
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Part A: To establish the identity and role of the respondent, to 
understand some of the respondent's background and to 
obtain additional information about the respondent's 
organisation. 
A.1 Identification of respondent and contact details 
Name: 
Nationality: Sex: Male (1) 
Female (2) 
Department: 
Organisation: 
Address: 
Phone: 
Fax: 
e-mail: 
Date: 
A.2 How would you describe your role with regard to EC internal market technical 
legislation? 
Legislator (1) Some other role (2) 
A.3 How would you describe the level at which you operate? 
European 
Community (1) 
Member 
State (2) 
Local 
Authority (3) 
Some 
Other (4) .......... .. 
(Multinational Corp, UK Co etc) 
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A.4 If the answer to A.2 was not (1): How would you describe the role that you have 
with regard to EC internal market technical legislation? 
Enforcer (1) Manufacturer (2) Other (3) .................. .. 
(Standards, Consumer Group etc) 
To understand some of the respondent's background 
A.S In what general area was your initial professional education/training? 
Law (1) Science (2) Engineering (3) Other (4) .................... .. 
(Arts, languages etc) 
A.6 In your opinion should there be formal job related training for all jobs in your 
general class of employment? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) No (1) 
A.7 Looking beyond your professional background, how were you trained for your 
current job? Identify all that apply. 
A.7.1 Formally - courses (1) 
A.7.2 Working with colleague(s) (1) 
A.7.3 Written procedures (1) 
A.7.4 Other training (1) 
A.7.S Not trained (1) 
Comments: 
A.8 Have you received any specialist training in the understanding and/or interpretation 
of EC internal market technical legislation ? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to A.9 No (1) Go to A.8.2 
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A.S.I If the answer to A 8 was' Yes' : Please briefly describe the training received. 
Comments: 
A.S.2 If the answer to A8 was 'No': What would your opinion be if you were offered 
specialist training in the understanding and/or implementation of European Community 
internal market technical legislation? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
~ Very Pleased (5) Pleased (4) 
Neither 
pleased nor 
Displeased 
(3) 
Displeased 
(2) 
A.S.2.1 Please comment briefly on your answer to A8.2 
Comments: 
Very 
Displeased 
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
(0) 
A.9 Have you received specialist training about the European Community internal 
market technical legislative change process? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to A.IO No (1) Go to A.9.2 
A.9.1 If the answer to A9 was 'Yes': How would you describe this specialist training? 
Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Very Helpful (5) 
Neither 
Helpful nor 
Helpful Unhelpful 
(4) (3) 
Unhelpful 
(2) 
A.9.1.1 Briefly describe the specialist training: 
Comments: 
Go to A.IO 
Very 
Unhelpful 
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
(0) 
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A.9.2 If the answer to A.9 was 'No': What would your opinion be if offered specialist 
training about the European Community internal market technical legislative change 
process? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Very Pleased (5) Pleased (4) 
Neither 
Pleased nor 
Displeased 
(3) 
Displeased 
(2) 
Very 
Displeased 
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
(0) 
A.9.2.1 lfthe answer to A.9.2 was greater than (3): Please briefly describe how you 
think such specialist training could be of benefit. 
Comments: 
To obtain additional information about the respondent's 
organisation. 
A.IO How would you describe the products/services etc that your organisation deals 
with? 
Comments: 
A.n Which of the EC new approach technical harmonization directives can have an 
effect on your work? 
A.n.l Low voltage (1) A.n.6 EMC 
A.I1.2 Machinery (1 ) A.n.7 Simple Pressure 
A.n.3 ATEX (1) A.n.S NAWI 
A.I1.4 Pressure Equipment (1) A.n.9 Others 
A.n.S CPD (1) A.n.IO Total NATHDs 
List others: 
Telecomunications. 
New hot water boilers. 
Noise emission 
Active implantable medical devices. 
Personal protective equipment. 
Not applicable. 
No reply. 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
( ) 
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A.12 Is there any additional data about your own background or about the organisation 
that you work within that you consider should be taken into account in this research? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to B.l No (1) Go to B.l 
A.12.1 What is the additional data? 
Not applicable. 
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Part B: To assess the respondent's basic knowledge of the 
European Union institutions and of the European Community 
internal market technical legislative change processes. 
B.I Within the European Union there are several separate institutions. Which of these 
institutions can you name? 
B.LI Commission (1) B.L8 Other responses: 
B.L2 Committee of the Regions (1) ............. , ..... 
B.L3 Council (1) ........ , , ......... 
B.I.4 Court of Auditors (1) ................... 
B.LS Court of Justice and/or CFI (1) ........ , , ......... 
B.L6 Economic and Social Committee (1) ................... 
B.L 7 European Parliament (1) ................... 
B.L9 Total named ( ) B.LIO Total correct ( ) 
B.2 Within the European Union there are several separate institutions that playa part in 
the EC internal market technical legislative process. Which of these institutions can you 
name? 
B.2.1 Commission (1) B.2.S Other responses: 
B.2.2 Council (1) ..... , ............... 
B.2.3 Economic and Social Committee (1) ..................... 
B.2.4 European Parliament (1) ...................... 
B.2.6 Total named ( ) B.2.7 Total correct ( ) 
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B.3 How would you rate your knowledge of the processes by which people become 
members of each of the European Union institutions that playa part in the EC internal 
market technical legislative process? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
Neither 
Knowledge 
~ Full Partial Nor Mainly Complete Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance Ignorance (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.3.1 Commission: 
B.3.1.1 Commissioners (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.3.1.2 Officials (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.3.2 Council (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.3.3 Economic and Social Committee (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.3.4 European Parliament (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.4 For those answers to B.3.l to B.3.4 greater than (1): Please briefly describe your 
understanding of the processes. 
Comments: 
Commission 
Commissioners 
Officials 
Council 
ESC 
EP 
Commission 
- candidates by MS government - approved by EP 
- appointed by Commission - open competition or secondment 
- appropriate MS minister attends 
- candidates by MS government - appointed by Council 
- directly elected - in UK by PR from 10 June 1999 
Partially 
Correct Correct Incorrect No Reply Judgement 
B.4.1.1 Commissioners (3) (2) (1) (0) ( ) 
B.4.1.2 Officials (3) (2) (1) (0) ( ) 
B.4.2 Council (3) (2) (1) (0) ( ) 
B.4.3 ESC (3) (2) (1) (0) ( ) 
B.4.4 EP (3) (2) (1) (0) ( ) 
Judgement 
Self OVER assessment = '1' 
()th~rwk~ = '0' 
274 
B.S What is your opinion of the statement "The EC internal market technical legislative 
process is a process that is formally described somewhere"? Where would you place 
yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(I) 
B.S.1 How would you rate your knowledge, in general terms at least, of the EC internal 
market technical legislative process within the European Community? 
~ Full Knowledge (5) Partial Knowledge (4) 
Neither 
Knowledge 
Nor 
Ignorance 
(3) 
Mainly 
Ignorance 
(2) 
Complete 
Ignorance 
(I) 
B.S.2 The high level procedure of the EC internal market technical legislative process 
is formally described - where do you think that this formal description is to be found? 
Comments: The Treaties - Article 251 (189b) Noreply D 
B.S.2 Correct (3) Nearly correct (2) Incorrect (I) 
B.6 When there are proposals for EC internal market technical legislative change that 
might affect your organisation who do you see as having responsibility to ensure that 
these changes are known by you? 
Comments: Own responsibilityO Don't know D No reply D 
Someone else - who? Trade Association, organisation's management etc. D 
B.6.1 What is the route by which you usually become aware of proposals for EC 
internal market technical legislative change? 
Comments: 
MS Government. 
European Trade Association. 
National Trade Association. 
Other. 
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B.6.2 When you become aware of proposals for EC internal market technical 
legislative change that might affect your organisation, do you attempt to make technical 
input with the objective to modify the proposals for change? 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) Never (1) 
B. 7 Briefly describe what you understand to be the opportunities to input your views 
about proposals for EC internal market technical legislative change, with a view to 
attempting to modify the proposals for change: 
Comments: 
Where: MS officials 
Commission officials 
ESC Member(s) 
EP Member(s) 
MS MP(s) 
When: Commission working drafts 
Before Common Position 
After Common position 
B.8 How would you rate your understanding of the procedures within each of the 
European Union institutions that might be involved with the EC internal market 
technical legislative process? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
Neither 
~ Knowledge Full Partial Nor Mainly Complete Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance Ignorance (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.8.1 Commission (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.8.2 Council (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.8.3 Economic and Social Committee (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
B.8.4 European Parliament (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
276 
B.9 For each of the European Union institutions in B.8.1 thru B.8.4 with the answer 
greater than (1): Explain what you understand the procedure is and/or explain where 
the procedure may be obtained. 
Comments: 
Correct 
B.9.1 Commission (3) 
B.9.2 Council (3) 
B.9.3 ESC (3) 
B.9.4 EP (3) 
Partially 
Correct 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
(2) 
Incorrect No Reply Judgement 
(1) (0) ( ) 
(1) (0) ( ) 
(1) (0) ( ) 
(1) (0) ( ) 
Judgement 
Self OVER assessment = ' 1 ' 
Otherwise = '0' 
B.lO For European Community institution Members & Officials and Member 
State Officials. 
What is your opinion of the statement" Declaration 39 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (on 
the quality of drafting of legislation) has had a significant effect on your work of 
drafting EC internal market technical legislation"? Where would you place yourself on 
the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Not 
Aware 
(0) 
B.lO.l If the answer to B.lO is greater than (1): Briefly explain the effect(s). 
Comments: 
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B.ll Is there any additional data concerning your knowledge of the European Union 
institutions and ofthe European Community internal market technical legislative change 
process that you consider should be taken into account in this research? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to C.I No (1) Go to C.l 
B.11.1 What is the additional data? 
Not applicable. 
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Part C: To explore the respondent's perception of the internal 
market and opinion about enforcement regimes across the 
Member States of the European Community. 
Product 
C.l In your opinion has the EC internal market achieved its objectives of removing 
technical barriers to trade? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
~ 
Comments: 
All barriers 
removed 
(5) 
Most barriers 
removed 
(4) 
No 
opinion 
(3) 
Some ban'iers No barriers 
removed removed 
(2) (1) 
C.2 What is your opinion of the statement "EC type examination documents and 
manufacturers' Declarations of Conformity generated in one Member State are 
accepted in all other Member States without problems". Where would you place 
yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
C.3 What is your opinion ofthe statement "For any given product there are no 
differences of technical requirements between Member States". Where would you place 
yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
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C.4 What is your opinion of the statement "All technical requirements for all products 
are covered by EC internal market technical harmonisation directives". Where would 
you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
C.S What is your opinion of the statement "The introduction of new, or modified 
directives, never provides any problems". Where would you place yourself on the 
scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
C.6 What is your opinion of the statement "Some aspects of EC internal market new 
approach technical harmonization directives are more difficult to deal with than others" 
Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Support (5) SUppOlt (4) 
Neither 
SUppOlt nor 
Oppose 
(3) 
Oppose 
(2) 
Strongly 
Oppose 
(1) Go to C.7 
C.6.1 If the answer to C.6 was greater than (1): Identify those difficult aspects. 
Comments: 
Variable conformity attestation methods. 
Failure to comply with drafting rules. 
Difficult language - translations. 
Sheer volume of words 
Others: 
Go to C.6.2 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
No comment 0 
C.6.2 In your experience are the difficult aspects that you have just described similar 
from one directive to another directive? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) No (1) Not applicable (0) 
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C.7 What is your opinion of the statement "More recent EC internal market technical 
legislation is simpler than earlier EC internal market technical legislation "? Where 
would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
C.7.1 Please comment on your answer to C.7 
Comments: 
Enforcement 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
C.8 What is your opinion of the statement "Within any given Member State there are 
no variations in installation and use requirements". Where would you place yourself on 
the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
C.9 How often do you have a need to see the enactment of EC internal market technical 
harmonisation directives in one or more Member States? Where would you place 
yourself on the scale: 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) Never (1) 
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C.9.1 If the answer to C.9 was greater than (1): Please briefly describe how you obtain 
copies of Member State enactments of EC internal market technical harmonisation 
directives. 
Comments: Trade associations; MS governments; associated companies; the Commission. 
Not applicable (0) 
Don't know 
No reply 
C.9.2 If C.9.1 has been answered: Are you satisfied with the process that you have 
described? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) Never (1) Not applicable (0) 
C.9.3 If the answer to C.9.2 was less than (5): Please outline what you would see as a 
satisfactory alternative process. 
Comments: 
All enactments of all directives available in all official languages from Commission. 
All enactments of all directives available in EN, FR & DE as for CEN. 
As above available via internet. 
References available via internet. 
Don't know. 
No reply 
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C.IO What is your opinion of the statement "Enforcement regimes, for any given EC 
internal market technical harmonisation directive, are the same in all Member States"? 
Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Comments: No comment D 
Differing requirements for conformity attestation - (cat2/3 etc in ATEX). 
Complaint driven or proactive enforcement. 
Level penalties for infringement. 
C.11 For any given EC internal market technical harmonisation directive, how do you 
learn about the enforcement regime in any given Member State? 
Comments: 
Rely on trade association briefings. 
Make direct enquiry of MS government. 
Read MS enactment. 
EIC/Chamber of Trade. 
Associated companies. 
Ad hoc. 
C.12 If the answer to C.lO was greater than (2): What is your opinion of the statement 
"Differences, real and/or perceived, in enforcement regimes for any given EC internal 
market technical harmonisation directive give cause for concern"? Where would you 
place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
(0) 
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C.13 Have you ever contacted the Commission directly for information on enforcement 
regimes of EC internal market technical harmonisation directives in Member States 
other than your own? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to C.l4 No (1) GotoC.l4 
C.13.l If the answer to C.l3 was 'Yes': Please comment on the Commission's 
response to your enquiry. 
Comments: 
C.l4 Is there any additional data concerning your perception of the internal market or 
you opinion about enforcement regimes across the Member States of the European 
Community that you consider should be taken into account in this research? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to D.l No (1) Go to D.l 
C.l4.l What is the additional data? 
Not applicable. 
Part D: To explore the respondent's understanding of 
harmonised standards. 
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D.l What is your opinion of the statement "All relevant standards are of value". Where 
would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
D.1.l What is your opinion of the statement "European standards are of value in relation 
to internal market new approach technical harmonization directives"? Where would 
you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
D.1.2 Please comment on your answer to D.1 
Comment: 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
D.2 Within the European Union the term 'harmonized standard' has a particular 
meaning - 'harmonized standards' have a special status. How would you rate your 
knowledge of this status? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
Neither 
~ Knowledge Full Partial Nor Mainly Complete Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance Ignorance (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
D.2.l If the answer to D.2 was greater than (1) please briefly describe this status: 
Comments: Provide a presumption of conformity 
Judgement 
Self OVER assessment = ' 1 ' 
Otherwise = '0' 
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D.3 How would you rate your knowledge of which standards bodies are authorised to 
prepare 'harmonized standards'? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
Neither 
~ Knowledge Full Partial Nor Mainly Complete Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance Ignorance (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
D.4 If the answer to D.3 Was greater than (1): Please identify those standards bodies 
that are authorised to prepare 'harmonized standards': 
D.4 Not applicable (0) 
D.4.1 CEN (1) D.4.3 ETSI (1) 
D.4.2 Cenelec (1) D.4.4 No opinion (1) D.4.S Number Correct ( ) 
D.S How would you rate your knowledge of how the standards bodies that are 
authorised to prepare 'harmonized standards' get their authority to do this work? Where 
would you place yourself on the scale: 
Neither 
~ Knowledge Full Partial Nor Mainly Complete Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance Ignorance 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
D.S.1 If the answer to D.5 was greater than (1): Please identify where the standards 
bodies that are authorised to prepare 'harmonized standards' get this authority: 
D.S.2 Comments: Directive 98/34/EC (83/189/EEC) or possibly individual directives (MID). 
Judgement 
Self OVER assessment = '1 ' 
Otherwise = '0' 
D.6 Do you purchase all European standards that are relevant to your work? 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) 
D.7 Do you use all European standards that are relevant to your work? 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) 
Never 
(1) 
Never 
(1) 
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D.8 Where relevant non-mandatory 'harmonized standards' are available do you use 
them? 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) Never (1) 
D.9 Does your organisation respond to relevant drafts that are issued for public 
comment from the European and National standards bodies? 
o Always (5) Often (4) No opinion (3) Rarely (2) Never (1) 
D.lO How would you rate your knowledge of the process by which a European 
standard can attain the special status of 'harmonized standard'? Where would you place 
yourself on the scale: 
Neither 
rJ Knowledge Full Partial Nor Mainly Complete Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance Ignorance (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
D.lO.l If the answer to D.lO was greater than (1): Please briefly describe your 
understanding of the process. 
D.I0.2 Comments: 
Mandate 
Prepare standard 
Approval within Commission 
Publish nationally 
Publish reference to standard in OJ 
Judgement 
Self OVER assessment = ' I ' 
Otherwise = '0' 
D.ll Is there any additional data about harmonised standards that you consider should 
be taken into account in this research? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to E.1 No (1) GotoE.1 
D.ll.l What is the additional data? 
Not applicable. 
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Part E: Suggestions for improvements to the processes 
E.1 In addition to the points discussed earlier, can you suggest anything that you think 
would improve the overall EC internal market technical legislative process? o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to E.2 No (1) Go to E.2 
E.1.1 If the answer to E.l was 'Yes': Please outline the suggestion(s). 
Comments: 
Remember technical legislative change in EC means all the way down to Member State 
implementations. 
E.2 What would your opinion be if all users of EC internal market technical legislation 
(Enforcers, manufacturers, consumer groups etc) were to be given active roles in the 
technical legislative change process? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Support 
(5) 
Support 
(4) 
Neither 
Support nor 
Oppose 
(3) 
Oppose 
(2) 
Strongly 
Oppose 
(1) 
E.2.1 Briefly describe perceived advantages/disadvantages of such involvement: 
Comments: 
E.3 Do you understand the difference between EC directives and EC regulations? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) Go to EA No (1) Go to EA 
E.3.1 If the answer to E.3 was 'Yes' please briefly explain the difference between 
directives and regulations. 
E.3.2 Comments: 
Judgement 
Self OVER assessment = '1' 
Otherwise = '0' 
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E.4 If the answer to E.3 was 'Yes': What is your opinion of the statement "The 
objectives of the EC internal market would be achieved more completely if the technical 
harmonisation was in the form ofEC regulations instead ofEC directives". Where 
would you place yourself on the scale: 
o Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
(0) 
E.5 Do you have any suggestions as to how enforcement information on EC internal 
market technical harmonisation directives in other Member States could be made more 
generally available? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to F.l No (1) Go to F.l 
E.5.1 If the answer to E.5 was 'Yes': Please elaborate the suggestion(s). 
Comments: Not applicable D No reply D 
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This final part of the Structured Interview is not critical to the 
main thrust of the research but will provide much useful 
supplementary information to support the main research if you 
can spare the time for its completion. 
Part F: Miscellaneous 
F.1 Is your organisation a member of any trade association(s)? 
0 Yes Don't know No Not applicable 
F.lo1 National (3) (2) (1) (0) 
F.lo2 European (3) (2) (1) (0) 
F.lo3 International (3) (2) (1) (0) 
F.lo4 For 'Yes' answers to F.l.l and/or F.1.2 and/or F.1.3 please provide details. 
Comments: 
F.2 Do you know of any web sites that provide access to information from, and about, 
the European Union institutions? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) Go to F.3 No (1) Go to FJ 
F.2.1 If the answer to F.2 was 'Yes': What website addresses do you know that 
provide access to information from, and about, the European Union institutions via the 
internet? 
Comments: 
europa.eu.int - OJs 
europarl.eu.int 
curia.eu.int - Commission 
ue.eu.int - Council 
Job specification and procedures. 
F.3 Is there a clear, written job specification for your job function? 
o Yes (3) Don'tknow (2) GotoFA No (1) Go to FA 
F.3.1 If the answer to F.3 was 'Yes': Do you have a copy of the written job 
specification? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) No (1) Not applicable (0) 
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F4 Are there any written process descriptions for your job, possibly included in some 
form of quality manual, that must be followed? o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to F.5 No (1) Go to F.5 
F.4.1 If the answer to FA was 'Yes': Do you have ready access to a copy? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) No (1) Not applicable (0) 
F.4.2 If the answer to FA was 'Yes': Do you have your own copy? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) No (1) Not applicable (0) 
F.S Does your organisation have any general policy statements, other than any 'mission 
statement', to which you must adhere? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) Go to F.6 No (1) Go toF.6 
F.S.1 If the answer to F.5 was 'Yes': Do you have copies of any general policy 
statements, other than any 'mission statement', to which you must adhere? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) No (1) Not applicable (0) 
F.S.2 Ifthe answer to F.5 was 'Yes' please outline these statements. 
Comments: Code of conduct D Ethics policy D No reply D 
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F.6 It is likely that your work is governed, to some extent at least, by internally or 
externally produced written regulations, policy statements, processes or procedures. If a 
new written regulation, policy statement, process or procedure is produced, or an 
existing one is modified, how would you become aware of it? 
Comment: 
UK government administrative procedures. 
Treaties - Amsterdam? 
EC Regulation, directive or decision. 
From ISO 9000 audits. 
No reply. 
Quality management systems 
F.7 Does any part of your organisation have ISO 9000 Series Quality Management 
System accreditation? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) No (1) 
F.7.1 Does your department have its own ISO 9000 Series Quality Management 
System accreditation? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) Go to F.7.2 No (1) Go to F.7.2 
Not applicable (0) 
F.7.1.1 If the answer to F7.1 was 'Yes': Which ISO 9000 Series Quality Management 
System accreditation does your depaliment have? 
Not applicable (0) ISO 9001 (1) ISO 9002 (2) ISO 9003 (3) Don't know (4) 
F.7.2 Does the wider organisation of which you are part have ISO 9000 Series Quality 
Management System accreditation that encompasses your department? 
o Yes (3) Don't know (2) Go to F.7.3 No (1) Go to F.7.3 Not applicable (0) 
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F.7.2.1 If the answer to F.7.2 was 'Yes': Which ISO 9000 Series Quality Management 
System accreditation does your wider organisation have? 
Not applicable (0) ISO 9001 (1) ISO 9002 (2) ISO 9003 (3) Don't Know (4) 
F.7.3 If either your department and/or the wider organisation encompassing your 
department have ISO 9000 series Quality Management System accreditation, do you 
know why the accreditation was obtained? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to F.7.4 No (1) Go to F.7.4 Not applicable (0) 
F.7.3.1 If the answer to F.7.3 was 'Yes': Please explain the reason(s). 
Comments: No reply 0 
F.7.4 Design Control! 
Either - if there is ISO 9001 accreditation applicable to the respondent's department: 
F.7.4.1 As your department is covered by an ISO 9001 accreditation then what does 
your Quality Manual say about clause 4.4 Design Control? 
Or - if there is no ISO 9000 series accreditation applicable to the respondent's 
department: 
F.7.4.2 As your department is not covered by an ISO 9001 accreditation then how do 
you ensure that you keep abreast of the statutory rules governing your work? 
Comments: F.7.4.1 or F.7.4.2 
Do you thinl{ your system really worl{s? 
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F.7.S If there is ISO 9000 Series accreditation: 
F.7.S.1 How would you describe the value of the ISO 9000 series accreditation to your 
depmiment? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o 
Not applicable (0) 
Strongly 
Support 
(1) 
Support 
(2) 
Neither 
Support nor 
Oppose 
(3) 
Oppose 
(4) 
Strongly 
Oppose 
(5) 
F.7.S.2 How would you describe the value of the ISO 9000 series accreditation to the 
wider organisation? Where would you place yourself on the scale: 
o 
Not applicable (0) 
Comments: 
Strongly 
SUppOlt 
(1) 
Support 
(2) 
Neither 
Support nor 
Oppose 
(3) 
Oppose 
(4) 
F.S Does your organisation carry out benchmarking studies? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to F.9 No (1) Go to F.9 
Strongly 
Oppose 
(5) 
F.S.1 Can you describe the outcomes and/or benefits of these benchmarking studies? 
Not applicable. 
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F.9 Is there any additional data that you consider should be taken into account in this 
research? 
o Yes (3) No opinion (2) Go to F.IO No (1) Go to F.IO 
F.9.1 What is the additional data? 
Not applicable. 
F.I0 Who else do you think I should interview for this research? 
Comments: 
F.ll Do you have any questions related to this interview? 
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T.C.Rogers 
'Brereton', Lower Marine Parade, Dovercourt, Harwich, Essex C012 3SR 
phoneljax 01255 - 508 054 e-mail terry.froghoppers@Btopenworld.com 
My Ref: Intra-letter 
Your Ref: 
Dear 
I am a research student at Middlesex University Business School undertaking research 
related to European Community internal market technical legislation. This research has 
been divided into two sections: a literature review and practical research that requires 
the gathering of information from persons closely involved with EC internal market 
technical legislation. 
This Structured Interview is part of the information gathering process. The individual 
responses to the questions will remain confidential to me and to my research supervisors 
but they will be used in conjunction with the responses from other interviewees to help 
generate an overall picture. Excerpts from this interview may be made part of the final 
research report, but under no circumstances will your name or any identifying 
characteristics be included in the report. 
Participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to answer any question and 
you are free to withdraw at any time. At any time during or after the interview you 
retain the right to retrospectively withdraw and for your data to be destroyed. At the 
end of the interview, ifthere are any questions that you would like to discuss further 
please identify them. 
A number of the questions in this interview require you to make a choice out of several 
options for your response. The different formats for these options are set out in the 
attachment to this introductory letter, it would be helpful if you had this attachment to 
hand as we go through the interview. 
Yours sincerely 
T.C.Rogers 
STYLE 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
T.e.Rogers 
23/04/00 
Attachment to Introductory Letter. 
FORMAT 
No opinion 
Yes or No 
Don't know 
Always Often No opinion Rarely 
Neither 
Very Pleased nor 
Pleased Pleased Displeased Displeased 
Neither 
Very Helpful nor 
Helpful Helpful Unhelpful Unhelpful 
Neither 
Strongly Agree nor 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Strongly Support nor 
Support Support Oppose Oppose 
Neither 
Knowledge 
Full Partial Nor Mainly 
Knowledge Knowledge Ignorance Ignorance 
All barriers Most barriers No Some barriers 
removed removed opinion removed 
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Never 
Very 
Displeased 
Very 
Unhelpful 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Complete 
Ignorance 
No barriers 
removed 

TRAINING IN LEGAL DRAFTING 
At the Commission it was decided that the training in legal drafting called for by the 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on common guidelines for the 
quality of drafting of Community legislation would be given by the Commission's 
Legal Revisers themselves. The Council is taking a similar approach, while the 
European Parliament relies on external experts for its training. 
A number of the Commission's Legal Revisers have been given courses in training 
techniques. They have now started giving the actual drafting training. 
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In the first instance the Legal Revisers are giving introductory courses largely centred 
around the Joint Practical Guide. The immediate aims are to: 
explain the background to the concern for the quality of drafting which led 
to the Interinstitutional Agreement; 
introduce drafters to all the different rules and principles applying to the 
drafting of Community legislation and explain how they interrelate; 
consider the effects of multilingualism; 
examine the structure of a typical act, identify the specific rules applying to 
each part of an act and see how those patts fit together; 
consider other drafting topics of concern to each group of trainees. 
The courses are, in the first instance, being given to the Directorate Generals and the 
Services which are most often involved in the legislative process. They will then be 
offered to other departments. 
As the next stage it is planned to offer more advanced courses focussing on the actual 
texts produced by the departments. 
The materials issued to participants in the courses are chiefly the Interinstitutional 
Agreement and the Joint Practical Guide themselves. 
Trainees are also given a list of the various rules applying and the sources of guidance, a 
copy of which is atmexed. 
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Annex 
RULES ON DRAFTING 
1. Interinstitutional rules 
Declaration No 39 on the quality of the drafting of Community legislation, adopted 
by the Amsterdam Conference in 1997 (OJ C 340,10.11.1997, p.139) 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on common guidelines for the 
quality of drafting of Community legislation (OJ C 73, 17.3.1999, p.1) 
Joint Practical Guide 
(Signed on 16 March 2000) Accessible from Europateam or from: http://www.cc.cec/sj/ 
2. Commission rules and guidance 
Horne page of the Commission's legal revisers: 
http://www.cc.cec/sj/jurrev/homejren.htm 
Rules on legislative drafting (RTL), 1997 edition (new edition in preparation): 
http://www.cc.cec/sj/jurrev/eniindex.htm 
Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
(OJ L 308,8.12.2000, p.26) 
Guide to the implementation of directives based on the new approach and the 
global approach, European Commission 
On-line version: http://europa.eu.int/comm.lenterprise/newapproachllegislation.htm 
3. Council rules and guidance 
Rules of Procedure of the Council 
(OJ L 149,23.6.2000, p.21) 
Manual of precedents, drawn up by the Legal/linguistic experts of the Council 
(2001 version) 
Member States' Initiatives, Guidelines of the Council Legal Service 
(September 2000) 
4. Other guidance 
Interinstitutional style guide, 1997 edition 
In particular for guidance for style and presentation: 
http://wwww.europateam.cc.cec/eur-op/code/enienc.htm 
Style guides issued by the Commission's Translation Service 
The Guide to Better European Regulation, Cabinet Office of the United Kingdom 
http://www . cabinet-
office.gov.uk/regulationiEurope/The%20Guide%20To%20Better%20Regulation.pdf 
d ('D (') -.
 
[J
J. 
-
.
 
o
 ~ 
THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN 
Mr T. C. ROGERS 'Brereton' 
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JACOB 
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Decision on complaint 708/2000/(IJH)BB against the European Commission 
Dear Mr Rogers, 
On 1 June 2000, you made a complaint to the European Ombudsman concerning 
alleged failure by the European Commission to publish the list of all committees 
which assist the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers, as 
required by Council Decision 1999/4681EC'. 
On 18 July 2000, I forwarded the complaint to the President of the European 
Commission. The Commission sent its opinion on 26 October 2000 and I 
forwarded it to you with an invitation to make observations, which you sent on 
19 November 2000. 
I am writing now to let you know the results of the inquiries that have been 
made. 
THE COMPLAINT 
The complainant complains that the Commission has not yet published the list of 
all committees which assist the Commission in the exercise of its implementing 
power (i.e. comitology committees), as required by Council Decision 
1999/468IEC. The list should have been published by January 2000. 
I OJ L 184, 17/07/1999 p. 23-26. 
The European Ombudsman 
avenue du President Robert Schuman F-67001 S rRASBO( IZC; CC Tel. +3 - ".(())s58 17.2 s. 13 - Fax. +? 
i.tOj3;s8. ! 7 Website hup:/Juww.curo-c~mhuclsman.>u,ii}t E-mail: curo-
umbudsmmO~'curry>arl.ru-i~u 
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THE INQUIRY 
The Commission's opinion 
The Commission in its opinion made the following points: 
As regards the background, Article 7(4) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of28 
June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission states that, « The Commission shall, within six 
months of the date on which this Decision takes effect, publish in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities, a list of all committees which assist the 
Commission in the exercise of implementing powers. This list shall specify, in 
relation to each committee, the basic instrument(s) under which the committee is 
established}}. Article 10 states that the Decision will take effect « on the day 
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities ». It was published on 17 July 1999. 
The list in question was actually published in Official Journal No C 225 of 8 
August 2000. 
The Commission wished to point out that it is always especially anxious to 
implement legislation scrupulously and correctly, particularly in view of the role 
conferred on it under the Treaty. It was also concerned to ensure as much 
transparency as possible. In this respect it should be pointed out that, over and 
above the obligations laid down in the Decision, the list published in the Official 
Journal indicated the applicable committee procedures and the publication 
references of the instruments in question. 
As the case involved implementing a provision in a legislative instrument, the 
Commission was in fact faced with a complex task, which it finally succeeded in 
accomplishing. 
Many reasons can be given for the delay; the Commission merely wished to 
stress three points: 
The scope of the task encompassed several thousand legislative instruments 
adopted over a period of decades; furthermore, those instruments relate to 
different responsibilities assigned to various committees under legislation 
that has been adopted and amended throughout the history of the 
European Communities; 
In particular, the exercise involved, first, distinguishing - from among the many 
tasks assigned to each of the committees - those tasks which came under the 
implementing powers conferred by the legislator on the Commission (the object 
of the Council Decision) from those which did not; and, second, settling a 
number of questions of legal interpretation which arose as a result; 
Last but not least, it is worth bearing in mind the circumstances in which the 
work was carried out, i.e. departmental reorganisation following the change of 
Commission and the reforms requested by the European Parliament, which 
naturally led to coordination problems between the various departments 
concerned. 
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The complainant's observations 
The complainant maintained his complaint and stated that he found the 
Commission's opinion totally unacceptable. The complainant made, in summary, 
the following points: 
Council Decision 1999/468 IEC sets out a timetable for action by the 
Commission. It was regrettable that the Commission failed to admit, up front and 
quite straightforwardly, that it had failed to meet the deadline for publication. 
The complainant noted the phrase « ... especially anxious to implement legislation 
scrupulously and correctly. ... ». According to the complainant there is no doubt 
that when applied to others, i.e. the Member States, the above phrase would be 
interpreted by the Commission as including implementation within the prescribed 
timescale. The inference here was that the timescale set by Council for the 
Commission did not apply. The complainant was not able to see any justified 
reason why this should be the case. 
The complainant found it impossible to believe that Council Decisions such as 
1999 I 468 IEC are adopted without the involvement and agreement of the 
Commission. If this was indeed the case then the Commission was guilty of one or 
the other, or possibly both, of the following: 
a) failure to recognise the magnitude of the task that it was being given and to 
assign sufficient resources to ensure completion on time; 
b) failure to manage the task effectively to a successful and timely completion. 
According to the complainant, the Commission appeared to be saying that 
requirements to comply with the law are, for an indeterminate period, not 
applicable to any organisation that is subject to a re-organisation when that re-
organisation was the result of a recent senior management change or the result of 
an imposition from outside the organisation. 
The Commission has the responsibility, under Treaty of Amsterdam Article 211, 
to « ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied ». 
The complainant was of the view that those responsible within the Commission 
for the failure to comply with Council Decision 1999/468/EC should be 
identified and held to account. 
THE DECISION 
1 Alleged failure to publish the list of all comitology committees, as 
required by Council Decision 1999/ 468/EC 
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1.1 The complainant alleges failure by the European Commission to publish 
the list of all committees, which assist the Commission in the exercise of its 
implementing powers, as required by Council Decision 1999/ 468/EC. 
1.2 Article 7(4) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying 
down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on 
the Commission provides that « The Commission shall, within six months of 
the date on which this Decision takes effect, publish in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities, a list of all committees which assist the 
Commission in the exercise of implementing powers. This list shall specify, 
in relation to each committee, the basic instrument(s) under which the 
committee is established}}. Article 10 provides that the Decision will take 
effect « on the day following that of its publication in the OjJi cial Journal 
of the European Communities 
1.3 The Ombudsman notes that Council Decision 1999/468/EC was 
published on 17 July 1999 and took effect on 18 July 1999 and, therefore, 
the list of all comitology committees should have been published by 
January 2000. 
1.4 The Commission in its opinion stated that the above mentioned list was 
published in Official Journal No C 225 of 8 August 2000. 
1.5 The Commission gives in its opinion three particular reasons explaining the 
delay in publishing the above-mentioned list. Firstly, the scope of the task 
encompassed several thousand legislative instruments adopted over a 
period of decades. Secondly, the exercise involved, distinguishing those 
tasks which came under the implementing powers conferred by the 
legislator on the Commission from those which did not and settling a 
number of questions of legal interpretation which arose as a result. Thirdly, 
the circumstances in which the work was carried out, i.e. departmental 
reorganisation following the change of Commission and the reforms 
requested by the European Parliament, which naturally led to coordination 
problems between the various departments concerned. 
1.6 The Ombudsman concludes that based on Article 7 (4) of Council Decision 
1999/468/EC the Commission had a legal obligation to publish the list of 
all comitology committees by January 2000. The Commission published the 
abovementioned list only on 8 August 2000 with a delay of over six 
months. By not publishing the list of all comitology committees as required 
by Council Decision 1999/468 /EC, the Commission has failed to act in 
accordance with a rule which is binding upon it. Therefore, the 
Ombudsman finds an instance of maladministration by the Commission. 
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1.7 The above mentioned failure is binding upon the Commission as an 
institution. The legal obligation is an obligation of the European 
Commission. The European Ombudsman does not find it justified seeking 
to identify or to hold to account possible individuals. 
2 Conclusion 
On the basis of the Ombudsman's inquiries into this complaint, it is necessary to 
make the following critical remark: 
The Ombudsman concludes that based on Article 7 (4) of Council Decision 
1999/468/EC the Commission had a legal obligation to publish the list of 
all comitology committees by January 2000. The Commission published the 
above-mentioned list only on 8 August 2000 with a delay of over six 
months. By not publishing the list of all comitology committees as required 
by Council Decision 1999/468 IEC, the Commission has failed to act in 
accordance with a rule which is binding upon it. Therefore, the 
Ombudsman finds an instance of maladministration by the Commission. 
Given that this aspect of the case concerns procedures relating to specific events 
in the past, it is not appropriate to pursue a friendly settlement of the matter. The 
Ombudsman therefore closes the case. 
The President of the Commission will also be informed of this decision. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jacob SODERMAN 
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